DISCARDED
ST. BENEDICT THE MOOR
CATHOLIC
MISSION
MILWAUKEE, WIS.

The Catholic
Theological Union
LIBRARY
Chicago, Ill.

FR 107. V86 85-771

FRANCISCAN PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION

OTHER SYMPOSIA

THE CLASSICS edited by Rev. Felix M. Kirsch, O.M.Cap., Ph.D., Litt.D.

FRANCISCAN EDUCATION edited by Rev. Felix M. Kirsch, O.M.Cap., Ph.D. Litt.D.

FRANCISCAN PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION

A SYMPOSIUM OF ESSAYS

WITHDRAWN

EDITED BY

CLAUDE L. VOGEL, O. M. CAP., A. M., PH. D.

CAPUCHIN COLLEGE, CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA



THE BRUCE PUBLISHING COMPANY

MILWAUKEE



273
B26
V

Cum Permissu Superiorum

Nihil Obstat
H. B. RIES
Censor Librorum

Imprimatur
✠ ALPHONSUS STRITCH
Archiepiscopus Milwauchiensis

December 10, 1930.

7705
DISCARDED

Copyright, 1930
CLAUDE L. VOGEL

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Province of St. Joseph
Capuchin-Franciscan Libr.
Mt. Calvary, Wisconsin
FR
107
V86

INTRODUCTION

Man is by nature a philosopher, intent on finding the causes of things. Even in primitive times, when the maxim, *primum vivere deinde philosophare,* was preëminently his guiding principle, the philosophic instinct was everywhere fostered. The ancient peoples of the Orient, the Babylonians and Assyrians, the Egyptians and the Chinese, the Hindus and the Persians, all had their philosophers, their lovers of wisdom, whose philosophic speculations have in their own limited way contributed to the advancement of philosophy. With Plato and Aristotle, the two master minds of Greece, ancient philosophy reached its zenith only to become the solid groundwork for the philosophy of the Christian Schools. In the deft hands of the Fathers, of an Origen, an Augustine, a Cyril of Alexandria, philosophy was shorn of its pagan dross as these enlightened teachers discerningly rejected whatever could not stand the test of reason reënforced by the light of faith. Then came Scholasticism, the golden age of philosophy, when all that had gone before was taken up and developed well-nigh to perfection. Bonaventure, Thomas of Aquin, Scotus, and a host of other schoolmen have played major parts in developing and perfecting the earlier systems of philosophic thought.

It is, indeed, remarkable that throughout the long years of philosophic investigation, the ultimate object of man's quest was God. "Know thyself," said Socrates, and he meant: Know thy limitations, thy dependence on the Higher Power; know thyself to control thyself, that thou mayest live in harmony with the Supreme Power above. To Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, the highest types of pagan teachers, this was the ultimate object, the very essence of true knowledge. Nor do we find any other ultimate object in the philosophic efforts of the great teachers of Christianity. The Fathers, the Scholastics, the greatest philosophers of Christian times, also regarded God as the object *par excellence* of their philosophic search. Their contemplation of the heavens, of the mountains, of the ocean, of nature with its myriad mysteries, led them ultimately to the throne of the Creator where, filled with the consciousness of His majestic power, they uttered that cry of amazement and wonder: "Great is the Lord and exceedingly to be praised, and of His greatness there is no end."

Nor should we wonder at this lofty human achievement, this natural

ascent of the human mind to God. Man unaided by faith is truly capable of such an ascent. For every natural cognition three things are requisite, e. g., a cognizable object, a faculty of cognition, and a union of the two. Now, the *ens, verum, bonum* are all cognizable objects of the intellect, while the intellect itself is a faculty of cognition. Therefore, when united as a subject with its object, our intellect can certainly cognize not only the *ens, verum, bonum,* but also God Who is the *Supremum Ens, Verum, et Bonum.* Of course, we do not claim for the intellect here on earth, an immediate intuition of the Divine Essence as the Ontologists assert, but merely a mediate or indirect cognition which results from first apprehending the visible world, and thence ascending to a knowledge of God as its Creator. In the words of Pope Leo XIII: "This great and noble fruit is gathered from human reason, that it demonstrates that God *is;* for by the greatness of the beauty and of the creature the Creator of them may be seen so as to be known thereby."

In thus tracing all creatures to the Divine Essence, in using created things as stepping-stones to God, we are but cultivating a natural instinct to arrive at the Highest Truth. Great men of every age have pursued this natural theology and have ordered their lives according to its inescapable conclusions. History speaks of the high type of pagan who, as a result of finding God, rose at least in theory, above native selfishness, sensuality, and barbarity. But since divine revelation has shed additional light on the conclusions of reason, it was only to be expected that a nobler type of humanity would succeed the pagan of old. And in the judgment of many, St. Francis of Assisi, in the high degree of Gospel perfection he attained, is the nearest approach to Christ, the ideal of all perfection. Francis did not, it is true, establish a system of philosophy in the technical sense, but in the opinion of Etienne Gilson, the learned author of the essay, *St. François et la Pensée Médiévale,* the saint *inspired* a whole philosophy by the attitude he took toward the world.

Someone has called, St. Francis, "the dream of the Fathers that has become ostensibly true." There is truth in this statement. For, if we study the personality of Francis, we shall find in it all the highest intellectual conclusions of the Fathers as though he had studied all their writings and made it his purpose to realize them in his life. He lived in conformity with right reason, his life being the

perfect expression of reason's highest attainments enlightened by faith. He believed in God and lived a life fully, I might even say, greedily in keeping with his deep convictions. And his world-attitude or world-view he successfully bequeathed to other great minds among his followers, notably Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales, Scotus, and others. Open the ponderous volumes of St. Bonaventure and read how the world is made of *vestigia, imagines,* and *similitudines* of God. Our own spiritual ascension to God (*Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*), in the mind of Bonaventure, passes through six successive stages, viz., sense, imagination, reason, intellection (primary understanding), intelligence, and the *synderesis* in which intelligence and love unite to produce not only the image but the very similitude of God.

This, in general, is the thesis of the Franciscan School—all things are vestiges of God and by following them we ascend gradually to God. Francis is rightly considered the inspiration of his School, for even though he wrote no philosophy, still may we not ask with Gilson: Would the great Franciscan schoolmen have been what they were had Francis never lived? With Gilson, we venture an emphatic, No. For, conscious of his memory, and inspired by his example, the Franciscan schoolmen focused their attention on their founder as the subject of their meditations; they synthesized his lessons into a genuine doctrine which tempered subsequent medieval thought. In this sense, then, the Saint of Assisi is a philosopher whose influence on the world-view will be felt for all time.

The contrast between the great philosophers of medieval and even ancient times and the philosophers of the modern era is a sharp one. Philosophy emptied of its age-old ultimate is now the order of the day. Following in the wake of Kant, Descartes, and their adherents, the savants of the new system reject the naturally-proved personal God and thus become more pagan than the pagan of old. Philosophers of today are only too busy caricaturing and discarding the well-tried theistic arguments that have meant so much in the philosophy of the past. The following statement of William James is typical of the views held by Drake, Hocking, Leuba, Otto, Alexander, and a host of other contemporaries who are warring against the traditional belief in a personal God:

"The theological machinery that spoke so livingly to our ancestors, with its finite age of the world, its creation out of nothing, its juridical

morality and eschatology, its relish for rewards and punishments, its treatment of God as an external contriver, an intelligent and moral governor, sounds as odd to most of us as if it were some outlandish savage religion. The vaster vistas which scientific evolutionism has opened, and the rising tide of social democratic ideals, have changed the type of our imagination, and the older monarchical theism is obsolete or obsolescent."—*A Pluralistic Universe* (New York, 1909), p. 124.

That philosophy such as this is making its rounds in non-Catholic universities, in current philosophic magazines, and is consequently affecting the lives of the people, is beyond all doubt. One should imagine that the chaos, intellectual and moral, into which it has plunged its followers, would be sufficient cause for its rejection. But having cast aside revelation which proves that God is knowable from creation, these godless philosophers have gone further and discarded reason as their guide. Without reason, inconsistency, subjectivism, and materialism must necessarily follow. If the spiritual, personal God be expelled from the mansion of philosophy, the spiritual, immortal soul of man must also be cast out. If there be no realm of spirit, perfect and eternal, then there can be but a realm of matter, corrupt and temporary. Consequently, there can be no sanction for the moral law, no hope of adequate reward, no fear of merited punishment. If such atheistic philosophy be true, human life can be nothing more than a ceaseless and futile effort to discover the laws of nature so that man might become perfect master of his nature and destiny. Such was the dream of Faust.

In dealing with the subject of philosophy, the Franciscan Educational Conference, true to the injunctions of Pope Leo XIII, has not thrown aside " the patrimony of ancient wisdom," but has followed the sanest traditions of the past. If in any of the papers or discussions views contrary to those of the older Scholastics are expressed, such conclusions have been dictated by sound reason as a result of scientific progress made with the centuries. With the hope of aiding in some small way the Neo-Scholastic Movement which, as a safe and sound philosophy, must have God as its ultimate end, the present volume containing the papers and discussions presented at the Twelfth Meeting, are herewith published.

CLAUDE L. VOGEL, O.M.Cap.

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION v

THE FRANCISCAN SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY by *Fr. James O'Mahony, O.M.Cap., B.D., Ph.D.* 1

COÖRDINATION OF THE VARIOUS PARTS OF PHILOSOPHY by *Fr. Gerard Schmalz, O.F.M., Lect. Phil.* 18

TEACHING THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY by *Fr. Claude Mindorff, O.F.M., Lect. Jub. Phil.* 41

HOW CAN WE VITALIZE OUR COURSE OF PHILOSOPHY AND MAKE IT MEET CONTEMPORARY MODES OF THOUGHT? by *Fr. Edwin Dorzweiler, O.M.Cap., A.M.* 50

METHODS IN TEACHING PHILOSOPHY by *Fr. Berard Vogt, O.F.M., Ph.D.* 64

THE CORRELATION OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY by *Fr. Hubert Vecchierello, O.F.M., Ph.D.* 72

THE VALUE OF EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY by *Fr. James Van der Veldt, O.F.M., Ph.D.* 92

THE PHILOSOPHY CURRICULUM by *Fr. Cyprian Mensing, O.F.M., A.M., Ph.D.* 105

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN OUR COURSE OF PHILOSOPHY by *Fr. Cyprian Emanuel, O.F.M., Ph.D.* 117

THEODICY AND ETHICS by *Fr. David Baier, O.F.M., S.T.D.* 154

THE TEACHING OF EPISTEMOLOGY by *Fr. John Baptist Schunk, O.F.M., Lect. Phil.* 165

THE TEACHING OF ONTOLOGY by *Fr. Cuthbert Dittmeier, O.M.C., D.D., Ph.D.* 185

FRANCISCAN PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION

THE FRANCISCAN SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

Fr. James O'Mahony, O.M.Cap., B.D., Ph.D.

WHEN it was suggested that I should contribute a paper entitled *The Franciscan School of Philosophy,* I had some misgivings. To speak of a Franciscan philosophy without any reference to the philosophy of St. Thomas was unthinkable, and it was just possible that my remarks might prove displeasing to Thomists and Franciscans alike.

With no desire to displease, however, I am submitting the reflections which follow. These reflections are necessarily fragmentary. They do not pretend to be complete. They represent a sincere effort to touch on certain fundamental issues that must be faced before we can speak intelligently of a *Franciscan School of Philosophy.*

Is There a Franciscan School of Philosophy?

Obviously, the first question that must arise is bound up with the very title of this paper. Is there such a thing as a Franciscan School of Philosophy? Is there a known system of thought which may be characterized as philosophy and as Franciscan? Is there such an accord between outstanding Franciscan thinkers that they may be said really to form a Franciscan School of Philosophy? Where is this system of Franciscan philosophic thought to be found?[1]

The very moment such questions are broached, one is conscious of the difficulties they cover. Has any Franciscan come before the world to outline, even vaguely, the leading theses of Franciscan philosophy? Nor would it be sufficient so to outline the leading tenets of Franciscan thinkers; the soul and spirit of the Franciscan synthesis should be shown to animate the different theses that must pass both as Franciscan and as philosophy. I think you will

[1] The justice of this query will be recognized when we recall the recent controversies concerning the meaning of Scholastic philosophy itself. Cf. *Revue néo-Scholastique,* XXVII (1927), pp. 1-27; pp. 223-243. The leading theses of Thomistic philosophy have been frequently grouped together. Père Sertillanges, in his *S. Thomas d'Aquin,* 2 vols. (4° ed., Paris, 1925) and E. Gilson, *Thomism* (Cambridge, 1924), have given expositions.

agree with me that it is of very vital interest to look long and earnestly at certain ultimates before such a task can be undertaken or fittingly accomplished. The very breath and spirit of all philosophy is synthesis and unity. And before we can put before the world a Franciscan System of Philosophy we must have grasped what precisely is the unifying theme, the real *motif,* that governs the Franciscan quest for truth. The characteristically Franciscan attitude to the ultimate and elemental things of reality, of life and of knowledge must first shape and form itself before we can have a Franciscan School of Philosophy.

I

Franciscan Philosophy in a Wide Sense

If we take philosophy in its widest sense as an ultimate attitude to life we shall have little difficulty in speaking of a Franciscan philosophy. Every Franciscan is in this sense, whether he knows it or not, a philosopher: he has or ought to have, an ultimate and consistent outlook on life. St. Francis certainly had such an attitude: unerringly and with swift rapidity of vision he saw the unity and intelligibility of things in God and in Jesus Christ.[2] In that he was a true type of Christian philosopher.

It is not difficult to see that a true Franciscan philosophy would be simply the raising of this instinctive Franciscan attitude to the heights of consciousness. It would be a soul-attitude becoming conscious in the mind of a living Franciscan philosopher and finding expression in a system of thought which would touch on as many points as possible the complicated systems of reality and of life.

Franciscanism first a Form of Life then a Philosophy

Before Franciscanism became a philosophy, it was first a form of life, an attitude towards life dictated by the example of St. Francis. Knowledge is simply life coming to consciousness of itself, and when men had lived the Franciscan life in all its fullness, it was inevitable that they should seek to give to the world the intellectual expression of that life. The development of Franciscan life into Francis-

[2] For the necessity for Christian philosophy of apprehending the new unity of things in Jesus Christ, see my article, "Philosophy and Holiness," *Irish Ecclesiastical Record,* XXXI (1928), pp. 113-124.

can philosophy is just as normal and natural as the transformation of darkness into dawn. Life is ever struggling to express itself in thought; the dark unconscious side of the life process tends to become limpid and lightsome in the minds of men. Franciscan philosophy is merely Franciscan poetry grown conscious of itself, and Franciscan life viewing itself in the mirror of its own limpidity.

Much has been written of the Franciscan attitude towards science and learning, but when we recall this inherent urge of life towards consciousness, we are prepared to recognize that the instinctive life-poetry of the followers of St. Francis was not a more natural expression of the Franciscan spirit than was the *Itinerarium Mentis ad Deum* of St. Bonaventure. The same impulse is at work.[3]

Yet, there is one conclusion that emerges from these discussions on St. Francis and science which merits our attention. It is a conclusion which, I think, cannot be disputed. Briefly put, it comes to this, that for the follower of St. Francis the intellectual life of thought cannot be an end in itself, an end-in-chief. Those versed in the philosophy of St. Thomas will remember with what enthusiasm he speaks of thought and of intellect as the characteristic human faculty and of contemplation as the final end of man. But in this St. Thomas, besides exemplifying the Aristotelian influence on his system of philosophy, was viewing things in the abstract. It is only in the abstract that thought and knowledge can be sought for their own sakes. In the concrete, and St. Thomas was well aware of the fact, there is something greater in human living than thought or knowledge: there is love, whereby the whole soul is carried on towards the only end which is one and obligatory for all, the vision of God.

Attitude of St. Francis towards Science

Naturally, St. Francis kept before his mind man's actual destiny to a supernatural end. He never thought of the abstractions of philosophers. All he knew or cared to know, was that man's life must prove itself by action, and that knowledge in our present life is an instrument, not an end in itself.

Knowledge not an End but an Instrument

He was aware also, that knowledge, not

[3] This point is developed more at length in a little work to appear shortly, *The Franciscans*, London, Sheed and Ward.

tempered by love, might prove dangerous. Too many prided themselves on knowledge in his day, and felt themselves so rich in its possession, that he thought he would sacrifice it the better to follow Christ in the poverty of an unadorned mind. Not that St. Francis was unlettered or ignorant. Humanly speaking he was cultured, and from a mental point of view he possessed no mean resources. A life so full as that of St. Francis was in time bound to express itself not only in poetry of word or action, as with Francis himself, not only in preaching by word and example as with his first followers, but also in that high form of intellectual expression which is to be found in the writings of an Alexander of Hales, a St. Bonaventure, a Scotus, or the many other Franciscan writers who have added pages to the common book of Christian wisdom.

II

What is to be our method of approach to an understanding of the ultimates of a Franciscan philosophy? Frankly, I think the best approach is offered to us in Thomism. In the first place, this philosophy affords the best approach, if only for the simple reason that for many Christian thinkers it is the only possible approach. Many, very many, know something of the philosophy of St. Thomas for whom the philosophy of Franciscans is almost non-existent. For the uninitiated Thomistic philosophy represents an effort to give a systematic account of reality on a purely rational basis, whereas Franciscan philosophy seems to them to be merged in Christian theology.[4] But there is a further reason why Thomism offers an admirable approach to the thought of Franciscan writers. It is this: the integral system of St. Thomas is sufficiently wide and embracive to allow of sympathetic contact with the ultimate view-points of Franciscans. The significance of this remark will make itself clearer, I trust, in the course of the present essay. For the moment I am content to underline the word *integral* as applied to the system of St. Thomas.

Thomism the Best Approach to Franciscan Philosophy

[4] To what extent, however, even Thomism is regarded by modern thinkers as a mere confusion of philosophy and theology may be seen from Zybura, *Present Day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism*, 1926.

For there are more things in integral Thomism than many admirers of St. Thomas seem to realize.

That is why so many demur when there is explicit question of a Franciscan philosophy as such. If we are looking for a Franciscan School of Philosophy in the sense in which so many take it to-day, you need not be surprised that we do not find it. St. Thomas has been hailed as the first of modern philosophers, because for the first time in the history of Christian thought he distinguished clearly between reason and faith and marked off the precise frontiers of philosophy and theology.[5] To meet the requirements of modern thinkers who reject both faith and the supernatural, it was rather inevitable for Catholic philosophers to emphasize the fact that their philosophy stood on its own basis, with an autonomy of its own. But in our desire to meet our adversaries on their own ground, it has scarcely occurred to us that where St. Thomas placed a *distinction* we have been introducing a chasmed *separation* between reason and faith and between philosophy and theology. The net result has been that we are left with a completely "laicized" philosophy on our hands.

Modern Separation of Philosophy from Theology

I am not allotting praise or blame. I register facts. And the fact is that Catholic philosophers of to-day feel themselves bound to keep rigidly to the strict domain of reason. To put forward, even as hypotheses, the things of Faith in the lecture-room of philosophy will be resented more or less by the student of philosophy, a child of his time, indeed. In such an atmosphere it is comparatively easy to forget the debt of Christian philosophy to theology, to forget also that the mind of Aquinas was not the laicized mind of a philosopher *in statu naturae purae*.

These considerations, strong enough in themselves, are further intensified when linked up with another reflection of the deepest import. This reflection has not yet been given the attention it deserves. Elsewhere, I have attempted to show its full significance.[6] Here I shall content myself with pointing out that in the present atmosphere of philosophy we are very much tempted to

[5] Cf. E. Gilson, *Etudes de philosophie medievale*, Strasbourg, 1921. Preface.
[6] See *The Desire of God in the Philosophy of St. Thomas* (Cork: University Press, Longman's & Co.), pp. 36-42.

look upon philosophy as an organic and autonomous whole, a system which can be completed within the sphere of pure and natural reason. Those of my readers who have had to teach a course of moral philosophy will surmise at once the point of my remarks. They have had to speak of the really final end of all human action, and of a "natural end" prescribed by the ethics of natural reason, and must have frequently found themselves in that very embarrassing position of having to speak of an ultimate end (the vision of God) unattainable by reason, yet "naturally desired" by the human soul.[7] In a word, the intelligent teacher of moral philosophy must realize, sooner or later, that in the sphere of human action the natural frontiers of human thought (which autonomous philosophy seeks to make so rigid) are very fluctuating indeed.

St. Thomas and the Insufficiency of Philosophy

St. Thomas saw very clearly that, not only in the sphere of human action, but also in the sphere of human thought, these natural frontiers of human reason are not fixed and rigid. Consequently, he never made the mistake of looking upon philosophy as autonomous under every aspect, or as of itself completable within its own sphere. Philosophy declares its own insufficiency. Philosophy betrays the antinomy that is part of the human soul. The finite character of mind's natural acquisition of being cannot, and should not, blind us to the quasi-infinite *capacity* of intellect, the proper object of which is the transcendental and illimited object, being as such. The effort of philosophy to find in God the intelligible unity of all multiplicity gives the human mind a definite orientation towards the unfathomable mystery of God, and leaves man wondering as to his final destiny which is hidden in the sanctuary of God's Mind and Will.

Inadequacy of Philosophy the First Principle of Franciscan Philosophy

In view of this it is not difficult to see why I have proposed Thomism as the ideal approach to the study of Franciscan philosophy. St. Thomas, who is invoked as the forerunner of modern philosophers, shows very clearly the incomplete and insufficient character of philosophy in its own domain. Now this instinctively, as it were, has always been the source of Franciscan thought.

[7] Cf. S. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, la-IIae, Q. LXII, art. 1; *Ibid.*, Q. XII, art. 1.

The inadequacy of pure philosophy is, I should think, the first principle of Franciscan philosophy.

This is the first point I should like to make in this paper. Franciscan philosophy asserts the insufficiency of philosophy as a purely rational attempt to grasp reality, and this explains why, though admitting the distinction of philosophy and theology, Franciscan thought has always deprecated the *separation* of these two disciplines of the human mind.

But then the difficulty arises, is such a system of thought entitled to be termed *philosophy*?[8] Obviously, if we accept a very narrow and ultimately unjustifiable, concept of philosophy, we shall have to admit that a Franciscan philosophy is non-existent. But is it so? What modern thinker, for instance, will refuse to St. Augustine the title of philosopher? It is one thing to propound a systematization of the doctrines of faith, and another to propose faith as the sole reason for adhering to certain truths. The Franciscan philosopher sets his thought to work on the data of Faith. In that he philosophizes, and if he is thorough, he will naturally pass on to meet the arguments of his adversaries on their own grounds.[9] But when in addition, he shall have shown the fundamental inadequacy of philosophy in its own domain, he will be in an ideal position to justify his retaining both theology and philosophy in his world-view, while distinguishing, though not separating, one from the other. This I submit, is the first thing to be settled upon in the programme of a Franciscan School of Philosophy.

The Franciscan Philosopher a True Philosopher

III

A second matter to be dealt with concerns this same fundamental fact, of which we have been speaking, from another angle. I have just introduced the name of St. Augustine. Let me say immediately that this mention of St. Augustine was not at random. Franciscan philosophy, in so far as it

St. Augustine the Forerunner of Franciscan Philosophers

[8] A very interesting discussion might be opened on the precise meaning of *Christian Philosophy* as such. When Mr. Gilson spoke of the system of St. Bonaventure as a philosophic system certain writers objected, notably P. Mandonnet, in the *Bulletin Thomiste*, March, 1926, p. 54.

[9] As St. Thomas does, for instance, in the first three books of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. Cf. M. D. Chenu, O.P., La theologie comme science au XIIIe siècle, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, Paris, 1927, pp. 31-37.

is a thought-out system of nature and of life, is a philosophy whose real teacher is Augustine.

As you know, St. Augustine was the first to expound a speculative synthesis of Christian dogma. His philosophy passed down to the Middle Ages as a precious inheritance from the past. Before Aristotle began to be known in translations, in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the influence of St. Augustine was predominant. The Franciscan School — Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure and Duns Scotus—may be looked upon as the real successors of St. Augustine, taking up and continuing his fundamental doctrines. Fidelity to the Augustinian tradition may, indeed, be put forth as the outstanding characteristic of Franciscan thought.

Though St. Thomas is not completely immune from all influence of St. Augustine,[10] yet he represents a break with the old Augustinian tradition. He was an innovator. And while we moderns will admire the novelty and originality of Aquinas, we must remember that in the eyes of his contemporaries he was tampering, as it were, with sacrosanct traditions. Scarcely five years after his death, certain propositions of his were censored by E. Tempier, Bishop of Paris, and by Robert of Kirwaldy, Archbishop of Canterbury, and broadly speaking, the prohibitions of Paris and Canterbury touch precisely on these points wherein St. Thomas had departed from tradition. It is even yet more interesting to note that when in later times John Duns Scotus opposed certain teachings of St. Thomas, Scotus was really upholding the older type of philosophy which prevailed before the assimilation of Aristotle.[11] It is no exaggeration to say that Franciscan philosophy, when it reaches Scotus, is even still the development of a long sequence which goes back to St. Augustine.

St. Thomas an Innovator

It is of relatively minor interest for our purpose here to raise the many points of difference between the system of St. Thomas and Augustinism as it was transmitted by the Franciscans.

[10] Cf. M. Durantel, *Le retour a Dieu* (Paris), 1918, pp. 228 sqq.; also his work, *St. Thomas et le Pseudo-Davis*, Paris, 1919. In general, however, M. Durantel exaggerates the influence of Platonism on St. Thomas.

[11] See Prof. D. O'Keefe, *John Duns Scotus, Ireland's Tribute to St. Francis* (Dublin, 1928), pp. 23-40.

Franciscanism Similar to Augustinism

What is of real importance is to see how the Franciscan attitude in philosophy is traceable to St. Augustine's views of the rôle and function of philosophy in regard to life. What really characterizes St. Augustine's view of philosophy is just the concrete way in which he looked upon philosophy as an interpretation of life and of human living in all its vast significance. Philosophy, for St. Augustine, was not so much a theory of being, as a palpitating quest for the good. With him philosophy is predominantly a theory and interpretation of Action.[12]

To convince ourselves of this, we have merely to mention the central place assigned by St. Augustine to the problem of human happiness or beatitude. This problem was not for him one amongst many: it was *the* problem of philosophy. Philosophy was no abstract affair, no merely speculative rendering of life.[13] Philosophy was simply the highest form of life finding consciousness and expression in man's quest for that supreme object which would render fully and adequately intelligible human living itself. Plato's idea of seeking truth " with the whole soul " was also Augustine's. " But the true and highest good, according to Plato, is God, and therefore we would call him a philosopher who loves God; for philosophy is directed towards obtaining blessedness of life, and he who loves God is blessed in the enjoyment of God." [14] No one, thinks Augustine, can be so ignorant as not to know that philosophers profess to be seekers after wisdom,[15] and no matter what differ-

Emphasis of St. Augustine on the Problem of Human Beatitude

[12] M. Gilson refrains from designating the system of St. Augustine as a philosophy of action for the simple reason that action in the system of St. Augustine is action subordinate to contemplation. Cf. *L'introduction a l'étude de Saint Augustin*, p. 362. It is certain, however, that Augustine's chief interest is action. In that sense I employ the phrase. There is no intention of associating St. Augustine with modern philosophies of action, as we know them; no more, for instance, than of associating the voluntarism of Scotus with that of Schopenhauer.

[13] How far such a view is removed from certain interpreters of Thomism may be seen from the definition of philosophy given by M. J. Maritain in his *Introduction to Philosophy* (Sheed and Ward), p. 102, where he says: " Philosophy is not a 'wisdom' of conduct or practical life that consists in acting well. It is a wisdom whose nature consists essentially in *knowing*." I do not think that M. Maritain's definition does justice to the views of St. Thomas himself. Cf. *The Desire of God*, pp. 36-42.

[14] *De Civitate Dei*, Bk. VIII, 8.

[15] *Op. cit.*, Bk. VIII, 11.

ences there may be, all agree that life must have one end and aim.[16] In fact, the work of Varro containing so many theories of human happiness, which Augustine quoted so frequently in his *De Civitate Dei,* was entitled *Philosophia.* And the Saint quotes Varro with approval to the effect that there can be different philosophies only in so far as any particular school may be said to have a theory of its own on the end-in-chief of human living. "For man has no other reason for philosophizing than that he may be happy; but that which makes men happy is itself the supreme good." [17]

Typical Franciscan Attitudes in Philosophy

Remembering this emphasis of St. Augustine on human living, on action, we are well prepared for the proper understanding of certain typical Franciscan attitudes in philosophy. For St. Bonaventure philosophy has merely to render explicit the fundamental fact that the human soul is made for God, and cannot find rest until it reposes in Him.[18] Whatever St. Thomas might say of the value of knowledge for its own sake, no matter how he might theorize about a "natural" final end, St. Bonaventure knew that knowledge must be transfused with love, and that the one unique and obligatory destiny of man was supernatural. It was not that St. Bonaventure could not apprehend the distinction of faith and reason, of philosophy and theology, but that in the present order such a distinction was not a practical one. What was of importance for him was to take man as he is in the concrete with his wounded nature, his destiny sublime, and his mediator and teacher, Christ.[19] In this St. Bonaventure was thoroughly Franciscan. For him philosophy should take into consideration the actual state of man, and his present supernatural destiny.

In view of this we can also understand a certain emphasis of will and its place in life which is common to Franciscans. It has

[16] *Op. cit.*, Bk. XI, 25.
[17] *Op. cit.*, Bk. XIX, 1.
[18] Nata est anima ad percipiendum bonum infinitum, quod Deus est, et ideo in eo solo debet quiescere et eo frui—1 Sent., 1, 2, 3, concl., Vol. 1, p. 40. Cf. E. Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure* (Paris, 1924), pp. 99 ff.
[19] Cf. E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 91 ff.

always been the fashion, more or less, to oppose the voluntarism of Scotus, for instance, to the intellectualism of St. Thomas. There is little doubt that the opposition has been exaggerated.[20] But the real source of the differences which do exist between St. Thomas and Scotus on this point has not always been noticed. The fundamental difference of the Thomist and Franciscan attitudes in philosophy is overlooked. When St. Thomas emphasizes the priority of intellect, and the value of knowledge for its own sake, he is viewing things *in the abstract.* In the concrete, St. Thomas knew well, the love of God is better than the knowledge of Him, and that will, aided by grace, is the faculty of the soul's return to God.[21] But the Franciscans, men of action as they were, and interested in their theory of action, rather than of being, were very insistent on the will's prerogatives. I think Dante must have been having a quiet joke against the upholders of contemplation for its own sake when he put a certain lazy Florentine, Belacqua by name, in Purgatory. "I read in Aristotle," says Belacqua, "that it was only by sitting down and resting one became wise." Even a less ignoble reading of Aristotle would not have pleased Franciscans.[22]

Real Source of Differences between Thomistic Intellectualism and Scotistic Voluntarism

[20] Typical of a renewed interest in Scotus is the work of C. R. S. Harris, *Duns Scotus* (Oxford, 1927), 2 vols. It is doubtful if such an enthusiast for Scotus (he believes that in Scotus rather than in St. Thomas scholasticism reaches the highest point of its development) will enhance the value of Scotus as a philosopher in the eyes of scholars. He has no real grasp of Thomism; his knowledge of Scotus is defective. See the able article of Prof. D. O'Keefe, "John Duns Scotus," *Studies*, Vol. XVI (1927), pp. 564-578.

[21] A very exhaustive account of the Thomistic account of will and intellect, their inter-relations and interaction, will be found in Père Maréchal's work, *Le Point de Depart de la Metaphysique*, cahier V, Louvain, 1926.

[22] It would unduly lengthen this paper to develop this Franciscan interest in action as exemplified by the English Friar, Roger Bacon. Suffice it to say that in his critique of the many sources of error in science he forestalled his illustrious namesake, Lord Francis Bacon.

IV

I must content myself with a few concluding remarks. I have emphasized the Franciscan interest in action. Now I think that here precisely lie the weakness and the strength of Franciscan thought as an adequate philosophy. Whether or not it is that the Franciscans' interest in action has obscured their views on being, it seems possible to assert that the Franciscan School lacks a firm and consistent theory of being. It would be of great interest to give a clear exposition of St. Bonaventure's theory of being, for instance. And yet, I submit, the writer who undertakes such a work will have no small difficulty in interpreting the following passage from the *Itinerarium mentis ad Deum*. St. Bonaventure is speaking of the ascent of the mind to God when contemplating being: "Si igitur non-ens non potest intelligi nisi per ens, et ens in potentia nonnisi per ens in actu; et ens nominat ipsum purum actum esse; ens igitur est quod primus cadet in intellectu, et illud ens est quod est purus actus. Sed hoc non est ens particulare quod est ens arctatum, quia permixtum est cum potentia, nec ens analogum, quia minimo habet de actu, eo quod minimum est. Restat igitur quod illud ens est ens divinum." [23]

Firm and Consistent Theory of Being Lacking in the Franciscan School

I have no intention of attributing ontologism to St. Bonaventure. It is a solitary text, in the first place, and besides much has been written to exonerate him whom we all venerate. I select it merely as it seems to represent a rapidity of inference, natural in such a "God intoxicated mystic" as St. Bonaventure, but to be guarded against in philosophy.

Passing from St. Bonaventure to Duns Scotus, we have other difficulties in the Franciscan philosophy of being.[24] Scotus, to hazard an opinion, was really nearer to the Thomistic view of the analogy of being than Scotus himself thought. When he criticised the apparent equivocation he thought he saw in the Thomistic view, and sought to retain an intrinsic relation to being on the part of all participated forms of being, he was really covering ground, already covered by Aquinas.

Scotistic Doctrine of Being not Free of Confusions

[23] Cap. V, 3.

[24] The reader will find a very penetrating study of the concept of being in the philosophy of Scotus by my confrère, Fr. Hilary MacDonagh, O.M.Cap., "La notion d'être dans la Metaphysique de Duns Scot," *Revue neo-scolastique*, Nov. 1928, Feb. and March, 1929.

However that may be, it is true that the Scotist doctrine of being is not yet free from confusions, due either to Scotus himself, or his numerous commentators. It is imperative therefore for a Franciscan School of Philosophy to outline a consistent doctrine of being which will allow for the transcendental and analogical character of being as such, for only in that way can we have a consistent metaphysic of becoming and correspondingly consistent theory of knowledge.

Here also lies the strength of Franciscan philosophy for the future. St. Bonaventure saw no good in philosophy as separate from theology. He was very conscious of man's actual state, and of man's *de facto* elevation to a supernatural destiny. His real teacher, he held, was Christ, not Aristotle. St. Thomas was not less conscious of these fundamental truths, but he, in addition investigated the broader aspects of philosophy, thereby pushing back analysis to the point where mind can see a distinction clear and well-defined between reason and faith, between nature and the supernatural. But as there is a growing consciousness of the necessity for a philosophy which envisages present palpitating human life in all its fullness, the contact of the modern mind with the minds of the great Franciscan thinkers may be productive of much good. That vigorous thinker, Maurice Blondel, has been developing a philosophy that has much in common with St. Augustine and Franciscan philosophers.[25] And Father Cuthbert has but lately suggested a possible contact between modern philosophy and that eminent Capuchin philosopher, Valeriano Magno.[26] Modern philosophy has lost consciousness of its historical origins in Christian thought. To rediscover them, and perhaps through historical Franciscan thinkers, might prove the rediscovery of the way back to truth, and Christ Who is Truth itself.

In Keeping Philosophy and Theology Distinct but not Separate Lies the Strength of Franciscan Philosophy

[25] M. Blondel's best known work bears the significant title, *L'Action*. Cf. also *L'itinéraire philosophique de Maurice Blondel* (Bloud et Gay, 1927), and P. Archambault, *L'oeuvre philosophique de Maurice Blondel* (Paris, 1928).

[26] Cf. *The Capuchins*, Vol. II. See also Camillo Pellizzi, "Franciscan Thought and Modern Philosophy," *St. Francis of Assisi* (London University Press), pp. 193-218.

With this thought I shall conclude. For the function of philosophy, as St. Bonaventure puts it in his *Breviloquium*, is to lead man to God through all the ascending series of creation. But the God of Franciscan philosophy is Jesus Christ. He alone imparts full and final intelligibility to the general trend of the world's course, and to that ever aspiring, though sagging, life-process which appears in human thought and human love.

DISCUSSION

FR. EDWIN DORZWEILER, O.M.Cap.:—In the last few decades, fruitful researches have been made in Platonic Augustinism as it appeared in the flourishing period of Scholasticism, especially in the Franciscan School of thought. New light was thus shed upon a phase of medieval philosophy which heretofore was but little understood and appreciated. These studies led to the surprising discovery that Scholasticism was not synonymous with Aristotelianism and Thomism, but that the Franciscan trend of thought provided a happy complement of Aristotelian Thomism. This once more put in bold relief the characteristic individuality of the medieval thinkers.

Franciscanism

The most comprehensive representative of Augustinism was St. Bonaventure. Being a philosopher, theologian, and mystic, and the General of his order, and conversant with the teaching of Aristotle and Augustine, he determined for a long time to come the scientific and ascetical tendency of the great family of St. Francis. And in view of the modern leaning toward transcendence and mysticism, it is not surprising that the Seraphic Doctor should be made the subject of so many critical studies.

St. Bonaventure and Philosophy

What attitude does St. Bonaventure take to philosophy? Is philosophy, to his mind, an independent discipline? Can unassisted reason cognize a sufficient number of metaphysical principles so as to construct a system of certain conclusions? And if this is so, have there ever been philosophers who have grasped the truth in its entirety? These questions are ably treated by Professor Gilson of the Sorbonne, in his work, *La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventure* (Paris, 1924).[1]

This well known philosopher of our day does not only record the thought of Bonaventure, but also favors the philosophical outlook of the Franciscan thinker and mystic. He tells us that Bonaventure has no difficulty in making an essential distinction between philosophy and theology, for the truth and certitude of the former rest on the clear insight we have of things, while the truth and certitude of the latter spring from faith.

Even though it is granted that reason, in the abstract, can know certain truths of the natural order, it has so far brought to light but a mixture of truth and error—hence it is asked whether the mind of man, in the present state of existence, can develop anything like a complete body of truths without the gravest errors ever creeping in. Bonaventure believes that this is practically impossible, especially in matters of natural theology. He holds

---

[1] Translated into German by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., Hellerau, 1929.

that every true philosophy since Christ, is a rational thinking in the light of faith. Reason and faith assist and supplement one another.[2]

This attitude of mind, viewed in its historico-philosophical aspect, shows the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor as the completion of Augustinism. It was the natural and logical outcome of conservative Franciscanism, just as the Arabic and Aristotelian rationalism of the time naturally led to the Thomistic concept of philosophy with its emphasis on a pronounced difference between reason and faith.[3]

This same mentality can be observed in the teacher of Bonaventure. Alexander of Hales plainly felt the insufficiency of all human thought. Much as he admired Aristotle, he could not but notice the weakness and indistinctness of the philosopher with reference to the First Cause. Aristotle and the Arabian philosophers did indeed speak of a Supreme Being as a principle, but failed to behold in it the highest good. Alexander chose to follow Augustine and Anselm rather than the pagan thinkers. To him as well as to so many other Franciscans, these Christian philosophers had a decided advantage. They stood on the high mountain where no haziness obstructed the view, while Aristotle and his pagan followers lived in the valley below where many vapors made a clear vision difficult, if not impossible. The former looked out upon the world from the mountain of holiness, free from the drag of concupiscence and the pride of life; the latter lived in the valley of sin, which retards the mind in its ascent to the heights of truth. Alexander observed that human passion and prejudice interfered with correct vision; even where the eye was believed to be perfectly simple, self-deception was not excluded.[4] In line with this thought are the words of Professor Krogh of the University of Copenhagen. In an address before the Thirteenth International Physiological Congress, at Harvard University, August 19, 1929, he said: "We fondly imagine that we are impartial seekers after truth, but with a few exceptions, to which I know I do not belong, we are influenced and sometimes strongly by our personal bias, and we give our best thoughts to those ideas which we have to defend." [5]

Alexander of Hales and Philosophy

Franciscan thought is evidently coming back to favor. The name of Duns Scotus, but a few years back, was either a non-entity or a curiosity in our textbooks. A turn toward recognition and appreciation is apparent. Proof of this may be found in the recent work of Joseph Froebes, S.J., *Psychologia Speculativa.* Scotus comes in for frequent mention; he is ranked with the greatest of thinkers; and whenever there is a difference of opinion on any question, the author favors the solution advanced by the Subtle Doctor.

Scotus in Favor

Here are a few instances where the author adopts the opinion of Scotus in preference to any other. In the question whether sensation is a purely passive process or also an active one, Froebes prefers the opinion of Scotus and holds that it is also distinctly active. In a similar way, the Scotists, and Froebes with them, teach over against the Thomists, that the primitive idea comes about not by a mere reception but by an activity of the thinking subject. In connection with the object best adapted to the human intellect, many Thomists held that we can also cognize the material substance together with the accidents. Following Scotus, Froebes contends that strictly speak-

---

[2] Cf. Stephen Gilson, *Der. Hl. Bonaventura,* pp. 151, 152.
[3] Cf. B. Jansen, S.J., in *Stimmen der Zeit,* Bd. 118 (1930), pp. 454, 455.
[4] Cf. *Opera Omnia Alexandri a ales,* Vol. I, Prolegomena in S. T., ad finem.
[5] *Science* (August 30, 1929), p. 203.

ing our intellect is restricted to the sensible qualities for its proportionate object of cognition. In agreement with the majority of modern neo-Scholastics, the author of the *Psychologia Speculativa* propounds the Scotistic doctrine that the human mind can have direct and immediate cognition of singular material things. The plurality of forms, an old Scotistic tenet, which has become popular again in recent times, is ably defended in this up-to-date textbook.

FR. SIMON JOSEPH ARCHAMBAULT, O.F.M.:—Different from an entirely intellectualistic philosophy which borrows its materials of thought from distinct perception and concepts abstracted by immediate apprehension, Franciscan Augustinianism seeks to demonstrate that, over the closed field of explicit thought, where acts follow ideas, we find an implicit knowledge in which ideas originate from inherent tendencies and practical experiences. The study of these intrinsic relations widens the broad horizon of religious psychology, for this is the normal crossroad of speculative and ascetico-mystical theology. Whoever directs his explorations across this psychological province, contributes to the development of both theologies.

Philosophy from the Franciscan Viewpoint

According to the idea of philosophy from the Franciscan point of view, beings are mainly what they do. Thus conceived, *philosophy has less an object to investigate than a task to carry out.*

The problem whose end and importance must draw our attention, is thus enunciated: Does philosophy work with its own resources in search of a theoretical and sufficient solution of all the questions brought along by life and thought? Or must not philosophy acknowledge its intrinsic inability, and try to help to determine the conditions of a complete destiny which exceeds its speculative capacity?

Who fails to see the importance of such a problem, the seriousness of such an alternative? With the first conception, philosophy tends to the apotheosis of abstractive thought. The other conception, without treading upon the rights of reason, safeguards the rôle of all the faculties, that of spontaneity and of sentiment, that of will and of generosity, that of grace and of faith.

Franciscan thought is a principle of life whose strength and fecundity have been manifested by speculation in a synthetic and differentiated doctrine. It is a principle that individual experience has proved by sanctity. Human society has been favored with it in works of the apostolate. Its existence has preceded literary form. In St. Francis we must first study the spirit which has vitalized and marked his work. There is a progressive maturation in Franciscan thought, but ripening on, it has never varied.

God the Total Object of Franciscan Thought

Just because Franciscan thought owed nothing to books, and was not checked by theories, it was brought into immediate contact with its total object. God, the world, and his own personal being Francis received as they presented themselves. And what characterizes his thought—his theoretical and practical knowledge of God, of the world and of himself—is precisely that intimate acceptation of reality, that adapting to all reality, notwithstanding the difficulties which may burden the mind through the vastness and complexity of its object.

With our philosophers, reality must precede system. Life is neither symmetrical nor systematic. And if they, for the benefit of the public, must adopt a system, they follow St. Augustine *who has seen and believed;* not Aristotle who could just see, and only partially at that.

In reality, Christ is the Center of Creation, as His Cross is the center of

history. If such is the present and concrete fact, which will be the most logical, scientific, and Christian attitude—that which judges and speculates as if the supernatural world did not exist; or that which reasons and lives accepting the presence of revealed data and their value in truth and life?

After the Encyclical Letter "*Studiorum Ducem*" (June 29, 1923), no reasonable doubt can be cast on the perfect orthodoxy of the Franciscan School.

Excessive Intellectualism of the Action Française

On the other hand, where there is excessive intellectualism, there may be imminent danger for our faith. We know that *Maurras*, the supra-intellectualist leader of the *Action Française* was called "a Catholic atheist." We know also that, a short time before Pius XI fulminated his condemnation against the *Action Française*, members of that association, who were students at the *Institut Catholique* in Paris, wrote the following to *Maurras*: "Your method is a perfectly secure and human method. . . . Is it not that upon which Aristotle has founded his speculation; does it not appear at the origin of Thomist philosophy?"

We do not claim infallibility for our system, but we prefer it to an exclusively intellectualist system; for we mean to reach Truth, that is God, *with all our soul.*

We do not despise the humble services of the senses, nor of the faculties inferior to reason. Still less do we refuse the sanctifying intuitions of the heart and the enlightening tendencies of the will.

COÖRDINATION OF THE VARIOUS PARTS OF PHILOSOPHY

Fr. Gerard Schmalz, O.F.M., Lect. Phil.

Looking through our manuals of Scholastic Philosophy one will generally find the entire matter treated there, divided into Speculative and Practical Philosophy, the former comprising ontology or general metaphysics, cosmology, psychology, theodicy; the latter, logic and ethics. This division of philosophy, however, is not Scholastic in the sense that it comes down to us from the schoolmen; it has its origin in the early eighteenth century. By coördination of the various parts of philosophy is meant here, the arranging of the above-named philosophical disciplines in such order as will be at once logical and practical.

To determine in what sequence the various parts of philosophy should be arranged and presented to the students, is not a trivial matter, but rather one of great importance. There must be method in the imparting of any kind of knowledge; this must then be the case also with respect to philosophy, and here all the more, since philosophy holds a position so important and so eminent among all the branches of human knowledge. Writers of textbooks of philosophy, and teachers of philosophy must take special notice of this matter, since it is of primary interest to them.

Where there are several parts, several arrangements of them are also possible; and the greater the number of parts, the greater, too, is the number of possible arrangements. It is evident, then, that there are many possible arrangements of the parts of philosophy, and they will naturally vary according to the aim and object one has in mind when undertaking the task. Evidently this is not merely a problem of mathematics; it is an educational problem involving not only philosophy, but also, and especially sound pedagogics. Two points must be looked to and kept in mind very clearly and strongly when attempting a solution of the problem of coördinating the parts of philosophy, *viz.*, the doctrinal content of these parts, and the minds of the students. Sound logic and

Guiding Factors

sound psychology must be the guiding factors: the former, to look after the interests of philosophy, in order to bring together what belongs together, in a natural, logical sequence; the latter, to respect the interests of the students, in order to accommodate the matter and the sequence to their mental capacity, bearing in mind, too, the natural progression in the acquisition of knowledge, *viz.*, building up on what the students already know, and then progressing from the easy to the difficult, from the concrete to the abstract, from the less abstract to the more abstract, etc.

It is not the purpose of this paper to enumerate and evaluate all the attempts that have been and are being made in this matter. What various authors of textbooks, and writers on subjects philosophical have said concerning the coördination of the parts of philosophy, may be read in their books and writings, and, no doubt, is already known to you. The object of this paper is rather a practical one, and it is directed primarily to the members of the Franciscan Educational Conference now in session here. I shall, however, mention one of the possible arrangements, one which is widely known and nearly universally in use for many years. According to this the parts of philosophy are presented in this order: Dialectics, epistemology, ontology, cosmology, psychology, theodicy, ethics. This arrangement may be called traditional, in the sense that it is found in very many of the texts which, for many years back, were written for the philosophical curriculum in our Catholic schools and seminaries, and it is still found in a goodly number of manuals that are being published in our own days. The reason for making special mention of this arrangement is the fact that the Franciscan Educational Conference, in its first meeting held at St. Louis in July, 1919, went on record for it, accepting it for our curriculum of philosophy, and it still is on record. Most of our textbooks of Scholastic Philosophy presented this order of parts and, I think, this was the reason for its official adoption.

The Traditional Coördination

It is surprising that authors of textbooks and teachers of Scholastic Philosophy have for so long a time and so tenaciously adhered to this arrangement. That it is not the very best is evident from the fact that educators, for some years back, have been trying to get away from it, and to find and substitute a more satisfactory one in its place. Here and there changes have already

been introduced. What can be said for and against this traditional coördination of the parts of philosophy has been, I think, briefly, yet sufficiently and correctly stated by Rev. Claude Mindorff, O.F.M., in a paper read at the above-mentioned meeting of the F. E. C., which paper appeared later in the Report of that meeting and can be found there. There is no reason for my restating what has been so well and ably said. Leaving other defects for discussion in this meeting, I shall mention only one, the one that always seemed to me greater and more objectionable than all the others.

A General Defect

It seems to me, that as long as we keep the traditional parts of philosophy, *viz.*, dialectics, epistemology, ontology, etc., we shall have on our hands a very difficult problem to arrange them in any order that will rationally satisfy the thinking mind of the teacher and perfectly suit the mental capacity of the students. I think, the whole matter of those parts can and should be eliminated. What we should try to coördinate is not *those parts,* but the *doctrinal content of philosophy.* Along the lines of those parts, whether coördinated correctly or otherwise, the students very easily, yes, almost necessarily get the impression that they are learning dialectics, epistemology, ontology, etc. The impression, however, which they should get very easily and very clearly, is that they are learning *philosophy.* This method of breaking philosophy into seven or eight parts, and rounding off each one as a complete unit all by itself and within itself, very easily and naturally leads the students on to forget that they are getting philosophy, even after they have learned the definition of philosophy, explained at great length in the first classes of the course.

Is Philosophy Merely a Name?

In fact, one may doubt whether philosophy is really a distinct science. May it not be merely one name for various sciences, each of which is a distinct and complete unit? Permit me to cite a passage by Very Rev. J. B. Hogan, S.S., D.D., *Clerical Studies* (2nd ed., Boston: Marlier & Company, Limited), p. 22:

> It may be fairly questioned whether there exists between them [i. e., the traditional parts of philosophy] a sufficiently close connection to gather them all under a single denomination. A conception which aims at embracing things so unlike has always something artificial and strained about it. Psychology is as much a distinct science as Physi-

> ology. Logic has as independent an existence as Algebra. Aesthetics and Ethics develop side by side without interference, almost without contact. Perhaps it might be said that Philosophy, as commonly understood, represents, like our knowledge of Nature, a group of sciences rather than a unit among them.

To my mind, this opinion is singular and exceptional, at least as far as print is concerned. But it is the statement of a learned man, in fact, a president of a seminary. How much more easily may this opinion arise in the minds of our students! It is surely not unfounded. I maintain, and I think you all will agree with me, that philosophy is not merely a name, but a science; nor is it a collection of sciences, but one science complete in itself and distinct from every other science.

What Is a Science?

A science, in order to be such, must have two things: the one, usually called its material object, is the object or objects which that science undertakes to consider or investigate; the other is the peculiar aspect under which the material object is considered or the peculiar manner in which it is treated; this is usually called formal object. The material object need not be one individual thing nor even one whole class of such individual things. Thus chemistry treats not only of one distinct amount of oxygen nor even of all oxygen, but of all the elements and their compounds; and although there is a large difference among these, yet nobody will say that chemistry is not a distinct science, but a conglomerate of various sciences. Every science takes its peculiar character as such a science, its distinction and difference from other sciences, primarily and principally from its *formal object*. As a matter of fact, various sciences may have the same material object; but each must treat this object in its own peculiar manner.

From this two things are clear. First, a science can deal with many widely differing objects, and the matter it treats may also be the material of other sciences. Hence regarding philosophy, the mere fact that it deals with many different things, yes, all things, can not be brought forth as a reason that it is not a science. Second, it is also clear that the material object is not the element which formally specifies and distinguishes the various sciences, giving to each its unity and its peculiar character as such a science.

Philosophy has its own material object: this visible universe

of ours and all the things contained in it. It has also its own formal object; it considers all things *per ultimas causas.* While the so-called natural sciences remain more or less on the surface of all things, philosophy delves deep into their essences and natures, and even peers far beyond them to find their very first origin and their very last purpose. Where the natural sciences stop, there philosophy begins and builds up. Hence philosophy is really and properly a science, and one science.

Philosophy Is a Science

Someone might ask, what has all this to do with the coördination of the parts of philosophy? Though this may be considered a digression from our main topic, yet it has an important bearing on it. If philosophy is really a science, if it is really a unit among the various branches of human knowledge, then this unity should not be forgotten, much less destroyed, when presenting this particular branch of knowledge to our students. To my thinking, the whole difficulty which is encountered in the attempt to coördinate the various philosophic disciplines, lies in the fact that this point is forgotten or at least not sufficiently taken into consideration. Philosophy, as shown above, like every other science, has its own material and formal objects. These two, as it were, constitute its essence, and establish its specific unity. To preserve this unity of philosophy and, therefore, philosophy itself, these two objects must be kept together. When dealing with philosophy, we should treat it fairly and correctly. We must, indeed, divide philosophy; there are contained in it many truths; we cannot learn all of these in one grasp; we must divide, and take them one by one. This is a feature common to every science, and it has its ground in the vast extent of truth and in the limited character of the human mind. But when we divide, we must not destroy the bond by which the various truths are united and form one science. Hence, too, in dividing philosophy, we must not destroy its unity; we must keep the material object and the formal object together, and we must have special regard for the formal object, since it is the unifying element of philosophy. This very important point, it seems to me, has been entirely overlooked, when philosophy was divided into the traditional parts that are found in all our textbooks, and that offer so much diffi-

The Unity of Philosophy Is to Be Preserved

The Division of Philosophy not to Base on Material Object only

culty to a natural and sound coördination. The division of philosophy into dialectics, epistemology, ontology, cosmology, psychology, theodicy, and ethics, I think, is based only on the material object of philosophy, apart from its formal object. As long as we retain this division, so long, too, shall we have to face that difficulty. Our textbooks of philosophy will remain philosophical checker-boards; philosophy will continue to be broken up into various parts which will be lined off and fenced in, each part all and only for and by itself, and the student may jump fence after fence in order to find philosophy, and not be able to find other than dialectics, epistemology, ontology, etc.

Rev. Fr. Claude in 1919, put his finger on the right nerve, when, speaking of coördination of the philosophic disciplines, in his above-mentioned paper, he said:

> I think the best system would be one in which the different branches were not separated and fenced off like so many pastures, but rather one in which all would be interwoven and correlated like one grand piece of landscape, with valleys and hills, rivers and lakes, woods and open pastures, all united to form one beautiful scenery. Such scenery could be viewed first as a whole, then in its separate parts without losing sight of the main road or the rest of the scenery, and summarized again in the end, as a means of impressing it more deeply on the memory.

Ideal Division and Arrangement

To achieve this end—and I think, it can be achieved—we must not strive to coördinate parts of philosophy, but the *truth-content* of philosophy, *taken as a whole.* In what follows, I shall explain my plan, which, however, I am merely suggesting as a basis on which to begin the work, and as broad lines along which the end can be obtained. I am not dogmatizing nor dictating, but simply stating what I think in the matter. I will, however, make this remark, *viz.,* that what I say is not merely theory, but nearly all of it is practice, in as far as throughout a goodly number of years I have conducted my classes along these lines. It works! And my students always know that they are studying and learning philosophy.

In order to be able to divide philosophy and coördinate its truth-content, we must have it before us as a whole. Hence we must begin with a definition which will express all that philosophy

Definition of Philosophy, Basis of Division and Coördination

is. There are many definitions of philosophy. The one that has always appealed to me is the following: *Philosophia est scientia omnium rerum secundum rationes universalissimas per ultimas earum causas naturali lumine acquisita.* This definition very clearly expresses the two essential elements of philosophy, the material object and the formal object. The former: *omnium rerum,* all things, this visible universe of ours. We should bear in mind here that, although myriads of things, distinct and different both numerically and specifically, go to make up the universe, yet they are all linked together by many a bond of unity and relationship; under more than one aspect they constitute an *Unum.* I mention this merely as one more reason, to show that philosophy is one science, deriving its unity, in no small degree, also from its material object. The formal object is expressed by *per ultimas causas naturali lumine acquisita.* The latter portion of this, *viz., naturali lumine acquisita,* marks off philosophy from dogmatic theology, and does not concern us much here. The other, however, *viz., per ultimas causas,* is of greater importance for us right here; it places the line of demarkation between philosophy and the natural sciences, which treat of the very same objects as philosophy does. Philosophy considers all things by investigating their ultimate causes; this is the proper and distinct work of philosophy.

Specific Work of Philosophy, to Find the Ultimate Causes of All Things

When we come to divide philosophy and to bring some order into its investigations, we must look not only to the various kinds of objects that are to be investigated, but also, and primarily to the specific point that we, as philosophers, are seeking in all things; the philosopher does not so much treat of all things, as rather of *the last causes of all things.*

There are five causes, hence also five ultimate causes: The Material, the Formal, the Efficient, the Exemplar, the Final. What is more natural now, than to base the division of philosophy on these causes, and thus have as many parts as we have causes, leaving to each part the investigation of one of these causes with regard to our universe, or all the things that make it up? Shall we be able to gather all philosophy under these few heads? We must be able to do so. If the definition of philosophy given above

is good and correct, then all that is really philosophical and belongs to philosophy, can be gathered under these causes. If there be anything in our present texts that will not fit into this division, it should be discarded as not belonging to philosophy.

Part I.

Let us begin with the ultimate Material and Formal Causes. These two causes should be taken together, since according to Scholastic Philosophy, they constitute all the objects that belong to our universe. It is proper to begin with them, since we cannot naturally and logically come to know the other ultimate causes of all things, unless we first know *what* these things are. Whether or not all things must be conceived as constituted of matter and form in the Scholastic sense of these terms, will be decided in the course of the treatise. As mentioned above, the ultimate Material and Formal Causes stand for nothing else than the essence or nature of a thing; we are, therefore, in this first part asking the question: What, ultimately, are all things? We are not considering all things individually, but *secundum rationes universalissimas.* Now all things of our universe are bodies, and there are two kinds of bodies, inanimate and animate.

Ultimate Material and Formal Causes of All Things

1. What are inanimate bodies? Practically, what are the elements of chemistry, and their compounds?
2. What are animate bodies?
   a) Plant. b) Animal. c) Man.

In treating these classes of bodies, we shall naturally consider first their respective perfections and functions, in order thus to arrive at the knowledge of their essences and natures, the real point at issue in this first part of philosophy. We have here, as is clear to anyone who is acquainted with our textbooks of Scholastic Philosophy, very much of what is taught in cosmology and psychology.

Right here, I think, is the place where ontology should be brought in, but not all of it. Thus the notions of substance and accident will have to be given in the first part of philosophy, in

What to Do with Ontology?

connection with the essences of all things, since all bodies are substances, each of which also has its own peculiar accidents. As far as necessary, therefore, these two notions should come in for consideration there, not to such an extent, however, as to hold up the treatise.

Although in this manner some points of the categories are taken care of, yet, I think, it would be very useful to give them a special treatment and consideration here in this first part of philosophy.

The Categories

They present nothing really new. The categories represent the classification of the realities that make up our visible universe. They are the very same objects we have thus far been considering, the *omnes res*, only in a higher abstraction and in a wider generalization. They could be given a more explicit treatment here; their finer points could be brought out. This would help to give the student a deeper and more intimate understanding and grasp of all things. Moreover, it would help to make his knowledge of all things more concentrated; he would thus be enabled to get all things more closely together and hold them in his mind under fewer heads. Synthesis after analysis.

I would then cap the whole matter with the consideration of the transcendental *Ens*, and thus make possible and very easy a still more compact synthesis of all things. Here, too, the important principles which base on the notion *Ens*, should be taken into consideration, e. g., the principle of contradiction. Of the transcendental properties of *Ens* I would here, at most, consider transcendental unity; there will be a more appropriate place for the others in other parts of philosophy. Likewise, leave for another place the question whether the concept *Ens* is univocal or analogous with regard to creatures and God.

Transcendental Ens

The student has thus far learned the essence of all things. Something should be said now regarding existence. I think, it would be not only proper, but also very useful and necessary to bring home to the student the actual existence of this universe of ours and all the things in it, by proving that the world is a world of realities which actually exist. At the same time idealism should be explained and refuted.

Then, the time-worn question could be given consideration: Are essence and existence identical or distinct? If distinct, which

distinction is to be held? Of course, if anyone thinks that this question is merely a matter of speculation and that it has no practical bearing whatsoever, he might omit it. *In suo quisque abundet sensu!*

To sum up, I would sketch Part I of Philosophy thus:

A. The Essence of all things.
   1. Concrete Essence.
      a. Inanimate Bodies.
      b. Animate Bodies. (Plant. Animal. Man.)
   2. Abstract Essence of all things.
      a. The Categories.
      b. Transcendental *Ens.*

B. The Existence of all things.
   1. Proof, positive and negative.
   2. Existence distinct, or not distinct from Essence.

This arrangement, I think, makes the grasping of the abstract notions of ontology less difficult, since their concrete correspondents have just been considered, and the knowledge of them is still fresh in the minds and memories of the students. I think, our students will find it comparatively easy, natural and even delightful to thus climb up the Porphyrian Tree, starting below, on *terra firma*, then climbing from limb to limb, from branch to branch, till they reach its very top. And they will not have to experience that mental haze and dizziness which cannot be avoided, if we set them up into those dizzy heights from the very start, practically blindfolded, and let them hang suspended there, without knowing how they got up there and how they are ever going to come down!

N. B. Other parts of Ontology.

The Rest of Ontology, to Be Considered in Other Parts of Philosophy

1. Identity and Distinction.

I would not consider these except right there where there is a concrete case of either, and the matter is important enough to warrant specific treatment.

2. Perfections of Essence and Existence.

The best place for this chapter, I think, is in Part II of Philosophy.

3. Causes.

The treatise on causes can be taken in the very beginning when the definition of philosophy is explained to the students. Here it may be done on more or less general lines. A more thorough treatment should be given to the causes individually at the beginning of the corresponding parts of philosophy. Thus the material and formal causes, the constituent principles of the essences of things, should be well explained at the beginning of Part I; similarly the others, each in turn, as a new part of philosophy is begun.

Part II.

We shall now naturally come to inquire, *whence* are all the things whose essences and existence we have learned in Part I. *Whence*, ultimately, is the universe? This question can first be answered negatively by refuting materialism. This will logically bring us to the conclusion that the universe is not self-existing, not an *Ens a se*; hence it must be an *Ens ab alio*; in other words, it must have been brought into existence by some extra-world being, which, in turn, cannot be an *Ens ab alio*, but must be an *Ens a se*, a self-existing being, God.

The Ultimate Efficient Cause of All Things

God, being an *Ens a se*, must exist necessarily, must be eternal, absolutely unchangeable, simple, one, infinitely perfect, etc. These perfections should be explained and established here, and along with them, the corresponding opposites, thus to bring out very clearly the wide and deep chasm and the vast difference that exists between the universe and its Maker. The explanation and refutation of pantheism will fit in here very properly.

One proof for God's existence has been given. Other proofs should be adduced now and they should be linked as closely as possible with the universe or factors in the universe. Faulty and invalid arguments could be mentioned and given criticism, e. g., that of St. Anselm.

The argument taken from the purposiveness and the order of the universe brings home to us that God is an intelligent Being, and thus we have occasion to consider the Intellect and the Will of God, Divine Knowledge and Volition.

Having established the truth that the universe was made by God, we may now consider *the mode of production* and thus come

to creation. The world was made by God out of nothing. What is creation? Is it possible? Is it a fact? Is it *ab aeterno* or *in tempore*?

Next, *the formation of the universe.* Was the universe from the very beginning as it is now? How has it come to its present form? Various systems of cosmogeny and geogeny can be considered here, if they are not treated in the science course. Regarding life: the origin of life; the origin of the living species; the origin of man, especially man's spiritual soul. If desirable, the first chapter of Genesis can be brought in.

God not only created the universe, but He also *conserves* it and *actively coöperates* with every action and motion that takes place in it.

To sum up Part II:

1. The universe was made by God.
   a. The universe not self-existing.
   b. The universe was made by God, hence it is not God.
   c. The existence and nature of God.
2. The universe was created, or made out of nothing, in time.
3. Formation of the universe.
4. Divine Conservation and Coöperation.

Part III.

God is an infinitely intelligent Being; hence He did not create the universe blindly, but under the guidance of the Divine Intellect. What *Exemplar* did God have to guide Him in the creation of things? This question brings us to the ultimate Exemplar Cause. Some authors make little of this cause. Others do not admit it at all. Others identify it with one of the other causes, with the Efficient, the Final or the Formal cause. To my thinking, the Exemplar is really and properly a cause, and a cause distinct from the other causes. It is an image of the effect to be produced, an image either in the mind or in the imagination. It determines the specific form and character of the effect, not indeed as an intrinsic constituent of that effect, but as *directing* the Efficient Cause in the production of such a specific

The Ultimate Exemplar Cause of All Things

The Exemplar, Really and Properly a Cause

effect. It does not move the Efficient Cause to operate, as does the Final Cause; it does not *produce* the effect; this is the work of the Efficient Cause. It is in the consciousness of the producer as a type or model, in imitation of which the producer, the Efficient Cause, gives the effect such or such specific form. It therefore exercises an actual influence for the existence of the effect, and an influence distinct and different from the influences of the other causes; hence it is a distinct cause and should therefore also be considered as such. The consideration of this cause, therefore, has its own place very naturally and appropriately in philosophy, and I would place this consideration immediately after that of the Efficient Cause, hence in Part III. Evidently, in God there is not a real distinction between the Exemplar and the Efficient Cause, as is the case in creatures. The Exemplar which guided the Divine Efficiency in the creation of the world and the things in the world, is the Divine Essence. *Materialiter* it is the Essence of God in so far as it is imitable in other beings; *formaliter* it is the Divine Intellect representing the Essence of God as imitable in such and such specific form. This consideration gives us very clear and certain knowledge on several very important points.

Importance of Considering Exemplar Cause of All Things

1. It shows the Essence of God to be the archetype of all created reality.

2. It shows the ontologic foundation of the intrinsic possibility of creatures.

3. It shows us that all the perfections of creatures are *aliquo modo* in the Divine Essence.

4. It helps us obtain a very clear conception of the Ontologic Truth of all things.

5. It shows us that the Divine Essence is the ultimate foundation and source of all Logic Truth, and helps us obtain a firmly founded appreciation of the absolute value of Logic Truth against that Subjectivism and Relativism, which, time and again, has popped up in philosophy in non-Scholastic circles and which makes the entire structure of human knowledge very shaky and uncertain,

to say the very least. The five points enumerated here, should get due consideration in Part III.

Part IV.

We now come to the fourth and last part of philosophy, which will treat of the ultimate Final Cause of all things.

Ultimate Final Cause

Why, ultimately, did God make all things in this universe?

1. Since the Creator of the world is infinitely intelligent and wise, He must have had a purpose when He called all things into existence, a purpose that is worthy of the Divine Nature of God.

2. God, precisely because He is God, cannot be indifferent as to whether creatures attain this purpose or not. He must effectively wish and will that they do. Creatures attain the purpose of their existence by being what God intended them to be, and by doing what God intended them to do. Hence God must seriously and effectively wish and will that creatures be and do as He intended from the beginning. There must, therefore, be in God a plan according to which all things are to be governed, so that they attain their last end and purpose. This plan we call the

Lex Aeterna

Lex Aeterna, and according to it God governs the whole universe. It is described as *Ratio Divinae Sapientiae secundum quod est directiva omnium actionum et motuum.*

3. This Law as such, is in God; to be effective it must be brought home to creatures. Now just as God does not personally perform all actions in creatures, though He could, if He chose to do so, using creatures only as occasions on the presence of which He would act, but has put into the natures of all things powers and energies to do work—so also He does not personally direct and govern all things to the attainment of the purpose for which He made them, but has impressed His Will, His Law, into their natures. Naturally this impression will differ in different creatures.

a) In inanimate bodies it is the *Physical Law.* This com-

prises not only the laws pertaining to physics, but also those of chemistry and other sciences that deal with inanimate things.

Physical Laws

The treatise on *Miracles* should be taken here, after the Physical Law has received its consideration.

b) In animate bodies:

* Plants. They, in as far as they are living bodies, are governed by the *Biological Laws.* These are rooted in the life-principles of plants and have at their service and under their direction the physico-chemical laws of inanimate matter, for the formation and sustenance of the organism.

Biological Laws

** Animals, in as far as they are animals, are governed especially by the *Instincts*, which are rooted primarily in the animal soul which also has at its service and under its direction the above-mentioned physico-chemico-biological laws, for the formation and sustenance of the organism.

Instinct

*** Man, in as much as he is a rational creature, endowed with understanding and free will, has for his guidance, especially for the guidance of the will, the *Moral Law* (ETHICS). This law is written into man's rational nature. But it is the work of the intellect of man to perceive the law, to formulate its precepts, and to intimate them to the will. That the intellect may do this work correctly and effectively, it also must have guidance and direction. The mind is directed to do correct thinking by the *Laws of Thought* which are impressed into its very nature (DIALECTICS). It must, moreover, have the assurance that with this correct thinking it can obtain its object, the truth. This assurance man's cognitive capacity has by what we may call the *Laws of Truth*, the veracity of the cognitive faculties, or their inherent, God-given aptitude to perceive the truth and to hold it with a firm and an unwavering conviction (EPISTEMOLOGY).

Moral Law

Laws of Thought

Laws of Truth

These laws are rooted primarily in man's life-principle, the spiritual soul, which has at its service and under its direction the physico-chemico-biological laws for the formation and preservation of the human organism.

Finis.

In concluding this paper let me call attention to one or other advantage which comes to the student by this arrangement of the contents of philosophy.

Advantages

1. It meets the student on his own ground and on *terra firma*. It builds up on what the student already knows or can rightly be supposed to know. It meets him in the order of concrete things and, step by step, leads him up to the abstract.

2. It builds directly upon the sciences, thus bearing out the correct view with regard to philosophy, *viz.*, that it begins where the sciences stop, and that it accepts all that they offer: facts as facts; hypotheses as hypotheses; dreams, however, and wild speculations also as such; that therefore, there can be no real opposition and clash between sound and correct philosophy and sound and correct science.

3. From the very beginning to the end of the entire course the student knows that he is learning philosophy. He is getting all of logic, ontology, cosmology, etc., some of these branches exactly as they stand in our present manuals; but he does not get them as completely isolated units; they come to him as groups of truths which quite naturally, one by one, develop out of the definition of philosophy. He gets a good definition of philosophy in the beginning of the course; he is kept in constant touch with this definition; he sees it develop gradually and logically; and when all is over, when the whole course has been finished, it is quite natural for him to get the thought that philosophy really is the *Scientia omnium rerum* . . . etc.; it is easy for him to have a comprehensive view of the entire field of philosophy, and it is also an easy matter for him to remember what he has learned, at least *quoad substantiam*, and to be able intelligently to let others know what philosophy is. And the real fruit of the whole study will be a solid and correct world-view, *Weltanschauung*, which, to be what our dear Lord wants it to be in our present order, needs only to be supernaturalized by Faith in Divine Revelation and by the Grace of God. It will not be so easy to get this world-view from the study of philosophy as it is presented in our manuals at present.

4. The student will clearly see that philosophy is not only

speculative, but also, and in no small degree, practical; he will see how and why logic and ethics are really parts of philosophy.

5. What advantage can there be in taking logic at the end of the philosophic course? There is very little or no advantage of having it anywhere else. If the student, on beginning his course in philosophy, has not so much natural or practically acquired logic in his head as to be able to begin philosophy without a special course in dialectics, especially after having gone through high school, then the course of dialectics will not be able to fill out the gap. If concrete mental work has left his mind blind and lame, abstract dialectics is not going to do the miracle of removing these defects.

Logic, at the End of the Course of Philosophy

The student's mind will surely develop more easily and more naturally by contact with actual concrete logic such as he will find in abundance in the various parts of Speculative Philosophy, than by the empty forms which are brought before him in dialectics *usque ad nauseam*. Hence, there is no particular advantage in placing logic at the beginning of the philosophic course.

Logic might be placed somewhere within the course, perhaps immediately after or within psychology. The only reason for so doing could be the fact that the two sciences have the same material object. I do not know what advantage this would bring either to the student or to psychology. It could hold up the course of psychology quite extensively; this would certainly not be of any advantage.

Taking logic at the end of the course of philosophy has some advantage which, I think, is worth while considering.

a) Dialectics. Very much of what can be called Applied Logic or Concrete Logic will have gone ahead in the one year, perhaps two years, which would precede the study of logic; so much thinking, defining, dividing, judging, reasoning; so many different kinds of propositions and argumentations! All this material stored up in the mind of the student, or at least very easily accessible in his textbook, is just what is needed to make dialectics worth while at all. This science must be rid of its abstract character; it must be made concrete and living, if the student is to get anything out of it. We have here, then, a wide field of material, all cut and dried, ready for use.

Dialectics

All this can and should be used for exemplification and illustration. This will not only make dialectics a very much alive and interesting study, but it will also make it necessary for the student to go over what he has learned before, and more intensely and attentively now than before. This will serve as a good and intelligent repetition. *Repetitio est mater studiorum!!* Besides, seeing the correctness of the work he has already done, his conviction of the truth of what he has learned will be clarified and strengthened. How many practical, useful and interesting assignments can be offered to the student while he is studying dialectics, if this part of philosophy is placed at the end of the course!

b) Epistemology. There seems to me to be no reason whatever for placing this part of philosophy anywhere within the course. I think, it is more harmful than useful to place it at the beginning.

Epistemology

The average student comes to philosophy with an implicit trust in the veracity of man's cognitive faculties. Why disturb this natural persuasion at the moment when he is to apply those faculties to the acquisition of the deepest and most important kind of knowledge? Why bring before him at this point all the vagaries of Skepticism, Agnosticism, Subjectivism, etc.? Will any lector be able to present all these errors to the student and show them up so clearly and convincingly that not a shred of them will be left to linger way back in some corner of his student's mind? Will the lector be able to carry clearness and conviction into the student's mind which may still be all a-haze from his airy trip through dialectic-land? Let us lectors recall the days when we ourselves were the victims of the old traditional coördination of philosophy, *sc.*, dialectics, epistemology, ontology, etc.!

Is it not more practical, and more charitable to the student to leave him in his natural persuasion through the various parts of Speculative Philosophy, and then, after a thoroughly practical course in dialectics, where he will have learned to think and to reason correctly and rationally, to bring up all those systems that would rob the world of all truth and certainty?

I conclude with what I have said elsewhere in this paper: It is not my intention to dogmatize or to dictate. I have simply proposed what I think on the subject of coördinating philosophy. I have taught philosophy in accord with this theory for many years, and feel convinced of its practical advantages.

DISCUSSION

FR. MARK STIER, O.M.Cap.:—The splendid paper of Fr. Gerard has shown how the very definition of philosophy gives us the key to a logical coördination of the various parts of philosophy. It goes to show that philosophy is not a conglomerate of several complete and distinct sciences that have a more or less close connection with one another, but that it is really and properly *one* science. However, I do not think it advisable to disperse the fundamental notions, usually treated in ontology, among the other problems of philosophy, but I recommend that this branch of philosophy be taught immediately before natural theology.

Furthermore, the logical place for epistemology is in general metaphysics. Epistemology, considered in itself, is not merely an introduction to metaphysics but a department of metaphysics. Its purpose is not to prepare the way for the study of metaphysics, but rather to perfect and reëmbody metaphysics. General metaphysics considers the various properties of being, consequently also the true; it likewise defends the first principles of all sciences, hence also the first principles of reason. Thus Aristotle treats the first logical principle, the principle of contradiction, in the fourth book of metaphysics. These reasons seem to offer a valid proof for placing epistemology in metaphysics. For practical and psychological reasons, however, I think it advisable to treat epistemology as a separate branch immediately after logic. Thus, from the very beginning, the students will be strengthened in their natural persuasion of the truth of human knowledge. The critical problem must be stated sincerely. The difficulty lies not so much in the solution of the problem, but rather in stating it in such a manner as not to beg the question or to create a vicious circle. The terms must be set forth very clearly. The intellect knows that it possesses truth because it is of such a nature that, in a reflex act, it can judge its own act, and consequently a real universal doubt is impossible. Hence, I think it proper to teach epistemology in the first year of the philosophical course. It might be urged that epistemology is too difficult for beginners and therefore should be taught at the end of the philosophical course. I easily grant that epistemology has its difficulties. But is one to conclude from this that it must be taught at the end of the philosophical course? A rather objectionable solution, because it is the duty of the professor to show the students not only the difficulties but how they are to surmount the same. Furthermore, we must guard against exaggerating the difficulties. If in the first year of philosophy the professor explains the mental function of judgment, warrants the possession of certitude, expounds the manner in which the human mind acquires and extends its knowledge, then, from the very outset, the youthful philosopher will trust his power of apprehension, he will proceed securely in his reasoning, he will run along the long way of deductions with a sure step, and he will not depart from the first evident truths until he comes to the consideration of Subsistent Truth in natural theology.

Logical Place for Epistemology is in General Metaphysics

FR. CYPRIAN EMANUEL, O.F.M.:—Teaching methods are so intimately associated with a teacher's personality, with his faculty of holding the attention of the students and of drawing out the best that is in them—that one can broach a discussion of them only with fear of being classed with those who "rush in where angels fear to tread." To be sure, there are certain general rules of pedagogical psychology that no professor, if

Teaching Methods and the Teacher

he hopes to succeed, can afford to transgress. But apart from these, so much depends upon his individual personality that it is impossible to cast a uniform and indispensable mold into which all teachers must fit themselves. A method that proves highly successful in the hands of one may lead another to utter failure, and *vice versa*. This is true, I think, of every phase of education. It is found to exist in a simple elementary branch of learning no less than in a more advanced and intricate course, in the selection of the textbook and the arrangement of the subject-matter no less than in the exposition of the contents.

Turning now to Fr. Gerard's splendid paper, I need not restate the many and obvious advantages of the plan he has so clearly and emphatically expounded. And I do not doubt in the least that many professors and a great number of students will find it a panacea for many of the difficulties that now encumber a course in philosophy. Nor is it in many respects as revolutionary as it may appear at first sight. Every professor of philosophy, I feel sure, has in the course of his experience encountered the necessity of rearranging the contents of the textbook to some little extent at least. And if he analyzes the procedure properly he will ascertain, I think, that very frequently he is making the rearrangement, perhaps unwittingly but none the less truly, on the basis of the formal object. Now Fr. Gerard merely suggests that we extend to the whole of philosophy and adopt permanently the mode of procedure that we are already following on a small scale and intermittently.

A Panacea for Philosophic Ills

Still, in view of the individual diversities that characterize both professors and students, as also in view of the fact that Fr. Gerard's plan has never, to my knowledge, been subjected to the ordeal of experience in its entirety, I should hesitate to sponsor it as unqualifiedly superior to the traditional arrangement of the parts of philosophy.

Universally Acceptable?

Since logic and ethics are not really coördinate with the other parts of philosophy but are supplementary to psychology, they are not so integrally a portion of the philosophical edifice and, in consequence, can be assigned positions in the course of philosophy pretty much at the pleasure of the professor without jarring the harmony of the whole. I must, however, express my full agreement with those who, for practical reasons, would have logic cease to be the gateway to philosophy and would give it a place at a more advanced stage of the journey through philosophy.

Logic and Ethics Offer No Special Difficulty

Ontology, too, because of its general and abstract character, holds a position all its own among the branches of philosophy,—not in the sense that it is dissociated from the rest of philosophy, but in the sense that it is not subject to the scrutiny of the five (four) ultimate causes as are the three branches of special metaphysics. Should it be taken before special metaphysics, or after, or should it be robbed of its identity as a branch of philosophy by being apportioned piecemeal, though not haphazardly, over the field of special metaphysics? I feel confident that these three possibilities will divide the professors of philosophy into as many camps. Personally I feel constrained to agree with the opinion which, if I have been correctly informed, Fr. Berard Vogt will deliver to this assembly at a later session. He will tell us, I think, that in a biennial rotating course in which one group of students takes up ontology before cosmology and psychology, and the other *vice versa*, he has repeatedly heard

The Position of Ontology a Moot Question

the former express their joy and satisfaction at having had ontology first. And, I think, *studenti credendum!* He is certainly in a position to judge.

As for myself, just as in all my studies I prefer to begin with the definition and then to observe it gradually unfold and clothe itself with the subject-matter, comparing the contents with the definition as I proceed and reverting specifically to the definition after I have covered the contents, in order to ascertain to my own satisfaction whether or not it has been verified; just as I prefer to have before me from the very beginning a general outline of the field to be traversed so that I can see at any stage of my study exactly where I am and how any particular point fits into the whole; and, to descend to specific examples, just as I should prefer to enter upon general ethics before special ethics and general dogma before special dogma: so too, I think I can truthfully say that I should prefer to take general metaphysics before special metaphysics. It is true, in this case the student will first come in contact with abstract ideas, definitions, and principles, but it seems to me the capable professor will ever have at his ready service a generous supply of simple, concrete, and familiar examples that will render sufficiently intelligible even the most abstruse points of ontology. And if the student is ready to enter the realm of abstract being after some little time spent in cosmology, I cannot throw off the impression that with the proper use of simple and familiar illustrations, he can do so directly. In some particulars it may entail more work on the part of the professor, but I think the student can here lay rightful claim to first consideration.

Why Ontology Should be Placed Before Special Metaphysics

Moreover, while stressing the advantages of the method proposed by Fr. Gerard we must not run the risk of jumping from the frying pan into the fire. One of the aims of the plan, as I understand it, is to dispel from the student's mind the bugbear of ontology by approaching it gradually and by devious ways, encountering it portion for portion in the various parts of special metaphysics. Is there not danger in such an event that the unity of these latter will suffer? Is it not to be feared that the student will become entangled in a mesh of loose ends and not know how to connect and interrelate them without, at least, great difficulty?

I readily grant that certain parts of general metaphysics can profitably be shifted to other fields of philosophy, but judging the question from the standpoint of my personal method of attacking problems, I should prefer to retain ontology generally intact and to consider it as preparatory to special metaphysics.

Of the philosophical sciences, cosmology, psychology, and theodicy alone are amenable to the five (four) ultimate causes. Hence, they are the parts most vitally concerned when there is question of dividing philosophy on the basis of its formal object and, in consequence, it is about them that the present discussion essentially turns. In the first place, the comparison of the field divided into sections by separating fences as contrasted with the landscape presenting a unified and composite whole with its hills and dales and winding streams, etc., appeals to me rather as a two-edged sword than as a convincing illustration. The fences that enclose the various parts of philosophy will either be high and insurmountable, or low and practically negligible, or absent entirely, in proportion to the professor's ability to scrap them by properly correlating the matter taken at any given time with what has gone before.

Special Metaphysics the Core of the Present Discussion

Moreover, to refer more directly to the comparison, if I were commissioned to gather four kinds of flowers from a given field, I could, of course, tramp

over the field four distinct times, each time taking with me a different basket and gathering into it its specific kind of flower. I think, however, that I should prefer to make first a general survey of the field, observing how it naturally divides itself into valleys, hillsides, etc., and then without losing sight of the whole and with the four baskets at my side, proceed to complete my quest in one valley before passing on to the next natural division into which the field falls. So, too, I think that personally I should prefer to make first a general survey of the field of philosophy (ontology) and then with the four (five) ultimate causes at hand, proceed to cluster around them all the knowledge to be found in one quite natural division of philosophy's material object (cosmology, psychology, theodicy) before passing on to the next. If I have four questions that I wish to ask concerning each of several correlated subjects, I deem it preferable to ask the four as each object comes within the range of my study, instead of asking only one question for the time being and then reverting to the identical object three distinct times for answers to the remaining three. And this is really the method (on the basis of the division of the material object) followed in practically all the branches of learning. That philosophy has its own peculiar difficulties is evident, but I think it may be reasonably doubted that these difficulties are so distinctive and outstanding as to warrant a general veering from the trodden path.

An Apology for the Old

In this connection my thoughts revert spontaneously to a personal experience of my days at our preparatory college. Both Latin and German were on the program from the very beginning. We were taught Latin according to the sharp and rigid methods of Englmann's Latin Grammar and Exercise Book, whereas in German we were lead along the lines of a rather loose conversational method. I must say that I derived much greater pleasure and benefit from the study of the former than from the study of the latter. And I attribute this difference to the fact that the material object of Latin was divided into as many parts as there are parts of speech and that we practically completed each part as we proceeded, instead of taking only a portion of each part and, in consequence, being obliged to revert to it a number of times before completing it. Here two points are very clear to my mind. First, although the material object of Latin was divided into very distinctive sections, I am unable to recall that I experienced any particular difficulty in scaling the dividing fences. Second, in all my subsequent studies where Latin was involved, I knew exactly where to place any given noun, verb, etc. I cannot say the same of German. I grant that this is only a comparison in so far as our present discussion is concerned. Still, the points of similarity seem to be sufficiently striking to carry considerable weight.

A further point to be borne in mind in the discussion of the feasibility of Fr. Gerard's plan is whether one professor teaches the whole of philosophy or whether several are engaged in the task; v. g., one for logic, ontology, and cosmology; a second for psychology and theodicy; and a third for ethics. I am inclined to consider it more workable in the former instance than in the latter for a number of reasons. It may be objected, however, that the very presence of two or more professors increases the desirability of such a method because of the increased danger of leading the students to believe that each professor represents totally distinct and unrelated sciences. My answer here, as it has been before, is that, if such an impression gains a foothold among a group of students, the blame must be laid at the door of the professor for having failed to correlate as he should.

I consider Fr. Gerard's definition of philosophy very sound and correct.

I learned it from him seventeen years ago, have used it throughout my eight years of teaching, and to this day have no desire, because I see no need, of altering jot or tittle of it. I am not, however, equally in accord with his interpretation of its single parts. Throughout the Introduction and Part I of his paper he gives us the impression, and in several instances states clearly, that the *omnium rerum*, the material object of philosophy, embodies "this visible universe of ours and all the things contained in it," apparently to the implied exclusion of God. I hardly think that any one will find it difficult to subscribe to the statement that the material object of any science is necessarily coextensive with the topics treated by that science. Now philosophy does and must treat of God, otherwise it contradicts itself in declaring its aim and purpose to be the investigation of all things in the light of their ultimate causes and then in failing to include the Ultimate Exemplary, Efficient, and Final Cause, i. e., God, within the pale of its material object. The fact that God is known to the philosopher only indirectly and by abstraction can scarcely be proffered as a valid excuse for the omission, otherwise we should be obliged to preclude also the essence of material bodies, the human soul, etc., since these, too, even though within closer reach of our cognitive faculties, are known only by abstraction. Nor is there aught in the definition of philosophy that necessitates such a restriction. On the contrary, it states that the material object embraces all being, provided only that it be within the ken of reason, (*scientia omnium rerum . . . naturali lumine acquisita*), irrespective of whether it be known directly or indirectly, by intuition or by abstraction. Moreover, in the subsequent sections of his paper Fr. Gerard evidently presupposes the inclusion of God in the material object of philosophy. Hence, why not from the very beginning interpret the *rerum omnium* as embracing all being, both infinite and finite, in so far as both are knowable by reason?

The Definition of Philosophy

TEACHING THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Fr. Claude Mindorff, O.F.M., Lect. Jub. Phil.

To cover this topic adequately, but with due brevity, it will be sufficient to answer the three leading questions of *Quid*, *Quare* and *Quomodo*. Without further ado, therefore, I shall first define history of philosophy, indicating what it is and what it is not; secondly, I shall consider the purpose of teaching it; and lastly, I shall give some suggestions as to methods and arrangement.

Quid? History of philosophy is, as the terms imply, the narrative of the process of development of man's scientific knowledge of the ultimate causes of all things.

It is first of all a process of development, not something ready-made, but a continual formation, not static, but dynamic, not a finished system of philosophical truths, but the development of the knowledge of those truths. This development, however, is to be considered as we find it in actual formation in the minds of men, and therefore both psychologically and logically; psychologically, because all history is a positive science and the history of philosophy is the history of actual thought; and logically, because no knowledge can develop except along the lines of logic, which gives it consistency and unity.

Secondly, history of philosophy narrates the development of man's scientific knowledge, not merely of his opinions or beliefs. Many truths of philosophy were believed and asserted by the Hebrews, but they were founded on revelation and tradition. Many truths, usually in a mutilated form, are also represented in the teachings of the Oriental peoples as well as in the mythology of various pagan tribes of Egypt, Assyria and other countries, but they are only beliefs or opinions handed down by tradition and preserved without any systematic coherence or development. Eclecticism, for the same reason, is not a system of philosophy, and is merely mentioned in the history of philosophy by way of parenthesis, or momentary aberration.

Lastly, history of philosophy must be a history of philosophic thought, i. e., of the knowledge of the *ultimate causes of all things*. Natural sciences do not constitute philosophy, neither does

astrology nor philology nor empirical psychology, nor do most of the four hundred varieties of the science of education come under the heading of philosophic thought, though they may have a bearing on its development. Unless we are looking for the ultimate causes of things we are not thinking philosophically. For this reason, and for other reasons given above, the history of philosophy really begins with the first crude attempts of the ancient Greeks to explain the world by one or more of the elements contained therein. Though their answers were far from the truth, still their attempts were truly philosophical, and the history of such attempts pertains to the history of philosophy.

Naturally, the history of philosophy includes something of the life and work of the philosophers themselves, but only in so far as they refer to the development of philosophic thought. History of philosophy is therefore not a series of dates or names, but a system of philosophy in the making—something that really adds to our store of philosophical knowledge. This suggests the next question.

Quare? What is the purpose of the history of philosophy and what benefit can be derived from its study? Though this is the most important of the three questions, still we need not dwell on it at any length. The purpose of the history of philosophy will always be a more complete and better understanding of philosophy itself.

Speaking of the history of philosophy *in genere:* the development of man's philosophical knowledge is one of the best sources for studying the finished product. When we see men groping for the truth, we become more interested and we desire that truth more intensely. This interest and appreciation makes us follow them in their efforts, fix the problem, and lay the basic principles; with them we try several directions until we hit upon a road that leads onward to safer ground and thus by means of their mistakes or successes we learn to avoid the pitfalls and choose the safer paths. We learn to doubt where doubt is in place, we give our intellect no more credit than is due to it, we become more humble and wary of our own opinions, and, above all, we learn to be grateful to God for His revelation and to depend upon His assistance in our search for truth.

Again, the study of the history of philosophy gives us a better insight into the nature of philosophy and its problems; it helps

us to define the meaning of philosophic terms, and to clarify the atmosphere of faulty definitions, unwarranted statements and false conclusions. The whole of philosophy may well be compared to a grand old basilica, built little by little in the course of centuries; the foundations were laid by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle; more material was gathered by the Fathers of the Church and the earlier Scholastics; the walls and roof were built by the great Scholastics themselves, and then the building was left to be buffeted by the winds and storms of humanism, rationalism and other false systems of the modern period. And now, though standing on a solid basis and without danger of collapse, it is nevertheless still in need of repairs and improvements and decorations, which we hope will be attended to by the present neo-Scholastics and subsequent philosophers. To study the history of this edifice in the making, is to know its structure, its limits, its basic solidity and its weaknesses.

Lastly, if we take the history of philosophy *in specie*, we can see the development of the separate questions, know exactly what the problem is, its difficulties and attempted solutions, the progress that has been made in its development. Thus only shall we be sufficiently equipped to find the correct, final and complete answer. Take, for example, the modern question of the validity of our cognitions, the epistemological question raised by Kant: unless we know the position of the skeptics, the sensism of Locke, the phenomenalism of Hume, the criticism of Kant and the solutions offered by succeeding philosophers, we shall hardly be able to define the question, much less be enabled to give a satisfactory answer. The *status quaestionis* is usually the most important of any given question and this *status quaestionis* is for the most part the historical setting of the question. So we see that the threefold purpose of the study of the history of philosophy may be summarized in the following: 1) to put the philosopher in his place, 2) to give him a more complete and connected panorama of philosophy itself and, 3) to enable him to see with greater clearness the separate problems, and with greater certainty find their solution. This purpose will at the same time determine in a measure the answer to the third question, *Quomodo*.

As to the method of teaching the history of philosophy, it is understood we cannot follow the *a priori* method as exemplified,

for instance, by Hegel in his evolutionary method of *thesis*, *antithesis* and *synthesis*. All history is the narration of contingent facts as they occur, and no *a priori* method can be applied, where necessity itself does not apply. Only the *a posteriori* method can be used logically to find the sources of a doctrine, to see what a given philosopher has taught, or to determine the doctrinal influence of a philosophical system on subsequent philosophy.

Quomodo?

As to the subject-matter and its manner of treatment, there are three elements in the history of every system and in every part of the history of philosophy to be studied and explained; 1) the contents, 2) the source or cause as well as the effects of a system, 3) its general influence and philosophical value.

1) It is the teacher's duty to give a clear and complete exposition of the system. He must not be biased in any way, but thoroughly sincere and impartial in his explanation and judgment; not putting forth his own doctrine or beliefs, but the doctrine of the author according to the mind of that same author, using his terminology as much as possible, without adding his own subjective opinion to the detriment or to the white-washing of the philosopher in question. We find the opposite method, for example, in many textbooks, in their treatment of ontologism, so much so, in fact, that we must distinguish between the traditional view-point of ontologism, proclaiming an immediate vision of God, and the real historical ontologism as found among the ontologists themselves, not one of whom ever believed himself possessed of the immediate vision of the divine essence.

2) Secondly, it is the duty of the teacher to show the connection of a philosopher and his philosophy with preceding systems, to find which principles or suppositions he borrowed from his predecessors, and, on the other hand, which thoughts and ideas were original. At the same time the teacher should explain the influence a philosopher or his system had upon his contemporaries or successors, in what way they reacted to it and whether the system in whole or in part suffered any modification at their hands.

3) The third element, which must not be neglected, is the general influence of the philosopher and his system upon the whole *corpus philosophiae* and its value as a part of that body.

a) Usually, every system, no matter how insignificant it may seem, has some influence; but, because of the number of such systems, it behooves the teacher to distinguish the more important ones from those of minor importance and treat them accordingly. Likewise the teacher must not make the mistake of selecting primarily those systems that are easiest to explain, in preference to those which have exercised the greatest influence.

b) On the other hand, the teacher has the right and the duty to judge a system according to its real value, *viz.*, according to the measure of philosophic truth contained therein. Practically every system, no matter how false, contains at least a grain of truth; when condemning or refuting a system, therefore, the teacher must separate the chaff from the wheat and not throw them both into the fire. This judgment of the value of a philosophical system is particularly necessary, when teaching beginners in philosophy, who are easily led astray by specious logic or the glare of a name. Unless this correct criticism of a system be given, and be given seriously, with due accent on the fundamental error or errors, the beginner's mind will become a maze of contradictions and doubts, and he will soon lose his reverence for truth and become indifferent or skeptical. This reverence and love for truth and rejection of error in whatever form, is one of the necessary fruits of the study of philosophy, and anything that tends to weaken or destroy this reverent love, must be eschewed. 'Tis true, that the errors of philosophy are historical facts, but they are also false doctrines and bad food for any mind, particularly, for immature minds which swallow everything presented to them and have neither discernment to distinguish the true from the false, nor the logical equipment necessary to fight off the germs of error and falsehood.

When determining the place for this study in our curriculum, we must first distinguish the active or post-graduate course from the passive or beginners' course. In the post-graduate course of philosophy, there should be a complete and thorough course of the history of philosophy, having almost as prominent a place in the course as any one part of philosophy itself. At the Collegio di S. Antonio in Rome, for example, two periods a week for all three years are devoted to the history of philosophy.

But in a beginners' course this is not possible, both for lack of time and for lack of understanding. In a beginners' course one

of two arrangements might be made, *viz.*, either it might be taught as a separate class, or it might be combined with the regular study of philosophy. If taught as a separate class, as it really ought to be, its place is only in the third year with three periods a week in order to cover the matter with some completeness. There are some few that think that the history of philosophy should form the *propedeutica*, or introduction to philosophy. Such treatment would have to be too meagre or too diluted to do any good, or too simple to constitute a history of philosophy.

If taught in conjunction with the regular study of philosophy, it might be sufficient to link the historical development of a problem with the *status quaestionis* of the given thesis and let this suffice. But if forced to distribute the complete history over the three years of study, it would be best to combine the Greek period with logic and cosmology, the Scholastic period with metaphysics and theodicy and the Modern period with epistemology and psychology. Whether it is possible to introduce the students into research-work, is a question for each professor to settle for himself. Personally, I found it practical and interesting to devote the regular seminar to some such research, i. e., looking up approved authors in the original to find out their doctrine on a given problem; likewise the students of the third year in writing their final thesis, were obliged to devote some time to searching the major authors for first-hand quotations. Real research-work, however, seems to be beyond the ability of the students of a passive course.

Many other questions could be offered for consideration on the point of method, but I shall leave them to the subsequent discussion. In conclusion, I wish only to emphasize once more the necessity of proposing the different periods and systems in the history of philosophy as a united attempt of the human race to attain to philosophical truth, in which the epistemological question, *viz.*, the origin and fundamental principles and natural limits of our knowledge, must always form the basic and unifying element. That student will always be the best philosopher, who knows the origin of his knowledge, grasps its fundamental principles and realizes the limits of the human mind, in other words, who knows how to think: A thorough study of the history of philosophy will, I sincerely believe, do that very thing for the philosophical student, *scil.*, teach him to think.

DISCUSSION

FR. JOHN BAPTIST SCHUNK, O.F.M.:—As Fr. Claude intimates in his eminently practical paper, the formal object of the history of philosophy is to show the genetic connection between the various systems of philosophic thought, not merely to exhibit their structure under the static aspect, but to point out their dynamic relation. There has been a natural development in philosophic speculation, beginning with the first efforts of the early Greek thinkers to arrive at the original world-stuff, the primordial material cause of the universe. *Natura non facit saltus* is an axiom that applies equally well to man's philosophic evolution. Every philosopher has been a child of his own time, and, in fact, his greatness is measured by the degree in which he has comprehended and expressed the burning questions of his age. Recent studies thoroughly explode the theory of the vaunted "originality" of Descartes.[1] The sooner present-day philosophers abjure their heresy of the non-continuity or hiatus in philosophic progress from 600 till 1600 A.D., the greater will be the possibility of *rapprochement* between them and the neo-Scholastics.

The Formal Object of the History of Philosophy

In view of this, the teaching of the history of philosophy as a separate course is, in my opinion, absolutely imperative. I do not wish to belittle the usefulness of giving an historical survey of each problem as it is taken in the classroom, e. g., when treating of the immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will, etc. This has always been and ought to remain an integral part of the "Scholastic Method." But it is apparent that the presentation of historical data in this wise is necessarily piecemeal and inadequate. The various systems ought to be presented as a whole, at least according to their fundamental structure, and their dependence on preceding systems and their influence on succeeding generations pointed out. In this way, the student will gain a more thorough grasp of philosophical problems, and will be enabled to know *why* a particular thesis is maintained in a given system, and even to deduce the several conclusions from the fundamental principles of the system. I have often wondered how certain Scholastics could admit, for example, the plurality of forms in man, and in the same breath sweep aside the Scotistic formal distinction as improbable. Does not this paradoxical attitude proceed from a lack of appreciation of the organic relation between the two theses? It is well for us to have the burrowing habit, but it is also well to see the forest as well as the trees.

Separate Treatment

> The details of systems may be reasoned out piecemeal, and when the student is working at a system, he may often forget the forest for the single tree. But when the labor is accomplished, the mind always performs its big summarizing act, and the system forthwith stands over against one like a living thing, with that strange simple note of individuality which haunts our memory, like the wraith of the man, when a friend or enemy of ours is dead.[2]

The topical method of presentation which we find in our textbooks is dressed, of course, in Latin. A separate treatment of the history of philosophy affords the added advantage of having the student re-think and recast philosophy in the vernacular.

---

[1] Cf., e. g., A. Koyre, *Descartes und die Scholastik* (Bonn, 1923).
[2] W. James, *Pragmatism*, p. 35.

Even though the course in the history of philosophy be limited to one year (and this has advantages all its own), it is not impossible to present the essential structure of the principal systems and their filiation. The judicious combination of the chronological order, which I think should be adhered to at all events, with the topical method, by considering, for example, the theory of being and the theory of knowledge in each system, will cover the field fairly well. The theory of right living, which follows as a corrollary from the preceding topics, should be touched upon, but the extensive treatment of this topic might well be reserved for ethics.

Methods

Names, dates, titles of books have their place in teaching the history of philosophy, but they should also be made to mind their place.[8] For our clerics, the detailed exposition of the medieval, at least of the Scholastic systems, which we find in current manuals, is superfluous, since they are already familiar with Scholastic philosophy, but this does not dispense them from learning the genetic relations of Scholasticism with ancient and modern philosophy.

FR. ALBERT O'BRIEN, O.F.M.:—I like Father Claude's paper very much and I agree with his conclusions. Perhaps I might supplement these with a few ideas of my own acquired during the past eleven years in which I have taught history of philosophy.

I have often wondered if we could not finish the undergraduate course of philosophy before taking up its history. I have been obliged to do more or less as Father Claude suggests, taking the ancient and medieval periods with the juniors and the modern period with the seniors. But first-year philosophers are not prepared to understand much about the concept of Socrates or the *Idea* of Plato, to say nothing of the heights to which Aristotle develops philosophy. I have found that instead of comprehending the logical sequence in the history of thought and the connection between this and the current history of the day, the average student is content with remembering one or the other teaching which the professor emphasized in class.

The course in the history of philosophy could be made to serve very well as a review of the field of philosophy with an eye to a critical comprehension of its problems. Scholasticism has not solved all our problems and St. Thomas has not cornered the market of truth. In every philosopher there is some truth, and we are not helping the philosophical bent of our students at all when we calmly dismiss all who disagree with us on the plea that we would protect their youthful minds from error. If such a student has any academic ambition at all, he will read those authors for himself without the advantage of the professor's guidance. The best way to get a student to read a book is to tell him it is forbidden.

Give Each Philosopher His Due

By all means let us give to the history of philosophy full consideration, recognizing its potentialities to round off the entire course of philosophy. Such a course taught interestingly might even bring forth the student for whom every professor of philosophy fondly hopes, namely, the student who will continue his reading and study of philosophy after he has left the lecture hall. Such a course taught after the student has somewhat of a grasp upon philosophy would help him to link up the problems of philosophy with the problems of life.

---

[8] Cf. H. Meyer, *Geschichte der Alten Philosophie*, 2.

I think that our Catholic professors of philosophy keep to themselves entirely too much. How many of them read the current magazines of philosophy? How many of them ever attend the various meetings during the year in which philosophers meet? Are we afraid to meet opposition? Or, are we really guilty of the charge often made against us, that our philosophy is dogmatic? If we are convinced of the truth of our philosophical tenets, then that truth must be *sui diffusivum* or, it is dead. Let us forget for a little while the glory of the Middle Ages and fight to place truth in the chair of philosophy in this our day.

HOW CAN WE VITALIZE OUR COURSE OF PHILOSOPHY AND MAKE IT MEET CONTEMPORARY MODES OF THOUGHT?

Fr. Edwin Dorzweiler, O.M.Cap., A.M.

A Vital Study

Philosophy is essentially a vital study. It is fairly throbbing with the pulsations of life. All the great thought-movements that have swayed humanity from the beginning come within its scope. What was a prime endeavor of the Greek masters of thought is still its cherished desideratum, "To see life steadily and see it whole." Carrying on the immemorial task of explaining reality beyond the limits of the several sciences, it is as wide as the universe and as profound as the heavens. Its purpose is to represent the panoramic view of all that the human mind has disclosed for the information of mankind.

Nothing in all nature, nothing human and divine is foreign to it. Philosophy attempts to explain the world in which we live, its origin and the laws that govern it; it endeavors to discover the ultimate composition of material things and to understand the notions of time and space. It invades the mysterious kingdom of the human mind and tries to unlock the secrets of its inner workings: how a physical nerve stimulation is suddenly translated into a psychical fact of consciousness, and how the intellect comes into its possession of truth and certitude. From the gaze of "strata of earth, motion of stars, and whirl of electrons," philosophy rises on vigorous wings of thought to a knowledge of the First Cause whose being is independent of time and space; it investigates, as far as unaided reason can, the essence of God and our relation to Him, together with the resultant concepts of law and duty and justice and morality.

Surely a science which deals with such fundamental and far-reaching questions is a vital study. It cannot be a "mere record of hollow speculation or an inventory of bloodless abstraction."

It is a living thing, a tree of knowledge whose many branches bear the fruit of ripe wisdom.

Its Influence

The philosophers of all times have claimed for themselves the mission to guide mankind in the development of knowledge and to open up visions that point the way to an understanding of the basic realities of existence. And what is the esoteric teaching of theirs to-day, becomes the exoteric information of the masses to-morrow. Poets, novelists, and artists fix upon the convictions that have slowly matured in the mind of the philosopher and make them, in their practical aspects, the property of the multitudes. Thus a potent influence is brought to bear upon each generation. For "every world-view issues into a life-view and a line of conduct." In fact, only then is philosophy truly valuable, when it becomes anchored to the realities of life and determines one's conduct. Says William James:[1] "I know that you have a philosophy, each and all of you, and that the most interesting and important thing about you is the way in which it determines the perspective in your several worlds."

Its Attraction

It is for this reason that philosophy has proved to be "the eternal magnet." Men turn to it, because they cannot escape its fascination. They will not be satisfied with the universe as a mere fact; they will have to know its ulterior significance. Man is incorrigibly philosophical; or, as Professor Maritain has it, "l'homme est un animal métaphysicien." Our own generation is witnessing a revival of interest in things philosophical. Books dealing with philosophical questions are pouring from the press to meet the growing demand. And the number of students at our large universities who devote themselves to the study of philosophy is increasing with the years. Many people look to it for guidance. They seek the truth at the mouth of philosophers, because they have grown tired of the fictions and theories that have arrested to themselves the prerogatives of truth. They would fain familiarize themselves with the teachings of the human past and combine them with what is best in modern thought, in order to form for themselves a safe *modus cogitandi et vivendi.*

However, philosophy can be a vital study only as long as it

[1] *Pragmatism: Popular Lectures on Philosophy* (New York: 1916), p. 3.

maintains a wholesome contact with contemporary modes of thought. Once it loses this human touch, it begins to feed on itself and soon withers and shrivels up in its own emptiness. Failure to refresh and replenish itself with the live stream of thought in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries led to the decadence of Scholasticism. The Scholastic thinkers of the Transition Period did not give heed to the grave problems presented by the rise of Humanism and the Renaissance. They failed to apply the principles so fruitfully employed by Thomas and Scotus, who lived in the living present, dealing with the problems of the day. They showed a deplorable lack of energy to take up the new questions and find the answers. They were content to write commentaries on commentaries, to quibble about the *ipsedixits* of a master, and to fritter away their time and talent with definitions and futile subtleties.

Necessary Contact

During its glorious period, Scholasticism had wrought into its texture all the material available from experience and the positive sciences of the time. Albert the Great and Roger Bacon had pointed out the method which philosophy was to follow in its development. But their far-sighted observations and directions were allowed to lapse into oblivion. The sciences were left uncultivated and, in consequence, no new experimental data were furnished for philosophical speculation, and thus the Scholastics of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries succumbed to the danger of falling into sterile repetitions. When in the two following centuries the sciences progressed and provided sufficient factual information, the Scholastics, having by force of habit lost the true philosophic temper, were unequal to the task of elaborating and assimilating it. They failed to appreciate and evaluate the new scientific discoveries and movements of thought. Had they possessed the philosophic outlook of the thinkers of the thirteenth century, they would have extended a warm welcome to the fresh cultural elements and would have fitted them into the broad and solid framework of their traditional system; they would have "complemented and fructified the medieval abstractness of concepts with the modern concreteness of things."[2] As a matter of fact, how-

Contact Lost

[2] J. S. Zybura, *Present Day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism* (St. Louis: Herder, 1926), p. 459.

ever, they had lost the "contact with the actualities of the time and seemed quite unable to realize that vital problems and epochal clashes were looming in the distance. No heed was given to the errors of the day." [3]

Whatever other causes may have been operative in the decline of Scholasticism, this neglect of the natural sciences and contemporary speculation must be regarded as a most potent factor. While the discovery of new realities and problems cried aloud for an answer, the representatives of a onetime live philosophy kept themselves painfully aloof and refused to take heed. A modern Scholastic writes of this period: [4]

> While the great discoveries were everywhere revolutionizing physical and mechanical astronomy, physics, chemistry, and biology, and the mathematical sciences as well, while the geocentric system of Ptolemy was being replaced by the heliocentric system of Copernicus, and Galileo's telescope was revealing the secrets of the heavens, while man's scientific conception of the universe was being reconstructed on altogether new lines, while many of the scientific theories which the medieval mind had incorporated in its synthetic view of the world were now finally and completely discredited, while profound and far-reaching political, social, economic changes were in progress, the minds of the Scholastics seemed to be hermetically sealed against the momentous import of all this new science, thought, life.

Thus the chasm between the representatives of the School and their contemporaries widened. The Scholastics lost the beneficent contact with the present that is so necessary to make of philosophy a vital study; they lost that zest that comes from the consciousness of grappling with live problems. And while they courted a smug self-complacency and aloofness, the world of thought slipped from them, and Scholasticism forfeited its influence and its reputation.—*Vestigia terrent.*

Old and New

Our course of philosophical studies must therefore be so arranged as to unite the *nova et vetera.* This was the spirit and procedure of the thirteenth century. The Angelic Doctor—the latest findings show—made such new departures in the presentation of his doctrine that he came to be regarded as a bold innovator by his more conservative contemporaries. Aquinas made all truth, wheresoever he found it, tributary to his grand synthesis. He borrowed

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 454.
[4] Zybura, *op. cit.*, p. 461.

from the pagans as well as from the Fathers of the Church, from the Jews as well as from the Arabians, from believers as well as from unbelievers, fusing the divers elements into a harmony.[5] Duns Scotus was equally broad and progressive. It was therefore but a harking back to the golden period of Scholasticism when Leo XIII, in his famous Encyclical, *Aeterni Patris,* said:

> We certainly do not blame those learned and energetic men who turn to the profit of philosophy their own assiduous labors and erudition as well as the results of modern investigation; for we are fully aware that all this goes to the advancement of knowledge. We proclaim that every wise thought and every useful discovery ought to be gladly welcomed and gratefully received by us, whatever its origin may have been.

It would be sheer blindness to deny the honest endeavors and splendid individual achievements of modern non-Scholastic thinkers. They have put forth a remarkable activity. The very fact that they are struggling for a solid metaphysics to steady them incites them to obtain results which challenge our admiration. They have given full and careful attention to the studies from which philosophy takes its points of departure, such as experimental psychology, history of philosophy, epistemology, psychology of religion, anthropology, methodology, and political science. These, together with the developments in the realms of physics, chemistry, and biology, must needs affect our course of philosophy.

Non-Scholastic Achievements

It would be as unwise as it would be harmful to think that all progress in human thought came to a standstill with the death of St. Thomas or Duns Scotus. No enlightened neo-Scholastic would entertain such a notion. Human thought moves on without let or hindrance. "Let us be persuaded," says Cardinal Mercier,[6] "that we (Scholastics) are not the sole possessors of the truth, and that the truth we do possess is not the whole truth." And Cardinal Ehrle tells us:[7] "The great teachers [of Scholasticism] should be our beacon-lights and pillars of strength; but they should not exclude independent inquiry and thereby bar the open

[5] Cf. P. Descoqs, in *Archives de Philosophie,* IV, 85.

[6] "Le Bilan Philosophique du XIX Siecle," *Revue Neo-Scholastique de Philosophie* (1900), p. 328.

[7] *Grundsätzliches zur Charakteristik der neueren und neuesten Scholastik* (1918), p. 11.

course of progress." In the opinion of these men, no less eminent for their scholarship than ecclesiastical dignity, all those who have the renewal and progress of philosophy at heart must orient themselves with the established results of the positive sciences and the trends of modern thought. They bid us look around and see where there is "something to gain, something to avert, and something to improve." These words indicate a program that can be followed with profit in our classrooms.

The conquests of modern science are so significant that it would be folly to neglect them. They must be exploited advantageously wherever they have a philosophical import. We must "prove all things, and hold fast to that which is good" (I Thess., 5, 21). While holding fast to the tested truths which have been transmitted to us by the thinkers of a former day, we should readily adopt whatever can quicken and nourish the system we teach. Outworn ideas and theories must be discarded, even though connected with names venerable in the history of philosophy. Scholasticism is a living organism capable of the double function of assimilation and elimination. It is for this reason that it has merited for itself the distinctive title of *philosophia perennis*.

Success of Neo-Scholastics

The objectives and methods pursued by the neo-Scholastic are plainly stated by Agostino Gemelli, O.F.M., in the exposition of his own philosophical development.[8] This illustrious thinker struggled his way through the maze of modern thought to a full appreciation of Scholasticism. His work as well as that of a score of other neo-Scholastics can well serve as a model and guide of our lectors in the art and science of uniting the *nova et vetera*. Everywhere these leaders are aware of the importance to think for the living generation. They readily appropriate whatever new elements prove available in the service of truth; without a regret they abandon the posts that have weakened in the face of recent discoveries; deftly they cross swords with their contemporaries in the defence of old doctrines. Many new problems are treated to which the Scholastics of an earlier day were complete strangers. Evidence of this is found at every step in the writings of Mercier and Geyser.

[8] Cf. *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*, 6. B. (Leipzig, 1929), pp. 43-109.

In the domain of psychology we meet with such names as Gutberlet, Geyser, Froebes, Mercier, Gemelli, and Thomas Verner Moore, who adopted and elaborated the copious new material of modern experimental psychology. The questions of consciousness, freedom of the will, ideology, relation of body and soul, etc., receive a generous treatment in the light of present-day speculation. The ethical problems of the day are worthily treated by Sanseverino, Schiffini, Mendive, Gonzalez, Vermeersch, von Hertling, Cathrein, John A. Ryan. In the field of natural philosophy the neo-Scholastics have assumed a critical attitude toward some of the fundamental tenets of the ancients. They give due attention to the theories advanced by chemists and physicists. They build their metaphysical concepts of life and vital processes on the foundation provided by new experimental data. Mention must here be made of the meritorious work done by T. Pesch and Schwertschlager. And such thinkers as Geyser, Garrigou-Lagrange, Marechal, Valensin, and Wust, vitalize their discussions of the foundations and methods of metaphysics with the problems raised by Kant, Hegel, and Bergson. The philosophy of religion has been enriched and broadened by Sertillanges, Garrigou-Lagrange, De San, Przywara, and Fulton Sheen. The epistemological establishment of our knowledge of God and the enucleation of the non-rational elements in the genesis of religion are accorded an extensive treatment.[9]

Special attention should be paid in our clericates to those modes of thought which have a distinct bearing on Christian Apologetics. We are preparing our clerics for the office of spreading the Christian truth and defending it against all comers. Religion is a great concern of to-day. And what is fundamental in modern religion is also fundamental in philosophy. Philosophy has come to occupy a place in contemporary thought from which theology is summarily excluded. The religious battles of the day are fought on philosophical terrain. It is here where the student, the future priest, will meet with difficulties that tax his mental grasp to the utmost. It is here where he will realize the wide chasm that lies between his own conception of religion and that of the moderns.

In the Service of Religion

[9] Cf. B. Jansen, "Papsttum und Neuscholastik," *Stimmen der Zeit*, CXVIII (1930), pp. 325-331.

He will find that he is speaking one language and they another. Religion has no longer the meaning it had a generation ago. A change has taken place in men's attitude toward religion which is as complete as the Copernican revolution in physics. The term "God" is still employed, but it has been emptied of the contents which one was wont to connect with it. The traditional proofs for the existence of God have ceased to interest modern thinkers. It is commonly believed that Kant has fully disposed of them.[10]

It is therefore of importance for the present-day preacher of the Gospel to make the proper contact with the religionists of our time. He must learn to understand their language and know their assumptions. He will render but small service, if he merely re-states over against them the time-honored truths of religion. He must be able to assume a foreign viewpoint and gradually prepare the common ground on which both can stand. What will greatly assist him in this laborious task is to know the historical origins of the contemporary philosophy of religion.

Change of Viewpoint

During the past four centuries there has been a gradual conversion from the object to the subject. In the flourishing period of Scholasticism, God was the greatest objective reality. He was the source of all that is true and good and beautiful and permanent. In consequence of this, all thought was preëminently real and objective, and the whole cultural development rose upon a solid and eternal foundation, assuring forever the stability of essential truths. With the advent of the Reformation, however, there came a gradual revolution. God, the Absolute and Immutable, was no longer the centre of religious life and action, but man—man with his changing moods and opinions. Kant, Fichte, and Nietzsche pursued this trend to its logical and inexorable conclusion—a radical reduction of all the world and what is in it and beyond it to a subjective product of the ego.[11]

The contemporary idea of religion is the logical outgrowth of Kantian doctrine. Kant denied the power of intellect to know

[10] "They have long since passed the critical stage in which critical minds find them convincing, and they are gradually approaching the stage in which men generally cease to find them interesting."—W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 299.

[11] Cf. F. X. Hörmann, "Mittelalterliche Objektivität und neuzeitlicher Subjektivismus," *Allgemeine Rundschau* (1930), pp. 165-168.

the transcendent. He drove the rational element out of religious speculation and opened the way for the philosophy of value, the dominant philosophy of to-day.[12] Each man may thus fashion a God for himself after his own image and liking. Fulton J. Sheen says:[13]

> Add to this subjectivism, this empiricism, and pragmatism, a pinch of biology, psychology, and new physics, stir it up, bake in a pan well greased with evolution, and the finished product will be the modern God. Some call it "Space-Time" (Alexander), others "The Harmony Among Epochal Occasions" (Whitehead), others the "Perfect Process" (Jones), others an "Imaginal" (Fawcett), others "Society Divinized" (Durkheim), others a "Projected Libido" (Moxon).

Hand in hand with this immanentism went the weakening or total abandonment of the substance concept. The polarity of substance and accident, which to the Scholastics seemed inevitable, has disappeared more and more. Hence came those strange inconsistencies which brought human cognition to a standstill before the qualities and prohibited the advance to the substance. Modern monism and pantheism have their foundation in this defective concept of substance. It is the question of substantiality which constitutes a prime hindrance in the *rapprochement* of Scholastics and moderns.[14]

They Refuse Substance

How are we to deal with the errors of the day? It is plain that we cannot go into details and follow them in all their devious vagaries. The time of two or, at best, three years given to the study of philosophy in our seminaries is too brief to permit of such a procedure. Modern philosophers are difficult to understand, since they depart so far from the common-sense and traditional way of looking at things, and since they employ a terminology which has none of the fixity and definiteness to which the Scholastic is accustomed. Each modern thinker creates his own language; and it takes a careful and discerning reading to discover the meaning he wishes to convey.

Our Attitude Toward Errors

We cannot introduce our clerics into all the intricacies and aber-

[12] Cf. George Galloway, *Religion and Modern Thought*, p. 78.
[13] *Religion without God* (New York: Longmans, 1928), p. 191.
[14] Cf. Georg Koepgen, *Die Neue Kritische Ontologie und das Scholastische Denken* (Mainz: Kirchheim, 1928), p. 10.

rations of modern thought. Nor is it imperative to do so. For it cannot be our purpose to turn out specialists. Besides, if we spent too much time over modern philosophies, we should have to neglect the systems of the past and thus forfeit the lessons they convey. It is well to note that what passes for a new creation is often enough but an old doctrine with a new appellation. It will be sufficient for us to give our students a thorough understanding of the general tendencies current to-day. An up-to-date textbook in the hands of a wide-awake lector will answer the most important demands. This can be supplemented in the seminar by a more intensive study of one or other of modern philosophers. In order to prevent confusion and false orientation in the mind of the tyro, it will be advisable to have the student prepare his paper under the guidance of the teacher. Our clerics should also be encouraged to read such philosophical journals and books [15] as will prove profitable to them. Thus they will keep abreast of the times and vitalize the more formal information of the classroom.

Training the Mind

However, the best equipment that we can give our students to meet the needs of the time still consists in a good academic training of the mind. Fashions in philosophy change so rapidly that only an agile and practised mind can keep up with them; the mere factual information with the philosophies of to-day will be out of style to-morrow. If our pupils are trained to think truly and consistently, to sift the wheat of truth from the chaff, to know the value of words and distinguish their various meanings, so as not to be caught by the deluding catchwords that frequently pass for truth, then they will be better fitted to deal with the thinkers of to-day than if they had a superficial acquaintance with many systems. Hence they must receive a good schooling in the art of right thinking, which should begin long before they come to the major seminary. They should be duly exercised in the use of all those intellectual weapons which are called into play in the combat of modern life. They must be keen to observe the tactics of the non-Christian thinkers; they must learn to handle the shield of exact knowledge, and the sword of discernment and logic. Unless so panoplied, they will be unhorsed in the lists of intellectual knighthood. But however eager they may be to do battle in the name of

[15] E. g., those of Fulton J. Sheen and J. S. Zybura.

truth, they must still be mindful of the spirit of St. Francis who was kind to every creature, and make their own the scholarly reserve and forbearance of St. Thomas who dealt patiently with the opinions of others, no matter how much they differed from his own. This attitude will accustom them to accept willingly and gratefully the many material elements provided by modern philosophy, even though its formal principles are largely at variance with those of Scholasticism.

Hopeful signs, too, have appeared on the horizon that promise a better understanding of the formal principles that form the very life of the Scholastic system. There is a more friendly feeling toward metaphysics. Men have recognized that they can rise from the data of sense to an appreciation of the suprasensible, that they are not definitively consigned to their own back yards or to the roof of their apartment houses, but have ways and means of finding the City of God. Neo-realism has inaugurated a happy return to the object, although it has not yet succeeded in disengaging itself from the trammels of empiricism. The notion is again gaining currency that there are objective standards of truth which are independent of time and space.

A Promise of Better Things

Many of these gratifying doctrines are embraced and popularized by the new "Humanism," which took the field in America during the last year. This new movement has set its face against a philosophy which is sodden with matter. It is plainly impatient with the prevailing naturalism which attempts to identify man with his material environment. It denies that science can be applied with equal fitness to thought and volition as it can to the forces and chemical elements of earth. It essays the task of re-humanizing man and restoring to him a spiritual intellect and a free will and a moral order. And the human past has for it salutary instruction. All these are commonplaces with the neo-Scholastic and wonderfully in accord with what he regards as the rock-bottom of unchanging truth.

"The times are ripe, if not rotten," someone lately said,[16] "and some workable philosophy will reap the windfall." What is needed is a body of men who have drunk deep of Scholasticism and have

[16] Gass, "Humanism as a Way of Life," *Forum*, May, 1929.

A Challenge

learned to be sympathetic with modern speculation. The call of the times is a challenge to present old and new truths in such a way as to command a hearing, and in accordance with the mentality and common assumptions of our generation. To perform this delicate task efficiently is to contribute, in a telling way, to the rehabilitation of Scholasticism and to the renewal of the glory that was Franciscan in the days of Oxford and Paris.

DISCUSSION

FR. PIUS KAELIN, O.M.Cap.:—There is not much danger of over-emphasizing, as an urgent need in our seminary courses, "the giving of special attention to those modes of thought which have a distinct bearing on Christian Apologetics." It must be obvious that present-day Apologetics differs to some extent from that of a few decades ago. With the appearance of Modernism, for instance, certain portions of our Apologetical treatises have had to be rewritten.

Meeting the Modern Objections to Christian Apologetics

Since then the rise of other errors in the world of thought have made similar changes necessary. This does not imply, of course, that these treatises have had to be corrected or changed essentially, for, after all, the Evidences of Christianity are the same now as formerly. But new problems and distinct objections have presented themselves in the philosophical and religious fields, and their solution insistently calls for a re-adjustment or at least a different use of our weapons of defence, since, as the paper just read states, "we are called upon nowadays to fight the religious battles on philosophical terrain." That was not so much the case prior to the present time. Hence, more attention must be given to current theories which are not, or cannot, be treated adequately in the ordinary textbook of Fundamental Theology.

Now, while it may be said that, because of its universal character and comprehensive scope, the "philosophia perennis" supplies us with the basic principles which must form the substructure of our critical evaluation and eventual refutation of the false theories which are advanced against Christianity in the present-day world of thought and religion, yet the the superstructure of arguments that is built upon these unchanging principles will fall short of achieving its intended purpose unless these arguments are perfectly adapted to meet the objections or falacious theories of our opponents. As a means to this end first-hand, and rather intimate, knowledge of modern philosophical and religious theories is required, together with a thorough knowledge of the underlying philosophical systems, which extend all the way from Kant's Subjectivism to Vaihinger's *Philosophie des Als-ob*. By exposing these false theories the props will have been pulled from under the unsound structure that has been reared upon them. At the same time the false philosophical or religious theories, which so easily gain entrance into the minds of the youth of to-day by reason of their insinuating appeal of modernity, and of the prestige afforded them in consequence of their being associated with the name of some prominent professor or clergyman whose brain-child they may be, will be effectually overthrown. By performing this task of exposing the speciousness of the

Ultimate Triumph of Scholastic Principles

theories referred to, Scholastic Philosophy will again show to the world that it is, in a preëminent way, true "common sense" philosophy, in the clear light of whose unchangeable principles the warped thinking that is largely woven into the fabric of modern philosophical and religious theories is bound to manifest itself.

Let it be granted, then, that there is need of our dealing somewhat more accurately with these theories in the seminary, albeit in a spirit of sympathetic and constructive criticism, and that our students must be made acquainted with them. But, as Fr. Edwin observes, we "cannot introduce our clerics into all the intricacies and aberrations of modern thought." That is obvious, for our courses of philosophy and theology must not divest themselves of their undergraduate character. Very gratifying results will be achieved if an up-to-date textbook (happily there are such) is placed into the hands of the students and if the lector presents to them a clear and brief digest of current false theories in the philosophical and theological domains, and if, in addition, he indicates the scholastic principles that will serve as the basis from which the overthrow or refutation or emendation of these theories must proceed. To the professor there is thus opened a wide field for seminar work of the finest character, and both he and his pupils will not only derive great advantage but also genuine joy from this more or less original work, which will vitalize the formal treatises presented in the Latin handbook. The great benefit thus gained will be inestimable to every future priest, but especially to the student who will later on be admitted to higher studies in either philosophy or theology.

Preserving the Undergraduate Character of Our Course

I agree with Fr. Edwin in assigning this particular field of Apologetical work to the philosophical department. Besides the reasons adduced by him, I believe that the theological course is entirely too crowded for Apologetics, the multitude of branches which comprise it necessitating a careful husbanding of the student's time, which leaves little opportunity for seminar work, as deplorable as this may be. The philosophical course is not so heavy, as a rule, especially, if three years are devoted to it as is urged by the Constitutions of several religious Orders. Incidentally a philosophical course in which the work under discussion is done, will better equip the student for his study of the Truths of Revelation in the theological department. However, a word of caution might be in place, *ne quid nimis*. While I am certain that there is no thought in the mind of the author of the paper to stress unduly this particular phase of the philosophical course, it may be well to point out that the work recommended, however necessary it may be, must always remain secondary in importance. The daily *expositio et recitatio* and the prescribed or recommended collateral reading must remain the chief work of the average student. If these are neglected we should perhaps be turning out "smart" and clever students, but nevertheless superficial students, whose knowledge would be shallow and inadequate. In the philosophical course clear, straight thinking and logical reasoning must primarily be insisted on, and this will go a long way in preparing the student for the field of Apologetics we are here considering.

Primacy of Essentials

As regards the reading of philosophical journals by the students in the seminary, it seems to me that the restrictions placed upon them by the *Sacrorum antistitum* of September 1, 1910, still holds. No matter what interpretation is put upon the words: *omnino vetamus diaria, quaevis aut cemmentaria, quantumvis optima, ab iisdem legi*, the reading of philosophical journals in the seminary would require rigid control on the part of the superiors.

FR. HUBERT VECCHIERELLO, O.F.M.:—It seems to me that we can greatly assist in vitalizing not only the teaching of philosophy but also the teaching of any other branch of study if we bear in mind the attitude of the pupils, their interests, and especially, the end to be accomplished. If the teacher is a *homo unius libri* whose knowledge of the subject is only sketchy, he will naturally find difficulty in making his subject live and palpitate. On the other hand, if the teacher is aglow with his subject, if his knowledge is broad and progressive, his attitude kindly, helpful and not in the least dictatorial, his students will soon respond most encouragingly to his efforts.

Necessity of Enthusiasm in the Teacher

A teacher of such calibre will soon find a most alluring field, because not only will his subject be more interesting, but what is more important, his students will become more mentally alert, their powers of reasoning, questioning, arguing, etc., more active as the days go by. Teaching such a class of students is a joy seldom equalled or surpassed, simply because a teacher capable of eliciting the best from his students becomes in a sense a student again pursuing the same old problems with the same keen, unalloyed pleasure he once experienced in his own student days.

In reality the failure or success of any teacher is in his own hands. If he forbids openminded discussion and questioning; if he acts high-handedly with his charges so as to stifle all mental exercise by his dogmatic method, his failure is just as egregious as is the outstanding success of him who forgets that silly and illusory thing called "prestige" and becomes one of the class, "rolls up his sleeves," so to speak, and attacks with persistent vigor every problem that comes up for discussion. The teacher who can step down from the rostrum and mingle prudently with his students loses nothing but rather gains confidence for himself. Such a teacher also learns many things which the textbook fails to mention, especially, the problems facing the youth of to-day. In this way he is in position to set aright many who would otherwise go a-begging for information necessary for the formation of correct life-principles and life-attitudes.

Every Teacher A Pupil

It seems that most of the trouble with regard to teaching subjects as old as philosophy is due to the fact that the system traditionally employed is made something sacrosanct in the sense that it cannot be amended or modernized by the exclusion of much that might have been vital in the past but is no longer of practical value, and by the inclusion of matters that are of the utmost interest and importance today. System is very necessary but it should not be made a fetish upon whose altar the good of our students should be sacrificed. The problems of our students are just as serious as those of the men who formulated our philosophical systems, and I think that any teacher who fails to meet these conditions and adapt the accepted system to present-day needs, is a failure regardless of how many definitions or theses his students are made to memorize for class. After all, to teach means to prepare for life, and whoever fails in this essential, fails as a teacher.

System Must not Be Rigid

METHODS IN TEACHING PHILOSOPHY

Fr. Berard Vogt, O.F.M., Ph.D.

I have been asked to write a brief paper on methods in teaching philosophy. Methods in teaching will naturally vary with the individuality and temperament of the teacher, and the personality of the teacher will lend an interest and charm of manner all its own to academic exposition. It is true also, that there are born teachers with a natural and special aptitude for teaching as there are born poets and born executives. So it would not do to attempt to cast all teachers, least of all spirited and talented minds of marked individuality, into one common rigid mold. Still, method in teaching is not something purely subjective. Teaching is a science and an art, and as such it has its objective laws and canons. These embody the accumulated experience of the centuries. This paper will endeavor to present a few aphoristic thoughts embodying personal views and experiences. They are offered in the spirit of brief suggestions which might serve as a basis for fuller and more fruitful discussion.

Purpose of Studies in the Seraphic Order

The general purpose of our course of studies is the thorough scientific preparation of our clerics for the tasks and ideals peculiar to our Seraphic Order. The more immediate scope of this scientific training is indicated by the requirements of the priestly functions and duties in our present-day environment. Our minimum standard must consequently be the level of education received by the diocesan Clergy. The plan of studies discussed at the St. Louis Meeting of the Franciscan Educational Conference, and since then adopted in substance by the various provinces of the Order of Friars Minor in the United States, with its three years of training, its emphasis on the main philosophical disciplines, and its inclusion of the collateral sciences, gives us an adequate curriculum guaranteeing a thorough and up-to-date course of education.

The complementary ideal to a good curriculum is, of course, a staff of trained teachers who have enjoyed the opportunities

of special post-graduate university training, for all the major departments of philosophy. The Church, we know, desires that philosophy be taught in Latin. Regarding the employment of Latin or English in the classroom, much will depend upon the topic of the hour. Not every subject, especially if it involves modern scientific hypotheses, lends itself to an easy treatment in Latin. The important thing, after all, is the grasping and penetrating by the student of the subject-matter under consideration. Hence a copious use of the vernacular will frequently be not merely advisable but a practical necessity.

Necessity of University Trained Teachers

The lectures are based upon the prescribed textbook. Textbooks are, however, primarily meant for general orientation, not for a too literal and mechanical catechetical treatment. Then, too, many of the briefly and dryly stated theories and theses of by-gone ages will appear to the student as "dead men's bones," unless a prophet be found to breathe life into them. The teacher must clothe these thoughts and systems of the past with the flesh and blood of actuality and breathe a soul of modern interest into them if they are to become living problems in the souls of our students.

Attitude of Teacher toward Textbook

Regarding the arrangement of the disciplines in the curriculum, the question is sometimes asked: "Would it be better to adhere to the traditional sequence and take metaphysics first, or should cosmology and psychology precede?" Those who advocate a change claim that it represents the more natural method of procedure, since it follows the mind's own way of ascending from the concrete to the abstract. Much may be said for either course. The students who take up cosmology and psychology first, will later find it easier to grasp the general principles of metaphysics; whereas those who begin with metaphysics, bring with them a capacity for readier and deeper insight into the problems of cosmology and psychology. We do not believe that it makes much difference which method is adopted, given a capable teacher, able to illustrate the abstract truths of metaphysics with empiric material when metaphysics is treated first, and equally capable of laying bare the deeper princi-

Which Disciplines Should Have Precedence?

ples beneath the problems of cosmology and psychology, should these two branches be taken first. It may be of interest to mention personal experiences in a biennial rotating course, in which one group of students would have metaphysics before cosmology and psychology, and the other vice versa. Repeatedly in the course of succeeding years we have heard the remark: "Father, we are glad we had metaphysics first; it gives us such an advantage in really understanding the problems in cosmology and psychology."

Method of Presentation

The method of dictating almost the entire matter in the classroom has too many disadvantages to recommend itself. It consumes much valuable time and easily kills interest. The supreme endeavor of the teacher should be to present his matter in such a way as to arouse the genuine and vital interest of the student. This implies, among other things, a truly scientific presentation. Only the teacher who conscientiously prepares his lectures will be able to present a given problem with thoroughly scientific method in its ideological and historical setting. As Franciscan lectors we shall, of course, devote special attention to the contributions of our own Franciscan School, in order to acquaint the students with the past achievements of our Order, and awaken in them a sense of legitimate pride and of present-day responsibility.

Kindness, a Mark of the Franciscan Teacher

An occasional open forum class devoted to informal discussion covering a convenient section of the textbook or some important problem, with general privilege of asking questions, stating views and presenting difficulties, will do much to promote a living personal interest in class work. The accumulated uncertainties and doubts of the student are thus cleared up, his difficulties removed and consequent discouragement avoided. These hours afford the teacher a real insight into the mind and soul of the pupil; they reveal to him the peculiar talent and specific sphere of interest, as also the specific limitations and peculiar difficulties of the individual student. It behooves the teacher to exercise kindness, indulgence and patience in this open forum hour. Nor should he be too sparing with a word of encouragement and praise. A sense of achievement is not pride, and psychology furnishes ample proof of the helpful influence of a sense of confidence and power in human endeavor and the attainment of successful results.

Again, a complete academic training cannot consist merely in the passive, receptive assimilation of textbooks or lectures, but includes, as a complementary element, the personal productive activity of the student. To train and insure this personal activity of the student was the purpose and function of the old traditional scholastic Circles and Disputations. In a garb more adapted to our time we have these to-day in the form of the seminar. The seminar, by reason of the individual, critical and productive work entailed in the writing of papers and the discussion of opinions, cannot fail to make the subjects thus treated living and personal possessions of the student. Besides, it aids the student to acquire a ready and practical facility in logical apprehension and expression; it teaches him how to master a new subject quickly; it trains him in personal independent judgment, which will be of the greatest value to him later on when he must meet the changing modern philosophical views differing from his own—an independence which is, after all, the primary aim and ultimate crowning achievement of all academic training. The seminar may thus become, what its name implies, a nursery of scholarship.

Value of the Seminar

We Franciscans ought to devote our seminars to Franciscan research work. Suppose we took up, for instance, the voluntarism of Scotus, his theory of knowledge, or his ethical theories, his views on psychological problems, the principle of individuation, his views on matter and form, or any other point of his doctrine, and went back to his works, carefully noting and copying every single passage in which a reference occurs pertaining to the doctrine we have selected for our special study. Given a class of intelligent students, this task can be divided among them, and, if necessary, distributed over two or three years. Each student should be apportioned a number of pages, and at the weekly or biweekly seminar, one or more should be called on to read the passages they have found. Then should follow a discussion of these passages, their true meaning, historical interpretations, their general medieval cultural values, their bearing upon other theories of Scotus, their relation to the views of other Scholastics and to modern scientific theories and speculative opinions.

Scotistic Views Well-Adapted for Seminar Work

It is easily seen that much general training and genuine profit can be derived from such seminars. Besides acquainting our students with our own Franciscan traditions, they would, if conducted in an enlightened and judicious manner, become practically enthusiastic Scotistic philosophical circles, meetings of Duns Scotus Literary Societies, which could be still further enlivened by an occasional "Actus Academicus" in the old approved style of formal discussion, or by an informal modern debate. Then, too, the results could be written up in the form of essays, thus affording training in literary activity. A good reference library is, of course, an indispensable necessity.

Other Advantages of the Seminar

I conclude with the words of Father Raymond Dreiling, O.F.M.: "To be successful, any method of teaching must include a sincere affection of the Lector for his Clerics, an understanding born of this sympathy of their circumscribed conditions of life, and a willingness to sacrifice himself for their progress' sake. These are the three charismata of the true teacher. The Lectors must meet their Clerics, not as university Professors meet their students, nor as superiors meet subordinates, but as older brothers who would show their younger brothers the ways of science and of life. *Caritas Franciscana est quae lectorem Franciscanum facit.*"

DISCUSSION

FR. EDWIN DORZWEILER, O.M.Cap.:—In the department of philosophy at Harvard University there is a practice in vogue worthy of imitation. When a student applies for admission, inquiries are made of his family and school as to his characteristic traits and intellectual needs. Immediately upon his matriculation the student receives a general orientation in the studies which he is going to pursue. About twenty students are assigned to one professor and are introduced by him into the program of studies. With the beginning of the second academic year, the young philosophers meet, once a week, individually or in groups of two and three with specially appointed tutors. Here they receive helpful suggestions in their literary endeavors; they discuss the matter treated in the lecture room; they deal with the correlation of the several branches of their studies, and learn the bearing of their acquired knowledge on actual life. At the end of the course a special examination is held to ascertain the fruits of this intensive training. The results have so far been most gratifying.

A Harvard Method

The method adopted at Harvard has all along been followed, in some manner, in our clericates. Since our classes are relatively small, we are able to give our students more individual attention than is possible in large schools. The intimate acquaintance which we have with our clerics and their needs,

the frequent quizzes in the class room, the informal discussion of philosophical topics outside of class, the papers prepared for the seminar, and the selected reading controlled by the lector—all this is in substance the method pursued at Harvard and brings about ideal conditions for efficient training in philosophy.

Whatever may be said about the proper order of the several philosophical disciplines from a psychological and pedagogical point of view—and much has been said about it—it would seem that in practice it matters but little whether logic and epistemology are treated at the beginning or at the end of the course. Even if these studies are abstract sciences, they may readily be based on the concrete reality with which each student is sufficiently acquainted. I recall an excellent teacher of logic, Father Eustace of Dunwoody Seminary, who taught at a summer school at Notre Dame. Few of his students there had ever studied philosophy before, but they found no particular difficulty in following the course of logic. As presented by this experienced teacher, logic became a highly interesting study. Logical rules and abstractions were not suspended on invisible pegs, but were made to rise from the immediate environment of the class room and the campus. It appeared that the students possessed sufficient information about the realities of life and being to insure an understanding of logic and epistemology. For, after all, it is the teacher who must put life into seemingly dead matter.

Sequence of Studies and the Teacher

FR. CYPRIAN EMANUEL:—Fr. Berard's excellent paper, embodying, as it evidently does, the fruit of years of successful teaching and redolent with the true Franciscan spirit of *suaviter in modo et fortiter in re*, touches upon the most potent factor of success in the art of teaching. The students' previous preparation and present environment, the number and arrangement of class periods, and the selection of textbooks are determinants the potency of which no professor of experience will wish to gainsay; still, they all dwindle into secondary importance when compared with method. A substantial previous preparation and favorable environment, most judiciously arranged class periods, and wisely selected textbooks lose much of their effectiveness under the stifling spell of an uncongenial and unproductive method; whereas all these conditions may be somewhat chaotic and, still, the professor who employs a method properly attuned to the branches he teaches and to the needs and talents of his students, cannot but attain at least reasonably satisfactory results.

Importance of Method

Methods, too, differ among themselves. Apart from some general pedagogical principles which must ever remain more or less uniform, we can almost say that the details of teaching methods are as multiple and diversified as are the professors themselves. Still, all methods, whatever be their mutual diversification, must ever aim to procure the twofold phase of successful teaching; namely, the imparting of knowledge lucidly and appealingly and the stimulating of interest, curiosity, and enthusiasm. They must impart, but they must also draw out. They must be conducive to arouse the student to a pitch of mental alertness and intellectual avidity that will impel him to call forth his latent talents and put them into productive operation. Any method that over a given period, let us say, a year, or even a semester, falls notably short of this goal in regard to an entire class of seriously

Aim of All Method

minded and earnest students, as our clerics generally are, must needs be discarded as faulty and ineffectual in favor of a more promising one.

Fr. Berard tells us that a good reference library is an indispensable necessity. I readily admit the truth of the statement within certain bounds. Personally, I have never felt any particular need of a very extensive reference library for my students. In the first place, as I hope to show in my paper on "The Social Sciences in our Course of Philosophy" at a latter session of this Conference, I have my work laid out in such a manner as to allow but little time for regular reference reading. Should a student, however, desire to enter more thoroughly into any problem, he is always welcome to have recourse to what I might enhance with the title of "my semi-private library of the social sciences." Moreover, as I shall also mention elsewhere, I always furnish the reference matter along with the papers I assign and that, too, I feel justified in saying, at a considerable saving of the student's limited time and with no special loss to his training in the use of sources. I have never been able to see the advantage, proportionate to the time and energy spent, of rummaging through a library in quest of material that might just as well be put into the student's hands by the professor.

Our Clerics and Reference Libraries

I do, however, encourage a certain amount of independent reference reading, but in a manner that may appear peculiar. In so far as I can judge, it is peculiar; i.e., peculiarly advantageous. I have a small bookcase in my classroom, the shelves of which are entirely vacant at the beginning of each scholastic year. As individual questions and problems come up, either in regular class work or in my assigned readings, to which I think reference reading might readily and profitably be attached, I bring with me to the classroom a number of pertinent books, explain very briefly the good points of each together with its connection with the present problem, and then either leave it on my desk or place it in the bookcase. I follow this method because I am convinced that a student is far more apt to pick up a reference work if he is thus brought in direct contact with it at the time its use will prove most profitable and if it is thus placed within his easy reach. I think it is safe to say that, if he does not do so now, he most assuredly would not have done so under conditions less favorable.

It might well be asserted that, even though our clerics' time is so occupied as to preclude the possibility of any extensive reference reading during the time allotted for study, still they should be given the liberty of a reference library during recreation periods. Here, as one charged also with the responsibility of looking after the physical health of the clerics, I obstinately contend that, if the student properly applies himself during the prescribed study and class periods, he must, ordinarily speaking, have the full amount of recreation allowed him by our General Constitutions and Provincial Statutes if he is to bear up under the seven years' strain and drain of philosophy and theology. Of course, if we could arrange extra reading time just for those who stand in special need of it and who, at the same time, could do so without any imminent hazard to health, I think it would be ideal. But, as I am convinced we all know, if our libraries were thrown open on free afternoons, etc., it is precisely these whom, as a rule, we should find most taken up with recreational activities, while the confirmed bookworm who stands most in need of recreation and social contact and least in need of extra study, would be hidden away in the library surrounded by his books and papers.

The question of textbooks, it seems to me, is just as delicate a one as is

that of method. That we must have textbooks, I am sure we are all ready to grant. Our students are simply not prepared to profit adequately by a note-and-lecture course. Many points they would miss entirely and many more they would catch only partially or even erroneously. But the choice of a textbook seems to be pretty much of a personal matter with the individual professor. He is guided in his choice by his general modes of thought, by his previous training, by his own method of attacking problems, by his own successes and failures, and points of a similar nature. The result is that, what one adopts as ideal, another will reject as being too elementary, or too academic, or too theoretic, or not sufficiently theoretic, etc. Thus we scarcely ever find two professors agreeing in detail on the merits of a textbook. Consequently, it is beyond the pale of possibility to pronounce any given textbook universally acceptable. And then, too, we must bear in mind that the specific type of textbook is, in reality, of secondary importance only. The essential desideratum is that the professor conduct his class successfully and, quite naturally, his chances of doing so are considerably increased if he has at his service a textbook which appeals to him as approaching the ideal just a little nearer than any other one obtainable.

No Textbook Universally Acceptable

THE CORRELATION OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

Fr. Hubert Vecchierello, O.F.M., Ph.D.

At the very outset of this paper I wish to state that my intention is not to present a finished work embodying a complete correlation, but rather to suggest various ideas that may be of some help both in discussing the problem and in creating a practical synthesis of all that is worth while in science and philosophy. At present the two disciplines are often at odds, but in the past they were linked as members of one family—one supplying factual, the other formulative, directive and synthesizing knowledge or principles.

Strictly speaking, science is not synonymous with knowledge. The latter is universal—the complexus of everything knowable and not this or that particular portion of the domain of knowable things. Hence, it ill-behooves any particular branch of knowledge to put forth dogmatically its own independent claims ignoring its relationship to others. Knowledge must be considered as a whole not as many disparate phenomena. The picture which St. Paul uses to illustrate the necessary connection and correlation of the members of the human body might well be applied in explaining the term knowledge. He says: "The body also is not one member, but many. . . . And the eye cannot say to the hand: I need not thy help; nor again the head to the feet: I have no need of you. . . . God hath tempered the body together, . . . that there might be no schism in the body; but the members might be mutually careful one for another. And if one member suffer anything, all the members suffer with it; or if one member glory, all the members rejoice with it." [1]

Knowledge a Universal Concept

In like manner, the interconnection of all branches of knowledge must be respected so that through the harmonious coöperation of them all, we might garner a better, surer, saner view of

[1] I Cor., XII, 14-26.

things than can be had from segregating and studying just one department of knowledge.

And now, what do we understand by science? The word science has within recent years come to have a rather limited application. In times past the word signified everything knowable and authors were wont to label their books *De Universis,* or *De Omni Re Scibili,* which indicates that science was used in quite the same sense as the generic terms of *knowledge* or *philosophy.* But nowadays with the great advances made in the physical, biological and technological fields, the word has taken on a new meaning denoting not any particular *group of facts,* but rather *a group of facts or truths obtained and proven correct by accurate observation.* In other words, by science we mean classified knowledge, knowledge systematized and formulated with reference to the discovery of general truths or the operation of general laws, especially when such knowledge refers to the physical world. "The chief goal of science," writes Vernon Kellogg, "is not merely to describe the phenomena of matter and life; it is to determine by long and close observation and ingenious and repeated experiment the order or regularity of nature, and hence to arrive at the position of being able to say what will happen under given conditions." [2] Hence it is clear, that much that is labelled science is not scientific in the least, but rather the untested, unsubstantiated consequences of subjective fancy.

Definition of Science

There is a marked difference between the concept of science and that of philosophy. Science is concerned primarily with the phenomenal, the concrete, the superficial manifestations of things; while philosophy does not confine its activities and investigations to one or several departments of knowledge. Its scope and its very nature demand of it that it delve beneath concrete facts, causes of phenomena, and palpable manifestations to seek and ferret out the ultimate principles and laws of all things. In doing this, in discovering ultimate causes, philosophy carries to a higher plane the unifying process initiated by the antecedent sciences. Science deals with stubborn and irreducible facts, philosophy endeavors to explain in the light of universally applicable

Science and Philosophy Contrasted

[2] *Human Life as the Biologist Sees It,* p. 132.

principles the mutual references between the various details entering into the flux of things. In the words of Henry Sidgwick: "It is the primary aim of philosophy to unify completely, bring into clear coherence, all departments of rational thought, and this aim cannot be realized by any philosophy that leaves out of its view the important body of judgments and reasonings which form the subject matter of ethics" and the sciences. There is no other method possible for the formation of correct ideas than that which presupposes the use on the part of philosophy of the facts, findings, laws, and principles which the sciences have discovered in the course of centuries of honest research.

Origin of Science

The origin of the sciences is shrouded in mystery in so far as actual documentary evidences of their founding are concerned, but we all know that their beginnings cannot be traced to any one man or race of men but rather to the very dawn of human history. Wherever and whenever men first appeared, they were soon forced by the nature of circumstances to become acquainted with their environment, they had to eke out a livelihood, which meant that all these vital activities as well as the circumambient phenomena in which they found themselves necessitated a knowledge of some kind which was rudely scientific. Coming down the centuries we know that the bases of well-organized scientific knowledge were laid down by those peoples who constituted the civilizations which flourished along the banks of the Nile and in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates. It is due to the genius of these people with a practical rather than a speculative bent that we owe much of our basic scientific knowledge which is so familiar, so commonplace, so homely, that we accept it much as we do air, light, or water, without analysis, without enquiry as to its origin, and without fully recognizing how indispensable and fundamental it really is. We know that astronomy, geometry, a crude mathematics, medicine, and physics had their origin among these races, but we are also aware of the fact that they failed to carry the sciences to that plane and degree of perfection to which they carried their arts. This work of generalization was left for the speculative Greeks; for as soon as the knowledge of these races had become the common property of the Greeks, their genius for perfecting and generalizing showed itself.

Of the Greeks who have profoundly influenced all subsequent thought, whether scientific or philosophical, one might mention Thales, Democritus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. To this galaxy of great men might be added the names of numerous others, but these seem to be the outstanding geniuses of the Greek period of scientific thought. All of them contributed much to science and philosophy, but the one who contributed most to science is undoubtedly Aristotle (384-330 B. C.), who was master not only of the best in the physical sciences but also of the philosophical systems of his day. Aristotle thought that science did not consist in a mere study of individual things but that we must pass from concrete facts to a formulation of general principles and then return to a study of the concrete. His was a systematizing intellect which has left its imprint on nearly every department of knowledge. Physical astronomy, physical geography, meteorology, physics, chemistry, geology, botany, anatomy, physiology, embryology, and zoölogy were enriched by his teachings. It was through him that logic, ethics, metaphysics, psychology, rhetoric, esthetics, political science, and zoölogy first received systematic treatment. The more or less chaotic learning of the times took on a logical, systematic, and uniform appearance after having passed through the alembic of his extraordinarily powerful and methodical mind.

Greek Contribution to Science

From Aristotle's time down to the sixteenth century science remained practically where the ancient Greek master-mind had left it. True, some progress had been made from time to time, in medicine and mathematics, but on the whole, scientific research pursued an uncertain and unpropitious course. Interest in it languished, its progress wavered, scientific discoveries were meager when compared with the vast amount of new material brought to light in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Before these two centuries scientific progress had apparently reached an impassé; since then there has been a marvellous and unflagging increase of interest in all branches of scientific learning. What was the cause of this change in attitude towards things scientific? Why did the pace of scientific progress suddenly quicken in these centuries? Briefly it might be answered: the Greeks had taken all previous scientific knowledge, added much to the sum-total, speculated much and generalized more until they finally developed

Growth in Scientific Interest

and elucidated the four possible types of thought which have persisted through the ages down to our own day.

There is, first, the immaterialistic monism which seeks to unify the inorganic and organic worlds by endowing matter with sensation and life; secondly the type of thought known as materialistic monism which would reduce all matter and the phenomena of life to physical laws; thirdly, the dualistic system of thought which takes cognizance of two separate realms of entities: the one physical or material, the other vital or supraphysical; and fourthly, the dualism of the physical scientist wherein the two realms are existentially recognized but the phenomena of life are excluded from all calculations on the ground that they do not fall within the sphere of scientific investigation because of the vital factor or entelechy which does not readily lend itself to the laws of strict scientific measurement. These systems were founded on certain postulates derived from observable data. Once these broad foundations had been laid, the work of the Greek philosophers and scientists might be said to have ended. I say ended, because their real achievement in the sphere of science was their contribution of the above-mentioned deductive laws which are founded on intuition more than experimentation. In science these are not sufficient, for in order to arrive at working laws which will be adequate for the classification of all phenomena, a great body of facts must be obtained and accumulated from observation and experimentation which are capable of being measured quantitatively. It is only through this method of procedure that anyone can establish the inductive laws which form what is now known as scientific knowledge. Had the ancients accumulated a large body of scientific data, formulated inductive laws, and devised an adequate system of quantitative measurement, the progress of science would have been different.

Stagnation of Science Arrested by Scholasticism

As it was, the learned world rested upon its laurels and gave itself over to a long period of extreme speculation on what had been handed down to them without going to the sources which the old masters had used for their work. Then came the gradual decay of the old order of things, the upheavals and social catastrophes brought about by the incursions of the northern tribes into the tottering Roman Empire, followed by centuries of re-adjustment, rehabilitation, Christianization,

and civilization of the unlettered invaders. Towards the end of these centuries we know that learning was again in the ascendency and Europe began a period of mental training which saw its fruition in the glorious age of philosophy typified by the thirteenth century, an epoch of strict orderly thought when rationalism of the most stringent sort held untrammeled sway over the minds of the leaders of thought. These centuries of the dominance of Scholastic philosophy had produced wonderful results in the field of speculation, but it does not take a genius to see that such a system of closed thought had its inherent weaknesses not only because it was a man-made system but also and especially because of the well-known propensities and frailties of the human mind to go from one extreme to another.

The centuries ensuing the heyday of Scholasticism saw it fall into the hands of men who were not awake to the slow change that was taking place in the minds of many thinkers. When new inventions stimulated thought and gave new life to the value of the physical speculations, these philosophers who still adhered to the strict *a priori* methods failed to rise to the occasion and therein lies the cause of that break between science and philosophy which has come down almost unbridged to our own times. The change from medieval thought-processes and attitudes to the modern scientific view is not due so much to the revival of learning as it is to the revulsion of many men from the strict and inflexible rationality of the decadent Scholastics. The birth of science is not to be conceived as an appeal to reason, but as a repudiation of the adequacy of the deductive method to supply the be-all and the end-all of human thought. Science began as a movement against the past methods of viewing things, and in doing this it took on an anti-intellectualist and anti-rationalist tone or bias from which it still suffers, due to the fear engendered in the founders of modern science of the endless and vain speculations of the philosophers who opposed every move made by the heralds of the new learning: science appealed to facts, rationalism appealed to its general laws and deductions, and this is where they stand to-day.

Breach between Science and Philosophy

Yet there must be some means of breaking down this bias which exists, for science was once a part of philosophy. Since the period

of the Renaissance, science and philosophy have pursued their separate ways ignoring each other and underestimating each other's work. The revolt might have been justified but there is no reason why it should continue, especially now when the supposed impregnable foundations of the various sciences have become weak and unintelligible. The sciences are on the threshold of a period of thorough criticism of their very foundations and to have any lasting success, they must become more philosophical. That there is a mutual distrust no one will deny, but this is a legacy of bygone days when there was more reason for such antagonism than at present. When the scientific movement gained momentum it seemed to have repudiated every connection with things philosophic, or to have fallen into the hands of those who were then formulating, or seeking to formulate a new philosophy. The fact that many, very many of the greatest scientists were also the makers of the modern philosophy which turned its back upon everything savoring of Scholasticism answers the question: "Is there any truth in the statement that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the discoveries of science and the conclusions of Scholasticism?" There is no conflict, because Scholasticism is the *philosophia perennis* and as such is able to accommodate itself to present conditions even with their glorification of science. Whether it has done this in the past or is doing it at present, is quite another question. But the answers to both aforementioned questions are to be found not so much in the relation between Scholasticism and modern scientific achievements, as in the attitude of Scholasticism toward modern systems of philosophy, since the origin of modern philosophy is analogous to that of science. The trends of the development in both modern science and philosophy were settled by men who gave the world its scientific principles and at the same time founded the prevailing modes of philosophic thought which dominate the thinkers of today in all schools of philosophy with the exception of the Scholastic. If there is any great conflict between science and Scholasticism it is not irreconcilable by any stretch of the imagination: all that it seems to be is one of attitude, of approach, of methodology.

No Conflict between Science and Philosophy

Modern science views nature, space, time, matter, the various laws concerning the transition of material configurations as objec-

tive, ultimate stubborn facts not to be tampered with and this objectivism and self-sufficiency of phenomena has rendered impossible any attempt to harmonize the ultimate concepts of science with the philosophical surveys of the whole of reality. Modern philosophy has been molded by Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, and their followers. Descartes' influences led directly to a distinct discrimination of species of entities, one material, the other spiritual. This delimitation of spheres moved inevitably towards theories of a materialistic, mechanistic nature, viewed by thinking minds. Science soon extended its sway over all nature and philosophy took control of the cogitating minds with the concomitant result that science would not venture beneath its ultimate mechanism and philosophy tended more and more to become subjectivistic, thus giving up its proper rôle of critic and unifier of the partial formulations of the sciences. The unavoidable consequences of this method of looking at things are that to-day the great problems of philosophy are the study of the mind and its functions and the epistemological theories of knowledge of a common objective world. In an effort to solve these numerous questions, modern philosophers have gone to the sciences for help and thus we see philosophers and psychologists, whose minds are as fully equipped for the settling of their problems as the medical physiologists, diligently working for a better understanding of the difficulties facing them.

Materialistic Views of Modern Philosophers

This trend of philosophy to incorporate the findings of science is a distinct contribution of the twentieth century and a definite break from that baneful parallelism which for two centuries or more has handicapped both science and philosophy. The tendency to move away from the static materialism of previous periods is most remarkable at present when we see the leaders of both domains of learning criticizing the formerly supposed all-sufficient methodological postulates based upon the Newtonian conception of nature as the basis of all speculation or means of viewing things. Such indications unmistakably point to a slow but sure approach on the part of both disciplines to a point where their results are very much like the dualistic conception of the universe which is thoroughly scholastic in content. Apropos of

Tendency of Science and Philosophy to Unite

this gradual meeting of the two disciplines on common ground, John A. Ryan, of the Catholic University of America, says:

> Despite lingering attachments to Monism, a fairer and juster estimate is quite universally made of the claim of Dualism that it represents a legitimate explanation of the nature of reality, and that only in a pluralistic universe can thought and experience ever come into harmonious and satisfying relations.[3]

Furthermore, not only is there no unbridgeable gap between the findings of science and any true system of philosophy, but it is hard to conceive of any real antagonism between what one might call the impersonal facts and principles of science with the precepts and teachings of religion. Here again, it is well to bear in mind the fact that we are speaking of basic principles and prescinding from personal attitudes. Whatever antagonism there has been or might be does not result from the facts themselves but from the personal interpretations which these facts are made to suffer in the hands of those who marshal such factors to suit their particular fancies. *Veritas veritati contradicere nequit*, says the old axiom, and what applies to truth in one field applies with equal force to truth in all fields. If science but remains within its own sphere, there is no reason why it should ever come into conflict with religion. Of course, there has been difficulty in the past even as there is at present in keeping relations in their respective channels. There must be a just balance between the two, even if it is admittedly hard to prevent the encroachment of one or the other, especially today when the world is dominated by the scientific method.

No Antagonism between Science and Religion

It is just at this critical juncture that the pertinent question might be asked concerning the advisability of keeping aloof from the sciences as an effective means of counteracting any baleful influence they might have had in the hands of those who are avowedly inimical, or frankly indifferent to the Church or her teachings. We all know that many of the leading scientists in the past have been devout Catholic laymen, but no one will deny that to-day there is a great need of scientifically minded churchmen, for they are the leaders, the representatives, the spokesmen of the

[3] *Present Day Thinkers and Neo-Scholasticism, an International Symposium*, by J. S. Zybura (Herder, 1926), pp. 349, 350.

Science Our Catholic Heritage

Church, and it is often only through them that the Church and her principles will receive a hearing. Students of history cannot fail to recall the time when the leaders in all branches of learning were clerics. Unlike those halcyon days, the field to-day seems to be preponderantly in the hands of those who are not any too well disposed to the Church.

Why should this anomaly be allowed to persist any longer? That we have permitted others to monopolize this sphere is a puzzle almost impossible to solve, unless it be on the ground of heavy financial outlays which any science course demands before it can be efficiently taught in our schools. Yet this answer does not seem complete. There is something else lacking. There seems to be an indifference, at times only half-expressed, born of a fear that there is something harmful in the study of the sciences. If it is not fear, perhaps it is suspicion which makes many look askance at science and the study of its laws. There is good reason for some of this if one takes into consideration the opinions of some of the leaders in science, but here again we must keep before our eyes the fact that the principles of science may be distorted by individuals just as the truths of religion may be subjected to the same procrustean process of being made to fit one's particular aim or view. There is nothing intrinsically evil or detrimental in the study of the sciences, as the lives and activities of many priest-scientists and good Catholic lay scientists amply prove. St. Thomas, in borrowing from pagan philosophy, while recognizing its insidious dangers, sifted it for data usable in Christian schools.

Decline of Catholic Interest in Science

What is needed to-day more than ever is a thorough training of our young candidates for the priesthood in the best scientific methods obtainable; for without this training priests will not be able to pass judgment on the validity of many of the claims and theories of science despite the fact of their commendable studies in philosophy. The sciences are a part of the domain of knowledge and as such ought to be given and allotted their just due and place in any scheme of education whether this education will ultimately lead to the priesthood or to the professions. How much more intelligible would not the abstruse

Necessity of Teaching Science in Our Seminaries

discussions on time, space, matter, substance, accidents, the proper objects of the senses, etc., be, if our students of philosophy first mastered the physics of these points? No one can deny that our cosmology classes, discussions, seminars, would take on new life, cogency, and meaning, if the factors taken up in cosmology had first been treated in geology or chemistry. Who will say that our studies in ethics, moral theology, dogmatic theology, psychology, and metaphysics would not have meant more to us had we first been trained in the sciences loosely labelled "biological sciences"?

Appeal to a Time-honored Axiom

The intimate nexus between these various scientific studies and philosophy has been aptly expressed by the old philosophic axiom *nihil in intellectu nisi prius in sensu.* It seems preposterous to ignore this axiom by trying to visualize something never perceived by the senses. It entails feats of the imagination which mortals are incapable of, and still greater feats of memory to con by rote many of the things demanded of the students in philosophy simply because they never had the necessary previous training in the sciences which form the starting point for all philosophic lore. There can be no sane, comprehensive philosophy without a thorough grounding in the sciences; for as long as we are part and parcel of the phenomenal world and utterly dependent on it for our existence and most of our ideas (if these are to be correct), we must study these phenomena in the light of and with the aid of science, the recognized interpreter of such facts.

Ambition of Neo-Scholastics

It is high time, then, that the divorce of the sciences from our school curricula be brought to an end. Neo-Scholastics decry this aloofness and are seeking by all the means within their power to bring about a reorganization of the methods by which they hope to further energize and revitalize the age-old yet ever new truths which are the heritage and the glory of their system of thought. "As the more capable historians recognize," to quote from Bruni-Zybura's *Progressive Scholasticism,* "Plato, despite Aristotle, continued to exercise a great influence on medieval science, which cultivated metaphysics and the deductive method with predilection, to the great detriment of the experimental sciences and the analytic method. The mania for systematization assailed the whole thirteenth century. The true significance and the reach of the revolution accomplished by Aristotelianism was very soon

lost for Scholasticism, but not for all human thought which, outside the *cadres* of the School, was to welcome the heritage as the principle of its own renovation, even though it execrated and derided Aristotle."

Thus, for example, the Aristotelian theory, *omnis cognitio incipit a sensu,* was eventually limited to furnishing the point of departure of a demonstrative process; above all, to satisfying the exigencies of logical thought and the now acquired sense, if you will, of an elementary experience; it was only moderately helpful in directing Scholastics to lay more solid foundations for metaphysics by the study of physics. Instead, the anti-Scholastic currents of the Renaissance were to find in that same theory their fundamental motive, as well as food for the crusade proclaimed in the name of empiricism by Francis Bacon against the hasty conclusions of the abstractive process. In a word, Scholasticism excessively emphasized the transcendent character of its truth, thus preparing the immanentistic reaction of modern philosophy. The reaction beginning with the humanistic and naturalistic tendencies of the Italian Renaissance, and at once accentuating itself, now in the direction of materialism, now in that of idealism, attempted the conquest of all modern life down to our own day.

Such being the case, we can readily understand why Picavet deplores the fact that medieval science had not promptly and resolutely set out on the way which Roger Bacon, boldly outstripping the times, pointed out to it in the thirteenth century. Picavet believes that a Scholasticism based on the direction indicated by Roger Bacon would have saved us from the anti-Scholastic spirit of Francis Bacon and of all modern philosophy, which in this manner would have been deprived of the initiative for renovating the thought of Western Europe. Thus, I can also understand why Olgiati, one of our neo-Scholastics, while always seeking strength and inspiration in St. Thomas and Greek thought, can hope for a complete resurrection of his system by giving Scholasticism a bath of concreteness. Writing to Zybura, he says:

Mistake of Medieval Science in Ignoring Roger Bacon

> We are Neo-Scholastics of the twentieth century, who propose to synthesize into one organic whole the immortal truths of pre-modern thinkers with the contributions made by modern times in the scientific and philosophical investigations of concreteness. Such is our programme,

> our method, our system. Such too, perhaps, is the battlefield on which will take place the philosophical engagements of the future.[4]

"This concreteness," Olgiati hastens to add, "is not opposed to abstraction and constitutes the soul of the modern world." [5]

Frankly, I would ask, is our stand in conformity with this? If it is, what have we done to bring these hopes to realization in our own preparatory and philosophy curricula? A casual remark, an indifferent shrug of the shoulders will avail us nothing in this day and age of science; for if we defer the duty now facing us, the task will but inevitably confront us in the future when opportunities may not be so propitious as they are now. Our teaching of philosophy needs a closer correspondence, in fact, an amalgamation with all that is beneficial and true, with the urgent aspirations of our day, and this can be greatly accomplished by giving our young men the best that is to be had in the field of the sciences.

Questioning Our Own Attitude

Of course, our ambition is not to make of our future priests scientists or researchers in the field of science. The desideratum is to have them become thoroughly acquainted with the methods of science. While philosophy trains them to proficiency in the deductive, speculative methods, we should not neglect the importance of the heuristic, empirical, or laboratory methods of science. The importance of this will become evident from the words of Dr. A. F. Frumveller, S.J., in the issue of *Thought* for March, 1927, p. 676. He says:

> Suppose for a moment that the totality of philosophers and philosophic writers now living were divided into two classes or camps, designating these by labels A and B: class A to contain all those who are professionally interested in scientific teaching or research, or who have had a thorough training of University grade in some such science as Geology, Chemistry, Biology, or Astronomy, and are still keeping in touch with it in the current scientific journals; class B to comprise all those left over, whose dominant interest lies in Literature, Metaphysics, or Theology. Suppose furthermore that some vital, urgent question like Evolution suddenly presented itself for general consideration: will the two groups mentioned align themselves on opposite sides, or not? and why?

An interesting little problem!—and our stage-setting is not

[4] *Revista di Filosofia Neo-Scholastica* (Jan.-Feb., 1925), p. 39.
[5] Bruni-Zybura, *Progressive Scholasticism*, pp. 139, 140.

wholly fictitious, either. The learned world, three centuries ago, found itself in just the position outlined above, with astronomy in the foreground of conflict; a hundred years ago, in a similar tourney, geology held the spotlight; to-day it is biology that stands in the front line of combat. In each case, the hypothesis of Evolution lay at the core of contention, dimly in the first instance, but openly in the two last. It was Modernism against Fundamentalism, or (as some are wont to style it) *Science versus Religion;* better though, and more accurately, it was the age-old struggle of *Monism with Dualism.*

We should only obscure the issue by endeavoring to distinguish between "true" and "false" science, or between science real, and so called. It would seem as if there were a deep-seated, fundamental divergence between two types or modes of thought, two types of mentality, two radically different viewpoints, two manners of approach that must needs clash. The whole truth could be brought to light only by analyzing seriously the viewpoint of science, and contrasting it with the mental attitude of a thinker whose training was predominantly non-scientific.

Urgency of the Problem

That such a study is urgently called for, who can fail to see? Since the days of Luther no issue as far-reaching as organic evolution has been debated before the world. To let discussion of it wander off into non-essential paths and be dissipated, instead of concentrating definitely upon the points of critical importance, would be disastrous in a very real sense of the word. Yet this is just what is now happening; science and philosophy are speaking in different languages; words like "evidence," "proof," "species," "hypothesis," are being used in totally different senses.[6]

Recommendation of Former Conferences

But one might ask, has not this aspect of the problem been taken care of for us in the Franciscan Conferences held at St. Louis and Cleveland? Yes, and no; for the sciences are not taught in all our clericates as they were outlined at these Conferences. There must be a strong reason for the failure to adopt or incorporate the previously mentioned plan of studies in our curricula and it is to bring these reasons to the fore that these few remarks are made. It seems to me that the question

[6] "Looking at Things Scientifically," *Thought* (March, 1927), pp. 666, 667.

could be discussed anew and much benefit derived because since these two Conferences we acquired greater knowledge regarding the needs of our clerics. No one will deny that physics, chemistry, and biology should be taught to our students, but is there any possibility of improving this schedule not only as to the time when such subjects are to be taught but also as to content? Personally, I think that the findings and decisions of the Conferences mentioned are excellent, yet I also know that there are many Franciscan educators who are not as fully convinced of this as one would like to have them. In asking for information on this point one often meets men who invariably ask the following questions: "Can you tell me why our future priests should study physics, chemistry, and biology? Can you give me the 'what,' the 'how' and the 'wherefore' of these sciences as far as our curriculum is concerned? And finally, to what extent, when and where should these sciences be taught and studied?" I frankly admit that in a gathering of this kind it would be presumptuous to attempt to answer all these questions with their manifold implications to the satisfaction of all concerned. It seems far better and more promising of results if these questions were debated on the floor where the representatives of the various provinces of the Franciscan Order could give us their opinions on the matter. In that way some agreement could be reached, plans drawn up, and provisions outlined which would be of the utmost benefit to all of us who are interested in this particular phase of education. Everyone sees the necessity of including the teaching of science in our curriculum, but the means to bring this about are not so apparent to all; everyone admits the good to be derived from the sciences, but the quantity and quality of this instruction is not at all clear to many of us.

If a plan were worked out which would be acceptable to all, great progress could be made to bring our courses of studies more in alignment with the ideas motivating the efforts of leaders of modern Catholic and neo-Scholastic thought. It is the avowed purpose of these leaders, especially in Europe, to bring about a synthesis of the best in modern philosophy and science and incorporate this into a system of thought known as the New Scholasticism. Unless we exert ourselves we shall continue to remain outside the main currents of modern Catholic Educational movements

Efforts of the Neo-Scholastics

which hold so much promise for the future. Our present task is to seek for ways and means to effect a workable synthesis, and it seems to me that no better instrument can be had for attaining this end than the Franciscan Educational Conferences. St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, even Aristotle were synthesizers of the mass of factual knowledge that had come down to them through the ages, and I am firmly convinced that the time is ripe for someone to suggest that the same be attempted to-day, as far as modern knowledge, both philosophical and scientific, is concerned. Scattered efforts and attempts have been made but these must forever remain insignificant because of the fact of their limited scope. An organization such as our Conference could set in motion a movement that would not only shed additional luster on the Friars, but also be of inestimable value to the cause of Catholic Education. As things stand to-day, the problems confronting modern philosophy and modern science are so intricate as to bewilder anyone attempting this task single-handed. Yet it must be done or the fate of Scholasticism is sealed. We cannot neglect the teaching of science, no matter how averse we are to it or how strongly wedded we are to the traditional curriculum with its emphasis on the classics. Pope Leo himself saw the need of this when he wrote:

Voice of Leo XIII

> An education which takes no notice of modern science cannot be deemed complete. It is obvious that with the existing keen competition of talents and with the widespread, and in itself, noble and praiseworthy passion for knowledge, Catholics ought not to be followers, but leaders. It is necessary, therefore, that they should cultivate every refinement of learning and zealously train their minds for the discovery of truth and investigation, as far as it is possible, of the entire domain of nature. This in every age of the Church has been the wish of the Church; upon the enlargement of the boundaries of knowledge she has been wont to bestow all possible labor and energy.[7]

To include the study of the sciences in our curricula and pursue this study with unflagging energy is the only means apparent to bring about a *rapprochement* between modern science and neo-Scholastic philosophy. In default of a workable synthesis, the best possible method is to continue along the recognized lines of modern scientific instruction until a practical synthesis has been made. Dr. James H. Ryan, of the Catholic University of America, writing on this phase of Scholasticism, has this to say:

[7] Encyclical *Longaeva* of Pope Leo XIII.

> There is a general feeling that Scholastic thought is so bound up with medieval ideas of science that anything like a *rapprochement* between it and modern philosophy is unthinkable. The philosophy of St. Thomas was developed in a period and in a *milieu* which were wholly unscientific. The physics, chemistry, and biology of the thirteenth century strike us as only a bit less childish than the animism of certain Australian semi-savage tribes of the present day. Not only did the Middle Ages lack scientific knowledge; their atmosphere was positively anti-scientific because of over-emphasis of the deductive process which is regarded as the sole means of acquiring truth. It is for some such reasons as these that many feel that a philosophy developed under such unfavorable circumstances has little or nothing substantial to offer to modern thinking.[8]

"The New Scholasticism, as far as science goes, is not medieval but modern. As a matter of fact, that is one of the reasons why it is a *new Scholasticism*. We are quite conscious of the scientific handicaps under which Bonaventure, Albert, and Thomas labored. We should consider it nothing short of suicidal to fail to make use of every item of information laboriously achieved by modern research and investigation. The New Scholasticism cannot accept the physics, the chemistry, or the biology of the Middle Ages, nor does it make any pretense to justify the scientific views of that period.

Neo-Scholasticism not Medieval but Modern

"In every field of investigation we have made substantial and important contributions to present-day knowledge. We have accepted, too, the results of other investigators and have attempted to interpret them in terms of our general philosophy of nature. Where these results have contradicted theory, we have not wavered in sacrificing theory to facts.

"The New Scholasticism cannot accept either the extreme Experimentalism or the extreme Deductionism. Taken as an exclusive method of approach to the problems of philosophy, both views are inadequate and false. But philosophy, because of the innate limitations of pure science, must ever soar above the formulations which are presented to it by science. It must also return to these same formulations in order to check up the truth of its own thought constructions. In both ways, therefore, science aids and even controls philosophy, for, first of all, it starts philosophy on the right road to truth, and then it calls her back to this road whenever, because of the hardihood of her speculations, she strays into by-

[8] J. S. Zybura, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

paths of error or falsehood, or, what is worse, into blind alleys which lead nowhere." [9]

Hence, there is nothing left for us to do but to develop ways and means of assisting this laudable movement which seeks to synthesize the findings of science and the best in modern Scholasticism. Cosmology, the philosophy of matter, must be studied in close alliance with physics, mineralogy, and mathematics; psychology, the philosophy of life, becomes very circumscribed unless taken in connection with biology, anatomy, and physiology; modern logic must take into consideration the interesting problem of the canons and limits of induction with its consequent minimizing of the value and importance of the syllogism. The same could be said of epistemology, ethics, history of philosophy, and the rest of philosophy. Our purposes must point not only to a greater and more intimate union between the teachings of philosophy and the sciences, but we must not forget that our decisions in this matter must conform with the best in present Catholic Educational Movements. Whatever our decisions will be, they will have far-reaching consequences for our future weal or woe. Professor Whitehead, one of the leaders in non-Catholic philosophico-scientific circles, has significantly and truly averred that " when we consider what religion is for mankind, and what science is, it is no exaggeration to say that the future course of history depends upon the decision of this generation as to the relations between them." I firmly believe that our patent duty is to throw our influence on the side of those who are endeavoring to bring about a concordance between science and philosophy and religion. We are shirking our duty and dodging a serious issue unless we do all in our power

Our Present Task

> to form, in greater numbers, men who will devote themselves to science for *itself*, without any aim that is professional or directly apologetic, men who will work *at first hand* in fashioning the materials of the edifice of science, and who will thus contribute to its gradual construction. The particular sciences do not give us a complete representation of reality. They *abstract:* but the relations which they isolate in thought *lie together in reality*, and are interwoven with one another; and that is why the special sciences demand and give rise to a science of sciences, to a general synthesis, in a word, to philosophy. Since individual courage feels itself powerless in the presence of the field of observation which

[9] *Present Day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism*, by Zybura, pp. 351-356 passim.

goes on widening day by day, association must make up for the insufficiency of the isolated worker; men of analysis and men of synthesis must come together, and form, by their daily intercourse and united action, an atmosphere suited to the harmonious development of science and philosophy alike.[10]

Philosophy is often compared to a wondrous temple and Huxley once said that the laboratory was the portico by which one must enter into the Temple of Philosophy. It has been my purpose to bring to your notice some of the thought-provoking problems facing modern educators whether their interests lie in the field of philosophy, science, or religion. With all the signs of the times pointing to a correlation between science and philosophy, shall we follow the indications or shall we continue on our course smugly complacent in the thought that ours is the only correct course and that our present educational position is impregnable. The decision rests entirely with us.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bruni-Zybura, *Progressive Scholasticism* (B. Herder Co., St. Louis, Mo., 1929).
Eddington, A. S., *The Nature of the Physical World* (MacMillan).
Haldane, J. S., *The Sciences & Philosophy* (Doubleday, Doran & Co., Garden City, N. Y., 1929).
Libby, W., *The History of Science* (Houghton, Mifflin Co., N. Y., 1917).
More, L. T., *The Dogma of Evolution* (Princeton Univ. Press, 1925).
Längdon-Davies, J., *The New Age of Faith* (Viking Press, N. Y., 1925).
Locy, W. A., *Biology and Its Makers* (Henry Holt & Co., N. Y., 1928).
Nordenskiöld, Erik, *The History of Biology* (A. Knopf, N. Y., 1929).
Smuts, J. C., *Holism and Evolution* (MacMillan Co., 1926).
Windle, B. C. A., *A Century of Scientific Thought & Other Essays* (Benziger, 1915).
Windle, B. C. A., *Vitalism and Scholasticism* (Herder).
Whitehead, A. N., *Science and the Modern World* (MacMillan, 1929).
Zybura, J. S., *Present-Day Thinkers and The New Scholasticism* (Herder, 1926).
Third Annual Proceedings: *American Catholic Philosophic Association.*
Reports of the *Franciscan Educational Conferences.*

DISCUSSION

FR. CLAUDE MUSSEL, O.M.C.:—It is not unlikely that practicability and material utility will soon bring havoc among our most abstract and speculative sciences. Both the leniency and superficiality of many of our philosophers coöperate forcibly toward this overthrow of the real intellectual

---

[10] *Rapport sur les Etudes Super. de Philosophie,* Congress of Malines, 1891, by Card. Mercier.

banquets of the mind. If we could but make clear to scientist-philosophers the true correlation of sense and intellect, of will and passion, also the problem of the correlation of science and philosophy would receive a satisfactory and adequate solution.

Present Trend to Pure Sensism

It is the trend of the age to deny the existence of all things that do not fall, directly or indirectly, under the perception of the senses or the imagination. Truths, that are acquired only through speculation of the abstracting intellect, are being looked upon as chimeras and day dreams of an idle, eccentric and old-fashioned quack philosopher.

By its very nature, science in general, is unthinkable unless there be embodied in its constitution generalities, applicable, not to this and that in particular, but to many or all in the same category. The great hitch lies undoubtedly in the misinterpretation of the trite axiom: "All knowledge takes its beginning from the senses." Although science begins there, it does not progress and end there. The senses are capable of perceiving an agglomeration of particular facts but no such collection constitutes science anymore than an aggregate of building materials constitutes a house.

Medieval Scholasticism Unworthy of Blame

Science in general, treats essentially of universal truths, whereas modern philosophers vainly endeavour to materialize, individualize and particularize them—a process doomed to certain failure. The criticism bestowed upon medieval Scholasticism, on account of its lack of concreteness, is wholly undue. Scholasticism is not an artificial systematization of knowledge but an organic masterpiece in which one truth is beautifully and coördinately linked to the other. Scholasticism, if it is to remain truly scientific, cannot be made concrete.

Things have been materialized enough and it is time that energetic reaction set in to cope with this outstanding intellectual evil. The senses are taking the foremost place in our scientific endeavours and the intellect is being forced to play second fiddle. Like the modern ethical evil of communism abolishes, by its nature, the two and only two virtues of the will, justice and charity, thus destroying the very heart of ethics, so does empiricism, if stressed too highly, lead to the deadening and total eclipse of personality in ideas and intellectual initiative.

Unum facere et alterum non omittere, would be the best rule to follow in this regard. Sciences must be taught but not to the detriment of the more human and noble knowledge that is dependent on the intellect alone. The natural sciences, as Fr. Hubert remarks in his excellent paper, could well be made to form a whole with philosophy. There is danger, however, that attractiveness of the sciences will draw away the attention of the student, in a marked degree from the more abstract truths of philosophy proper, a difficulty which an experienced teacher can easily overcome.

THE VALUE OF EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Fr. James Van der Veldt, O.F.M., Ph.D.

In the letter in which your Rev. President invited me to write a paper on the value of empirical psychology, he asked me to prove the following thesis: *Extra psychologiam experimentalem nulla salus pro Minoribus!*

I am sorry that I must disappoint his hopes, but I am really not able to demonstrate this thesis; the evidence of more than seven hundred years' history of our Order, with its great men and innumerable scholars, would testify against me. I should not dare to draw up the thesis in such an apodictic and absolute form. On the other hand, it is true that humanity always goes ahead: *Tempora mutantur et nos mutamur cum illis.* Science never rests, and therefore it is necessary for us to keep pace with its discoveries: it would be a very naïve attitude if we were to ignore all progress, and remain firm on the level of knowledge established some centuries ago.

Accordingly, I wish to draw up my thesis in this way: Considering the development of science, it is very useful and in some respects necessary for students of philosophy and theology to become sufficiently acquainted with the findings of empirical psychology, and that in a special course. Putting in the term *empirical psychology* I add a new correction to the formula first proposed. For in fact, in this paper, I have in mind not only experimental psychology in the strict sense; i. e., that psychology that is founded on experiments, but also that positive psychology, which in its whole extent is empirical (e. g., also characterology, psychopathology, psychology of childhood, etc.).

Thesis

When it was suggested above that our Order has prospered without experimental psychology our meaning might easily have been mistaken, and the proposition must be well understood. In point of fact, our learned men did have the material without possessing the label, for the psychology of Aristotle and the great Scholastics was thoroughly based on the solid grounds of experience. The facts were drawn from ordinary observation or provided by the science of their

Difference between Rational and Empirical Psychology

time, and from those data they drew conclusions as to the nature of the phenomena themselves. It must be granted that the observation was a little hasty, and that their speculations and systems sometimes went further than the facts warranted, but nevertheless these latter furnished the foundation.[1] Scholastic psychology was by no means an aprioristic speculation, which first set up the idea of the soul, and then from this ideational essence deduced its particular activities and manifestations, as O. Klemm [2] and Toulouse [3] wish us to believe. The latter even adds: *Encore aujourd'hui c'est la methode en honneur dans les milieux theologiques!* This method ought much rather to be assigned to Descartes and Kant, to the rationalistic and idealistic philosophers, who want psychology without keeping in touch with experience.[4]

But even if it be true that the old speculative psychology of the Scholastics still means something more than a question of mere historical interest, as Ziehen [5] contends, yet it is difficult to call it experimental or empirical psychology in the modern sense, as M. Barbado [6] seems to do. With the Scholastics the empirical element was completely fused with the speculative, and the scope of the study of the facts was to draw conclusions as to the nature of the substance to which they inhered, which same process is still followed in neo-Scholastic philosophy. But besides this psychology, which we may call philosophical, metaphysical or speculative, another science has developed: positive, scientific, empirical, or taking the *pars pro toto,* experimental psychology, which wishes to approximate to the natural sciences or even be one of them.[7] The object of these two psychologies is the same: the

[1] Cf. J. de la Vaissière, S.J., *Eléments de Psychologie expérimentale* (4th ed., Paris: Beauchesne, 1914), p. 11.

[2] *Geschichte der Psychologie* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1911), p. 12.

[3] *Technique de Psychologie expérimentale* (Paris: Doin, 1904), p. 3.

[4] Cf. F. M. Palmès, S.J., *Psicología* (Barcelona: Horta, 1928), p. 22.

[5] *Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie* (11th ed., Jena: Fischer, 1920), p. 4.

[6] *Introducción a la Psicología experimental* (Madrid: Editorial Voluntad, 1928).

[7] Cf. A. Gemelli, O.F.M., in *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen,* hrgn. von R. Schmidt (Leipzig: Meiner, 1926), V. 35: "Die experimentelle Psychologie steht mitten zwischen den Naturwissenschaften und der Philosophie."

T. Ribot, *La Psychologie anglaise* (3rd ed., Paris: Alcan, 1887), p. 34: "La psychologie dont il s'agit ici, sera donc purement expérimentale: elle n'aura pour objet que les phénomènes, leurs lois et leurs causes immédiates."

W. James, *Precis de Psychologie* (trad. franc. Baudin-Bertier, Paris:

study of psychic phenomena, but empirical psychology has a different scope (the description of the facts with the utmost precision, and, if possible, a measurement of them), a different method (experiment and systematic observation), and, moreover, has several practical applications. Thus, we acknowledge two different branches of psychology as e. g., Gemelli [8] and Fröbes [9] also do. Now it is the value and utility of this psychology for our students that I wish to prove to you. As my time is limited, I shall not enter into details but shall quote some authors where more can be found about the different topics.

In the preceding introductory pages we really find already *in nucleo* all the premises which should lead us to our thesis. C. K. Ogden [10] says: "Psychology ultimately provides a basis for all other studies—Ethics, Economics, Aesthetics, Ethnology, Grammar, Politics, and Mathematics. Even Physics is ultimately driven back on hypotheses which are essentially matters of psychological criticism and construction." Of course, it would be *des Guten zuviel,* if I should try to demonstrate all this; for our aim it suffices to consider the relation between empirical psychology on the one hand, and some philosophical and theological subjects on the other.

Value of Empirical Psychology for Philosophy

We are all convinced of the value that physics, chemistry and biology have for philosophy, but the utility of empirical psychology is greater still. The reason lies in the very nature of psychology: since its subject is the psychic activities of human and other living beings, it touches philosophical problems more than any other science does. This is especially true in the supposition that introspection is the foundation of its methods.[11]

It is empirical psychology which must furnish the data for

Rivière, 1909), p. 1: "J'ai l'intention de traiter dans ce livre la psychologie comme une science naturelle."

[8] *Op. cit.*, pp. 33, 34.

[9] *Lehrbuch der experimentellen Psychologie* (3rd ed., Freiburg i. B.: Herder, 1923), I, 1. *Psychologia speculativa* (Freiburg: Herder, 1927), I, 1. For the different opinions about this point cfr. De la Vaissière-Palmès, *Psicología Experimental* (Barcelona: Subirana, 1924), p. 14.

[10] *The Meaning of Psychology* (New York: Harper, 1926), p. 3.

[11] Cf. A. Gemelli, O.F.M., *"Rapporti tra scienza e filosofia,"* IV Congr. Intern. di Ph., 1911.

rational psychology. The medieval Scholastics had not made much progress in the sciences. Since, however, we now have a treasure of facts and solid research work at our disposal, it would be too bad if we did not make use of them. I quote here the words of such an authority as J. Fröbes in his eminent book on speculative psychology (Proemium V): "Quidam [philosophi scholastici posteriores] facta et leges noviter detectas negligentes, disputationem philosophicam semper plus restringebant ad quaestiones maxime abstractas. Alii e contra censebant traditionibus Scholae Peripateticae melius convenire, ut nova cum veteribus conjungerentur." The latter has been done especially by Cardinal Mercier [12] and his Louvain School, M. Maher,[13] J. Geyser,[14] and Fröbes himself. Such a combination of *nova et vetera* supposes, of course, a sufficient knowledge of the *nova* of empirical psychology.

Empirical Psychology in Its Relation to Rational Psychology

In order that you may understand me well, I must make the following remark. It goes without saying that speculative psychology as a whole does not depend on empirical psychology. Even without the minute methods by which the latter investigates the facts, one can prove the spirituality and the immortality of the soul and the freedom of the will. But there are many other more strictly scientific questions, on which the findings, laws and explanations provided by positive psychology may throw some light, just as chemistry and physics are of great value for cosmology. Let us take some examples. If one would understand well the human faculties of cognition and conation, he ought to be conversant with the data of animal psychology on that point. It would be quite hard to deal with the acquisition of new abilities and habits in men without some knowledge of the learning of the more highly developed animals.[15] One of the principal methods of empirical psychology is and remains systematic introspection,—whatever the Behaviorists such as J. B. Watson may contend. This psychological method, applied by Binet, Spearman and the famous school of Würzburg (Marbe, Messer, Bühler, Lindworsky, Gemelli,

[12] *Psychologie* (Louvain: Inst. Sup. Ph.), 2 vol.
[13] *Psychology* (5th ed., London: Longmans, Green, 1902).
[14] *Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Psychologie* (Münster: Schöningh), 2 vol.
[15] Cf. W. Köhler, *Intelligenzprüfungen an Menschenaffen* (Berlin: Springer, 1921).

Michotte, N. Ach) has supplied a quantity of facts to the phychology of thought and will, which cannot be neglected by philosophers. In this respect Gemelli writes: "Perciò oggi io credo non è possibile fare della psicologia dei processi mentali . . . senza conoscere i risultati della psicologia empirica." [16] Even a Non-Scholastic like de Sanctis [17] testifies that by those researches the existence of imageless thoughts has been proved as a matter of fact. The great problem of the relation between mind and body with its no less than seventeen different theories [18] belongs as such surely to philosophy, but it can be illustrated in an excellent way by the laws of psycho-physics and psycho-physiology, e. g., the law of G. Fechner,[19] according to which the sensation grows as the logarithm of the stimulus. I say that the controversy may be illustrated, for even after using psycho-physical parallelism as a working-hypothesis, we are ultimately driven back to metaphysics, as Leibnitz says in regard to this: "After having established these propositions I thought myself entering into port, but when I came to meditate on the union of the soul with the body I was as if cast back into the open sea."

Empirical Psychology and Epistemology

Knowledge of empirical phychology, especially if supported by experiments, will clarify some chapters of epistemology, above all, the relation between the *Ego* and the *Non-Ego*. Today it is inconceivable that one could deal thoroughly with the problem of the perceptions from a critical standpoint without taking into account the explanations of the school of Graz and those of the Gestalt-theory.[20] Personally I must confess that I only fully understood the bearing of Idealism after the study of experimental psychology. For instance, the question of the complementary colours which has no meaning in physics and which really belongs to psychology makes one feel, so to speak in an experimental way, the subjective element in perception. Many psychologists are subjectivists. "From its own outlook Psychology has long insisted on the subjectivity and relativity of space, time,

[16] *Nuovi orizzonti della psicologia sperimentale* (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1928), p. 121.
[17] *Psicologia Sperimentale* (Roma: Stock, 1929), I, 221.
[18] Cf. C. K. Ogden, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
[19] *Elemente der Psychophysik* (Leipzig, 1907), II, 13.
[20] Cf. W. Köhler, *Gestaltpsychology* (New York: Liveright, 1929).

movement, weight, etc., as C. Myers says.[21] The famous distinction of John Locke between " secondary " qualities, e. g., those of colour, sound, taste, and temperature, which were considered as purely subjective, and " primary " qualities, e. g., those of size, shape, hardness, movement and weight, which were regarded as " real " properties of matter, have long been abandoned by psychologists. The " primary " qualities are recognized as not more real than the " secondary," as Spencer points out: " What we are conscious of as properties of matter, even down to its weight and resistance, are but subjective affections produced by objective agencies that are unknown and unknowable." [22] Psychologists think that the arguments for this conclusion can be founded on facts. They think that all conscious products of mental activity are relative, e. g., the estimated distance between two points applied simultaneously to our skin differs in different parts of the body surface. Our estimate of the weight of an object is found to vary with the speed with which we happen to lift it, as is proved by the famous experiment of a box full of feathers and a box of the same weight full of lead. Our appreciation of colour is modified by successive or simultaneous contrast. When a grey strip is placed on a uniformly coloured (e. g., red) background, and the whole is covered with a piece of tissue paper, the grey strip assumes a colour (green) complementary to that of the background. And so we can multiply examples *usque in infinitum.* Do those experiments, however, suffice for us to draw a conclusion as to the complete subjectivity of our perceptions? I only put the question in order to show you the necessity for the philosopher of improving his acquaintance with the data of experimental psychology. And not only with its data but also with its theories, for the basis of the different schools amongst empirical psychologists is entirely philosophical, so much so that Köhler [23] concludes from Behaviorism—which tries to expel all philosophy—that it is purely epistemological. *Naturam expellas furca, usque tamen recurrit.*

In order not to extend this paper too much I shall pass over the relations between psychology and other branches of philosophy, however great may be its value for ethics and especially for

[21] *Psychological Conceptions in other Sciences* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929), p. 4.

[22] *Principles of Psychology*, I, 206. [23] *Gestaltpsychology*, p. 34.

sociology: the theories of Levy-Bruhl and Durkheim, e. g., are thoroughly founded on psychology. I shall now emphasize a little its utility for theology and pedagogy, especially for moral and pastoral theology and for catechetics.

Empirical Psychology and Theology

Speaking of its value for morals I have in view the psychology of the will, which lays so much stress on the necessity of ideals for the development of energy,[24] and that part of psychology which deals with dreams, sexuality and abnormalities such as neuroses, scrupulosity, neurasthenics, hysteria, hallucinations etc.

At the meetings called *Kongresz für Religion und Seelenleiden* which are held annually at Kevelaer in Germany by Catholic priests and physicians, presided over by the well-known Dr. Bergmann,[25] the continually recurring complaint is that many confessors still know so little of psychology and psychopathy, and that they often understand little of the abnormal cases, which at present are far more numerous than many think. Of course, the priest need not be a physician, and it is even dangerous for him to try to undertake the work of a physician, but he should at least have enough knowledge to distinguish between sin and sickness, that is to say, to determine the amount of responsibility of the penitent.

It seems to me that nowadays the priest should also have some knowledge of the principles of psycho-analysis as a method of curing diseases and as a doctrine. This theory has a bearing not only on morals but also on dogmatic theology and even on Scripture, and for an understanding of its interpretations it is not sufficient to know that Freudism is a strange and not very " clean " system.

With regard to ascetical and mystical theology no one will doubt that knowledge of the psychical powers of man is a *conditio sine qua non* as the case of Therèse Neumann of Konnersreuth proves.

The priest often has to deal with education in catechetics, in school, and the leadership of young people. Now the art or rather the ability to be an educator cannot be learned: one possesses it

[24] Cf. J. Lindworsky, S.J., *Der Wille* (Leipzig: Barth, 1923), p. 226.
[25] Up to now five volumes of the proceedings have been published: *Religion und Seelenleiden*, hrgn von W. Bergmann (Augsburg: Haas and Grabherr).

Empirical Psychology and Education

or not. With all the psychological and pedagogical books in the world one cannot learn how to educate children well if one does not have the flair for dealing with them. Several great psychologists, who wrote so well on education, were not able to bring up their own children well. But supposing that one has the aptitude, one may learn a lot of things from the science of education: one may refine one's methods, apply some laws systematically which perhaps were first discovered intuitively, and pay attention to the individual behavior and differences of some of the pupils. For the educator ought to work on a growing mind, with the definite purpose of obtaining an end in view. Now the educator can attain this end by specified means, because the growth of the mind follows certain fixed laws. But what the laws of the mind are we learn from pschology.[26]

In catechetics the fine analyses of the psychology of the child made e. g., by Binet, Piaget, Stern, Bühler etc. would be of inestimable value: they show us how the child thinks, what is its idea of God, its suggestibility, its logic, the value of interest for attention and progress in learning, the peculiarities of the child's phantasy, to which we must attribute many of its so-called lies. Psychology may also give us some help in the art of interrogation.[27]

Very exacting are the requirements demanded of leaders of young people, directors of asylums and also of confessors in their dealings with youth in that dangerous period of *Sturm-und Drang,* which is called puberty. In such circumstances it does not suffice to know that this time is a dangerous one. No, if one really wishes to help the young people he must know what are the manifestations of puberty, and to conclude from them the special phase through which the boy or girl is passing. The right word spoken at the right moment can do enormous good and prevent much evil.

And now I pass over in silence knowledge of temperament and character, and their somatic manifestations.

So far we have only spoken of the close relation which exists between empirical psychology and some sciences which the priest

[26] Cf. J. Ward, *Psychology applied to Education* (Cambridge: University Press, 1926), p. 1.
[27] Cf. Hamilton, *The Art of Interrogation* (London: Kegan Paul, 1929).

and the candidate for the priesthood need. Empirical psychology must not, however, be considered only as an auxiliary science, as a kind of *ancilla philosophiae et theologiae.* It is, as I said at the beginning, an autonomous science, and as such has value in itself. If we were to practise a science solely because of its utility we should fall into the purest Pragmatism or Utilitarianism. The definition of man—at least according to Scholastic philosophy—is *animal rationale,* and not *servus utilitatis.*

Empirical Psychology as an Autonomous Science

On the other hand, however, every science which is exercised for its own sake sooner or later yields profit. Thus, several branches of applied psychology, e. g., the measurement of intelligence, psychotechnics, and vocational psychology have direct utility. I personally think that empirical psychology, put on the program of our students in philosophy, will be an excellent means towards understanding the method of positive science: it shows how far science can go, where its limits are, and what questions must be answered by philosophy. Therefore, it seems to me a disadvantage to study empirical and rational psychology together. In order to avoid a hotch-potch, it seems better to define clear dividing lines and to treat both separately.

You see, there are many reasons in favor of empirical psychology, and you will have no doubt that this science has quite an extended field of work, so much so that T. Ribot,[28] exaggerating a little, says:

> On a pu dire que toute chose dans le Ciel et sur la terre en tant qu'elle est connue, est une matière psychologique. Elle [la psychologie] inclut les faits les plus vulgaires de la vie animale comme les manifestations les plus hautes de l'art, de la science, de la religion, ou les plus complexes des sociétés civilisées.

Finally, I must add a special reason for Americans. You know that in the United States psychology has taken a lofty flight. At the last International Congress held at New Haven last year, about twelve thousand American psychologists attended, perhaps more, as Boring said, than all Europe could furnish. But among all those learned men there were only a few Catholics. It seems that in this matter Catholicism is a little

Empirical Psychology in America

[28] *Methode dans les sciences* (Paris: Alcan, 1909), p. 256.

behindhand. Consequently, there is a whole field of work for Catholic energy, in which the Friars may also collaborate. This collaboration may be very fruitful, supposing always that we do not consider psychology as a mere collection of contingent facts, but that we regard it a real mental science, and that we do not lose sight of its relations with metaphysics.

So I may conclude this dry enumeration of different reasons, each of which could be developed at length, but since a minute is only a minute, it seems to follow that 25 minutes are just 25 times one minute. Let me conclude with the words of Fröbes,[29] which I wish to quote literally because they express my thought so well: "Qui ergo ad mentem sanae philosophiae peripateticae hodie psychologiam tractare voluerit, et nova et vetera colligere debet, quaerens veritatem undecumque juvari poterit ne ob ignorantiam novae scientiae etiam solida capita veteris doctrinae adversariis contemptibilia reddat."

Conclusion

A last word about the practical question, which was put to me, *scil.*, how psychology should be dealt with, and how much time should be spent on it. I am, however, hardly able to answer, since I am not *au courant* with the school-program in America. Only a few suggestions must suffice.

The Question of the Program

As I have already said, empirical psychology should be treated in a special course for the philosophers. An elementary course emphasizing only the method and the fundamentals is sufficient, for the principal thing is that the students should have a clue for further study. The best time would be the first year of philosophy and probably three hours a week would suffice. It would be very useful to have one hour a week for a seminar and demonstrations in a laboratory. A course of biology and some knowledge of physiology, especially, the physiology of the sense-organs and neurology, would be of inestimable help for psychology: these matters might perhaps be treated in the seminary (high school). Those topics in psychology and psycho-pathology which have relation to theology might best be dealt with in the theological course itself, in order not to lose the connection, always supposing that there has been a psychological course in philosophy.

[29] *Psychologia Speculativa*, I, 2.

If students follow this sketch-program I am sure they will make great progress in understanding what the mind is, and they will know better their own mind as well as the minds of others. "Shall we not, then, as we have much time, retrace our steps a little, and examine ourselves calmly and earnestly, in order to see what these images in us are?" (Plato.)

DISCUSSION

FR. VINCENT FOCHTMAN, O.F.M.:—This paper shows clearly that Dr. Van der Veldt is deeply influenced by that "nobler curiosity which questions of the source of the River of Life," of which John Ruskin speaks in *Sesame and the Lilies*. My views are so fully in accord with those expressed by Dr. Van der Veldt throughout his excellent paper that I find little to discuss, for discussion, after all, is born of disagreement. Allow me, however, to call attention to some points in this paper that deserve special recognition. His advocacy of separation of empirical and rational psychology is undoubtedly a step forward. This division has already been carried out in one textbook with which most of us are familiar. I refer to the excellent *Introduction to Philosophy* by Dr. Charles A. Dubray, S.M. It is unfortunate that Dr. Dubray's meaty and concise treatise of psychology is not slightly enlarged, brought up to date in a few minor details and published as a separate volume. Some eminent neo-Scholastics, foremost among them Professor Josef Geyser, object to the separation of empirical and rational psychology. Whether or not one sides with Geyser, the practical advantages accruing to a divorce of empirical and rational psychology have been so eloquently portrayed by the writer that one will not hesitate to endorse his stand.

Separate Treatment for Empirical Psychology

The importance of psychology for philosophy, especially for epistemology, has received an excellent exposition at the hands of Dr. Van der Veldt. His confession that psychology was necessary to bring to him a full realization of such problems of the theory of knowledge as idealism will, I am sure, be shared by many. In Scholastic textbooks psychology is introduced quite extensively into epistemology. However, the terms used and often insisted on are only too frequently antiquated. In many cases they do not seem to have more than a historical value. Why not substitute the appropriate terms as they are used in modern psychological treatises? This would put our students *en rapport* with the thought of the modern world. It is this viewpoint that has actuated Cardinal Mercier and his school as well as practically all the German Catholic psychologists and philosophers. It would go far towards remedying the isolated position of educated American Catholics. The eminent writer of this paper has tactfully hinted that we American Catholics are outside the pale of what is best in modern thought. But it is a pale erected by our own neglect.

Dr. Kirsch in a previous discussion has called our attention to the need of psychology for the pastor of souls. The writer also insists on this in his paper. In fact this part of his paper seems to me the most important

Psychology and the Pastor of Souls

of all. Most priests in this country have some acquaintance with the psychological problems that await the priest and the educator. The masterly articles of Dr. Bruehl in the *Homilectic and Pastoral Review* deserve a large share of the credit, inasmuch as they have awakened interest by pointing out how psychology can and should be applied to the cure of souls. Undoubtedly, a thorough course in psychology would prove of immense advantage.

In conclusion may we hope that by following the suggestions of our esteemed confrere we American Franciscans may come to the front in the science of psychology which is coming to mean more and more in American life.

FR. CLAUDE VOGEL, O.M.Cap.:—The necessity of studying empirical psychology will hardly be questioned in these days when our very atmosphere is charged with psychological terms and explanations. This is an age when

Psychology Overreaching Itself

psychology is employed to investigate cases of poverty, illness, delinquency and crime. While admitting the good accomplished by psychoanalytic methods, there can be no doubt that many psychologists have gone too far in attempting to explain every physical and spiritual disorder in terms of mental deficiency and hereditary weakness. To be sure, these causes have their place in the correct diagnosis of human ills, but not every human ill, certainly not the many treated by behavioristic psychologists and quack psychiatrists are rightly ascribed to such causes. It is therefore necessary that we have a sane view on the subjects of mental deficiency and hereditary weakness and that we understand their relation to Catholic doctrine and practice. In this connection I should like to recommend a set of four timely pamphlets which might well be placed in the hands of those prematurely caught in the woof of false psychologists. These pamphlets are: 1. *Inheritance of Mental Defect*, by Ulrich A. Hauber, Ph.D.; 2. *Social Care of the Mentally Deficient*, by Charles Bernstein, M. D.; 3. *Moral Aspects of Sterilization*, by John A. Ryan, S.T.D.; 4. *Eugenic Sterilization in the Laws of the States*, by William F. Montavon, K.S.G.[1] These pamphlets are done by specialists in their subjects and are treated succinctly from the viewpoint of sound Catholic psychology.

That physical and spiritual difficulties continually arise in the course of ordinary human existence is too well substantiated by constant, personal experience to admit of denial. It is also true that physicians and priests,

Recognizing the Conflict

possessing as they do the confidence of the people, must be the living depositories of the greater portion of physical and spiritual woe unburdened from the minds of their clients. As priests we need to know psychology for its application in the pulpit, in the confessional and in the classroom. Aside from divine assistance, our success as physicians of souls will normally be in proportion to our knowledge of men and of the laws that make up their physical and spiritual existence. One fact no student of human nature will ignore—the inner conflict described by St. Paul in the words: "The good which I will, I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do" (Rom. vii, 19). Every human being experiences this same conflict of forces within the soul. Analyzing the driving forces of human nature, the schoolmen distinguished the

[1] Obtainable from the National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1312 Massachusetts Ave., N. W., Washington, D. C.

sensitive appetite (*appetitus sensitivus*) and the rational appetite (*appetitus rationalis*). The sensitive appetite being material tends necessarily towards the sensible good as its proper object. The rational appetite or "will," on the contrary, is of spiritual nature and is free and its object is all good. While the rational appetite or will can *gradually* bring the sensitive appetite under control, there is, nevertheless, a constant conflict between the two, the sensitive appetite, as it were, reaching over into the domain of the will and inclining it to submit to the lower nature. While practically all of this is discoverable by the light of reason, theology explains the conflict more fully by pointing both to original sin which has weakened the power of the will, and to grace which arms and aids the will to triumph in the conflict.

Understanding this sum and substance of human nature we are better able to grasp the psychology of human conduct, and stressing both in the pulpit and in the confessional the existence of this unavoidable conflict, might in many cases be the secret cure or alleviation of spiritual abnormalities with which we priests come in contact. Abnormal disgust with self, tendency to scrupulosity, torturing worry about phantastic representations, failure to distinguish between temptation and sin, might in time be relieved or cured if it were brought home to the patient or penitent that the conflict between the two appetites is altogether normal in our present state and that there is no reason for disgust or despair with self. On this point both science and theology stand on common ground and on this postulate so fundamental in human nature, much modern psychotheraphy is based.

Practical Psychology

As priests, our part towards such spiritual aberrations is not to ignore the *natural*, but rather to recognize and use the natural to smooth the way to the *supernatural*. Teaching people the proper attitude toward that which they cannot help will in many cases be the foundation for building up the supernatural life. Man is a reasonable being and in these days of general education we should realize that the appeal to reason is often not only legitimate but in some cases the most hopeful argument for our cause. St. Paul realized this when, seeing the Athenians worshipping the unknown god, he took up the idea and raised it to the supernatural. This habit of adapting himself to the mental condition of others, becoming all things to all men, meeting them on common ground, employing the natural as a basis for the supernatural, proves him a practical psychologist whom we priests may well emulate in these days of empirical psychology.

THE PHILOSOPHY CURRICULUM

Fr. Cyprian Mensing, O.F.M., A.M., Ph.D.

From time to time in a dynamic society it is imperative that we stand aside from the movement of affairs to review trends, to assay products, to map out new paths. The purpose of such a halt is to make those changes which are necessary. In school affairs during the past few years much time has been given to the consideration of existing curricula and, to some minds, it has seemed that everything handed down to us has been wrong and is in need of drastic changes. On the other hand, there are some who are so awed by the heritage we have received, that they deem it almost sacrilegious to even think of change. Whether or not we are inclined to view a change in curricula with a favorable eye, we all understand that a mere shifting of position is not necessarily progress. There are, we know, more ways of going wrong than of going right. The *status quo* is usually better than a change in the wrong direction. Before countenancing any changes, therefore, we must, first of all, be convinced that a change is needed, and secondly, we must be sure of our guiding principles, so as to be led in the right direction.

Is There Need for a Change in the Curriculum?

Is a change in the curriculum of philosophy desirable or necessary? Before attempting to answer this question, it might be more proper to first consider whether and to what extent we are bound to observe any definite type of curriculum. For, if we are bound by laws and statutes to follow a certain definite type of curriculum, it will not profit us much to know whether or not we ought to make a change. For this purpose a brief review of Fr. Valentine Schaaf's article in the Eleventh Report of the Franciscan Educational Meeting will be in place. With regard to philosophy the author first cites the Code of Canon Law which directs that:

> The religious who are properly instructed in the lower branches of study shall diligently devote themselves to the study of philosophy for at least two years and of sacred theology for at least four, adhering to the doctrine of St. Thomas in accordance with the norm of Canon 1366, No. 2 and according to the instruction of the Apostolic See. (Canon 589, No. 1.)

Explanatory of the Code, the *Specimen Statutorum pro Studiis Regendis in Ordine Fratrum Minorum, recommends* a three-year course in philosophy for all, but *prescribes* it in those cases only where the study of literature, physics, and mathematics are continued in the philosophy course. The curriculum in rational philosophy must comprise first, the *partes reales*—general metaphysics, cosmology, psychology, general principles of education, experimental psychology and theodicy; and secondly, the *partes intentionales*—logic, criteriology, ethics and the law of nature, sociology and political economy. The study of philosophy is to be completed with the history of philosophy treated genetically. In the two-year course two lectures daily are to be devoted to the study of philosophy; in the three-year course, at least seven every week. Moreover:

Statuta Pro Studiis Regendis in Ordine Fratrum Minorum

> The study of philosophy is to be rounded out by such a treatment of the cognate branches of the natural sciences (geology, mineralogy, general biology, botany and zoölogy), physics, chemistry, mathematics and astronomy, that the young Friars aspiring to the priesthood "not only be the better instructed by the investigation of nature, but also be solidly (*apprime*) educated in those sciences which bear some relation either to the interpretation or the authority of the Sacred Scriptures." . . . Finally, in order that the students upon completion of their philosophical studies may be better prepared to begin the study of Sacred Scripture, it is suggested that they learn the rudiments of Hebrew. Furthermore, they should not neglect the study of other languages.[1]

In the *Analecta Ordinis Minorum Capuccinorum*[2] we find a conspectus for the curricula in philosophy and theology which are to be followed in the Capuchin schools. The course in philosophy is to comprise rational philosophy, ethics, and sociology, history of philosophy, science, study of letters and the Roman Catechism. These subjects are arranged in a three-year course approximating a weekly assignment of sixteen hours as a minimum.

Courses to be Followed in Capuchin Schools

These various regulations are definite enough as regards the subjects that are to be taught in our schools. Details as to the arrangement of the courses are naturally left to the needs and

[1] Eleventh Report of F. E. C., pp. 69-70.
[2] XLVI (1930), 2 ff.

customs of the respective Provinces. A question that naturally faces our Prefects of Study is: In arranging our courses, shall we follow the trend of the times towards standardization? To-day standardization is a common topic with educators. Some of our teachers wish to standardize everything, much as we standardize parts for automobiles. Though most of us are loath to bind and shackle our every movement, we, nevertheless, realize that standardization can be productive of good, especially, in so far as it legislates in regard to the time that must be devoted to certain subjects. In this way a well-rounded and well-balanced course is assured for undergraduates. After all, our courses are frequently what our professors make them and not necessarily what our Order and our Province want. Ordinarily our teachers are specialists in philosophy. Specialists are apt to be attracted by certain phases of their work. Such phases seem very important to them and they shape their courses accordingly. This explains why students of elementary philosophy are at times forced to spend days and weeks doing or following research in some abstruse problem which is not practical for their future calling. The diversion was good for the specialist—the teacher, but the time might have been used much more profitably by the student.

The Problem of Standardization

In a paper of this kind it is impossible to go into details concerning what is taught in our philosophy courses. It might, however, be interesting and profitable to consider in a general way the subjects taught in our schools and compare them with the courses taught in other ecclesiastical seminaries. This study will reveal a divergence of opinion as to what the various school authorities consider important and necessary.

In an investigation which I have attempted to make I have taken but two elements into consideration, namely, the number of subjects taught and the time expended on them. As a result of my efforts I have obtained data on the subjects taught in the philosophy curriculum of fourteen provinces of the Franciscans and of four ecclesiastical seminaries located in the United States. These eighteen schools are the following: Of the Order of Friars Minor: the Sacred Heart Province, the Province of St. John the Baptist, the Province of the Most Holy Name, the Province of Santa Barbara, the Province of the Assumption and the four German

Results of an Investigation

Provinces of Saxony, Bavaria, Tyrol, and Thuringia. Of the Order of Friars Minor Conventual: the Province of the Immaculate Conception, the Province of St. Anthony, the Province of Our Lady of Consolation. Of the Order of Friars Minor Capuchins: the Province of St. Augustine, and the Province of St. Joseph. The four seminaries used for comparison were: St. Bonaventure's, Allegany, N. Y.; St. Bernard's Seminary, Rochester, N. Y.; St. Mary's, Baltimore, Md.; and the Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C. This number, it is true, is not large and the data supplied not always as specific as might be desired, nevertheless, the results of the survey will, it is hoped, in a measure at least be interesting and profitable.

The questionnaire called for the number of weeks, the number of periods per week, and the length of periods in all subjects taught during the course of philosophy. Since in several cases this time element was neglected in regard to subjects taught which were not strictly philosophical, I have confined myself mostly to the consideration of the time spent in the teaching of subjects strictly philosophical. With regard to the length of class periods almost all schools specified full-hour periods, though one used fifty-minute periods and another fifty-five, the latter usually being considered as an hour period, allowing five minutes for a change of classes.

Subjects Strictly Philosophical

The following were the subjects specified as philosophical: 1. Introduction to philosophy. This was inserted because of the fact that when a student begins the study of something quite different from anything he has met before, it is quite generally conceded that he should have some kind of an introduction to it, so that he might be able to visualize the field over which he is to travel. 2. logic; 3. epistemology; 4. ethics; 5. aesthetics; 6. history of philosophy; 7. experimental psychology; 8. rational psychology; 9. cosmology; 10. ontology; and 11. theodicy.

Only three of the eighteen schools of philosophy signified that they offer a separate course of introduction to philosophy. Fifteen of the schools, therefore, either neglect the subject entirely, or content themselves with a few remarks at the beginning of the philosophy course. A reason for this may be found in the fact that the courses may be rotated, the same subjects not being taught

in successive years. In this way beginners enter classes with students of a year or more experience in philosophy, hence little or no time is given to introductory work. From a psychological viewpoint, such a procedure is hardly apt to awaken the desired enthusiasm in the student. This is particularly true if the student is immediately ushered into one of the courses in rational philosophy. He is very apt to form the idea that philosophy is a dry, uninteresting study. An introductory course enabling the student to see where he is going and for what reason, would counteract the danger of losing interest in the very beginning. Quite naturally, all schools answering the questionnaire signified that they were giving a course in logic. There can be no doubt, therefore, that this subject is considered one of the most necessary. The same can be said of epistemology. To the question, which of these subjects is the more difficult or the more important, nine schools replied that they devote more time to the teaching of epistemology than to logic. One school gives only half as much time to epistemology as to logic, and the remaining eight allow approximately the same time to each. Evidently, these subjects are not considered of equal importance by all schools. Which schools are right and which wrong cannot be easily determined. But it is interesting to note the differences in the number of hours allotted to the teaching of each of these subjects.

Necessity of an Introductory Course

From the answers received, we find that the various schools devote from 36 to 144 periods to the teaching of logic, and from 36 to 162 to the teaching of epistemology. This great difference cannot be explained by the fact that some schools have a three-year course in philosophy while others have only two, for of the eighteen schools from which we have compiled our data, only four have a three-year course. Though there is some correlation between the three-year course and a greater number of classes in all subjects, it is not extremely high. The correlation, however, in the case of these two subjects is higher than in most cases, since three of the four schools giving a three-year course devote over 120 periods to each of these two subjects. The fourth would allow only 54 hours to each.

Great Divergence in the Schools

The next subject listed on the questionnaire was that of ethics. The results, I think, are interesting, due especially to the fact that

some of our seminaries are beginning to question the wisdom of teaching ethics in the philosophy course. All of the American schools of the Franciscans answering the questionnaire signified that they are teaching this course. Three of the German schools do not mention the subject. The fourth teaches it, but in the course of theology. This is also the procedure in one of the seminaries for diocesan priests. If we attempt to answer the question as to how important this subject really is, we can form no idea whatsoever from the time allotted to it, since the schools teaching ethics devote 36 to 240 hours to its study.

The Place for Ethics

Further answers to the questionnaire would seem to give the impression that there is little room for the beautiful in our courses. Only three of the eighteen schools reported that they give instruction in the subject of aesthetics. Apparently there is little interest in aesthetics. Can this be the case? Educators are almost unanimous in the opinion that there has never been a time in the history of the world when the average man had more leisure than he has today. If this is so, education must train men for leisure hours. The importance of this fact will be better understood by considering the cheap means to which many have recourse to while away their leisure hours. Our priests, too, in many places, have a considerable amount of leisure on their hands. A good hobby is a great boon and in many cases solves the problem of leisure. But with proper training in the appreciation of the beautiful, the arts and the sciences would surely play a larger part in our lives. If our tastes have not been properly educated, there is great danger that we, too, will prefer to cultivate not so much what is beautiful as what is merely attractive.

The Question of Aesthetics

With regard to history of philosophy, two of the eighteen schools incorporate this branch in other courses. One school does not mention the subject at all, and a fourth answers that this study is taken care of by lectures given throughout the two years. How many or how often these lectures are given was not stated. All the other schools apparently give a regular course in this subject. With some this course extends over two years with others over one only. The number of periods devoted to this subject range from 70 to 148. A considerable number of educators seem

Regarding History of Philosophy

inclined to favor teaching history of philosophy toward the end of the philosophic course. This is in accordance with the scheme advocated by Cardinal Mercier. The reason for placing such a course at the end is that it can well serve as a review of all previous work in philosophy. Just as an introduction to philosophy prepares a student for what is coming, so history of philosophy serves to summarize at the end of the course all that the student has studied.

As I mentioned before, nine out of the eighteen schools give courses in experimental psychology. The number of hours devoted to this subject range from 25 to 126. Leaving aside the question, whether or not this subject really belongs to philosophy, I know of several priests who took this course after ordination, and it is their opinion that they would have benefited greatly if they had taken it before or during their regular course in philosophy. From the meagre time devoted to this subject, it would be unfair to measure its degree of importance.

Experimental Psychology

Rational psychology is taught in all of the eighteen schools, though the time given to it varies exceedingly. Surprising as it may seem, both the school that devotes the smallest number of hours (54), as well as that which gives the greatest amount of time to psychology (168), have a philosophy course of two years. The second lowest in time allotment (60 hours) and the third highest (144 hours) are schools with the three years' course. Thus, while all are agreed that this subject is important, it is difficult to determine the degree of importance attached to it.

Rational Psychology

All of the schools but one teach cosmology, ontology and theodicy. The one exception omits theodicy. Again we find a great difference in time allotted to them. The various schools give from 36 to 144 hours to cosmology and ontology, and from 36 to 126 hours to theodicy.

Cosmology, Ontology, Theodicy

It might be of interest to note the total number of hours given to philosophy and to other subjects taught in the philosophy course. The order followed below in designating the various schools is not the same as that listed above.

Number of Periods Devoted to Philosophy Courses

School	A	(3 yrs.)	Philosophy	840	periods	Other subjects	520
"	B	(3 ")	"	1134	"	" "	756
"	C	(3 ")	"	954	"	" "	?
"	D	(2 ")	"	576	"	" "	324
"	E	(2 ")	"	1040	"	" "	280
"	F	(2 ")	"	720	"	" "	?
"	G	(2 ")	"	720	"	" "	?
"	H	(2 ")	"	608	"	" "	?
"	I	(2 ")	"	770	"	" "	370
"	J	(2 ")	"	589	"	" "	576
"	K	(2 ")	"	936	"	" "	306
"	L	(2 ")	"	432	"	" "	504
"	M	(2 ")	"	360	"	" "	216
"	N	(2 ")	"	882	"	" "	252
Secular Seminaries:—							
"	O	(2 ")	"	468	"	" "	?
"	P	(2 ")	"	490	"	" "	860
"	Q	(3 ")	"	648	"	" "	828
"	R	(2 ")	"	504	"	" "	792

The above figures are as nearly correct as they could be made from the meagre data available. Since some of the schools answered by stating the number of terms a subject was taught rather than the number of periods or hours, we had to make use of the average number of weeks in order to reduce all to a common unit. The data shows very plainly that some of our schools are carrying a much heavier schedule than others. Without knowing just how much of the various subjects is necessary for the student, it is hard to say whether any particular schedule is too heavy or too light. There can be no doubt, however, that our courses lack standardization.

Franciscan Schools Versus Diocesan Seminaries

It might be interesting to note just how the diocesan seminaries compare with our own in number of hours devoted to philosophy. In only one case does any of the four seminaries have either the lowest or the highest number of hours for any subject. This one exception is in the subject of rational psychology, the seminary allowing only 54 hours. In general, there is some evidence to show that these seminaries teach the same subjects as our own schools, though devoting a slightly smaller number of hours to philosophy than do the majority of our schools. There is, however, not much more uniformity found in their schedules than in our own. The four seminaries devote from 468 to 648 hours to philosophy as compared with 360

to 1134 hours in our schools. The average number of hours of all schools is 704. Three of the four seminaries devote 792, 828 and 860 hours respectively to subjects not strictly philosophical. I was unable to secure accurate data from the fourth seminary on this point. None of the Franciscan schools, from which information was obtained devote as many hours as any of the three seminaries do to these subjects.

There are several other topics that might be considered in this article besides that of the curriculum. Since, however, it is necessary to limit this paper, I can only propose a few questions based directly or indirectly on the results of this questionnaire.

First, what subjects of philosophy ought we to incorporate into our course of philosophy? The answer to this question must depend upon the aims we have before us in teaching philosophy. Is philosophy to be studied only as the *ancilla theologiae,* or have we other aims in teaching it? If there are other aims, they must be made definite, otherwise we can never tell whether they are being achieved or not. Our answer to this question will also determine the amount of time to be spent on each subject, the points to be stressed and those to be omitted.

A second question is, what other subjects should be taught in the course of philosophy? It is true that some other subjects besides the philosophical are mentioned in a general way in our various statutes for regulating studies, but there is nothing definite as to what extent they must be taught. If they are to be taught only in so far as they are auxiliary to philosophy, then very little of most of them is needed. In fact, many of them might easily find their place in the senior high school or junior college, so that more time might be given to the student to concentrate upon his philosophy.

A third question might be asked concerning textbooks. It is hardly profitable, however, to go into this subject since, unless we know exactly what subjects and to what extent each is to be taught, we can hardly arrive at a satisfactory solution to this problem. One text will stress certain problems, and another others. The teacher will naturally select that text which treats in the best way the problems in which he is most interested. In passing, it might be remarked that eight of the schools signified in their replies that they are using almost exclusively Hickey's *Summula Philosophiae.*

All that has been said up to this point, however, leads to one all-important question, the one proposed at the beginning: Is there a real need for a general revision of our philosophy curriculum or should we continue to be satisfied with a course uniform only in a broad sense? No one will deny that at present great differences prevail in our courses. When one school can teach all the ethics necessary in 36 hours and another needs 240, is it not reasonable to suppose that both schools have a vastly different idea as to what is essential? Granting a difference in needs and ideals between the students and teachers of respective schools is that difference so great as the number of periods indicate? My investigation of eighteen schools has shown a great difference in time allotted to various branches. Who is right in this matter? One way to effect greater harmony and thus solve the problem would be to appoint a committee of experts to draw up a schedule of classes in which such vast divergence as to subjects and periods would be lacking. No absolute uniformity can be expected in our various schools, but a more balanced curriculum, the result of constructive criticism and willing coöperation, is surely very desirable.

The Question of Method

There are several methods of carrying out such a curricular revision. There is the activity method, the textbook comparative method, etc., but I think it hardly profitable to go into this question of method until it is first decided whether or not there shall be such a revision. So, too, in regard to the introduction of new courses into the curriculum, such as educational methods, principles of education, etc. Let us first determine the essentials, and then we shall know whether or not we have room for other courses. In regard to courses in education our teachers themselves can be lessons in pedagogy, if they will make use of good educational practices instead of antiquated ideas. Later on, if it is seen to be advantageous new courses can be introduced. At present I think it would be sufficient if our teachers would show how to make a class live instead of making it consist in mere lectures and note taking. They will in that way show our students how to teach and how to study, both of which are necessary for the future priest, since he will be a teacher whether he spends his future days in the classroom or not, and he must be a student to the end of his life.

In conclusion I should like to say that Catholic educators in our country are frequently calling for a thorough revision of our seminary curricula. The main difficulties have consisted in overcoming opposition to change in certain quarters and in securing whole-hearted coöperation in a thorough investigation. The Franciscans of this country have united for the purpose of bettering their school curricula. By means of a thorough investigation, they can either justify their present system or change it in accordance with carefully determined needs. In doing this, they will not only be helping themselves, but will also be an inspiration and an incentive to other schools throughout the country and possibly throughout the world.

DISCUSSION

FR. HUBERT VECCHIERELLO, O.F.M.:—The key to an analysis of any problem is to be found in an analysis of the activities of life in which people are engaged or for which they are preparing. We all feel rather certain concerning the specialized and peculiar activities for which our students are preparing, but aside from this, are we so certain that we are giving them the best possible preparation for their work? This is a question that has taxed the best minds connected with this vital phase of our educational activities.

A Plea for the Study of Education

The ever-recurring question as to whether we should include the study of education in our philosophy curriculum seems to indicate that there is neither unanimity of opinion nor certainty concerning the usefulness of education as a subject to be pursued by our students for the priesthood. If we examine the mind of the Church we shall see that she wishes all students for the priesthood to be prepared according to certain recognized and approved standards plus the needs of the individual countries in which these priests are to labor. No one will deny that today America is a leader in things educational. For this reason, then, we cannot afford to slight any factor in our educational scheme which so fundamentally affects our future. It is beside the point to level an accusing finger at theoretical education and pick out many things that are ephemeral in nature because of their very nature. The point at issue is not what is permanent or transitory in education today, but, should we include the study of education in our philosophy curriculum.

The inclusion of this subject in our philosophy course would not only make our future priests more conversant with the most important problems in this field, but it would also give them the benefit of the best and most efficient methods evolved and in vogue today in our best educational institutions. This would force many of our teachers to become acquainted with these methodological means which, in turn, would succeed in bringing about an organization and an investigation into the subject-matter as it is now being taught. The result would be a better, a more correlated and vital teaching of the various philosophical subjects. There is no doubt that much teaching is done which is a torture to the pupils, whereas an inquiry into the methods advocated by sound educational theory might soon put an end to the evil. A philosophy course in which we purport to teach our students the ultimate reasons of things and at the same time actually ignore the primary functions of a funda-

mental study of all educational processes—including the study of philosophy—is committing a grave error simply because a whole set of very important and fundamental principles is omitted by omitting to teach education. On the other hand, by including the study of education in our philosophy course, we can easily accomplish a great deal towards the revitalization and reintegration of our work in philosophy.

Employment of Modern Methods

The employment of modern methods in teaching philosophical subjects will also add new life to subjects otherwise difficult to teach and still more difficult to make interesting. Psychology, as now frequently taught, is a mere repetition of what has been handed down from antiquity. If this course were made to include much of the best in modern experimental psychology which follows a totally different line of procedure and makes use of devices such as intelligence and achievement tests, concrete expression would thereby be given to numerous problems in educational objectives, and the students would be enabled to test the worth of many frequently discussed topics of to-day. If, instead of giving a bare, dry account of much that enters into psychology, we would correlate these facts with much that educational methods stress, as for instance, character training, many of the fundamental psychological principles could be put to work and beneficial results obtained.

What we have said of psychology applies to other subjects of our courses and especially to ethics. This eminently practical subject, instead of allowing it to become a mere memory task, could be dovetailed with the various means employed by modern pedagogy in its efforts to foster both the natural and supernatural virtues in the young. The future priest, whose work will be mostly ethical, should be given the best possible opportunities to investigate these means and thus see for himself what will be of value to him in his priestly work.

Apologetic Value of Education

In fine, it seems strange that so important a study as education should be neglected in our philosophy curriculum when its basic principles are philosophical. The future bodes ill for any class of men who are not at least trained to meet the objections to many questions pertaining to the study of education. If our priests are the leaders of the people they must equip themselves to meet any contingencies that might arise and this is one for which few, very few are sufficiently prepared to speak intelligently or with any hope of conviction. The graduates of non-Catholic institutions, where courses in education are made much of will eventually become the leaders in their respective communities. We know also that many of the theories and practices advocated by theoretical educationists are not in conformity with our own Catholic principles, but if we are not preparing our own leaders to be able to meet these persons on their own ground then our struggle for Catholic education is all but lost. "In time of peace prepare for war," runs an old proverb, which to my mind contains more than a modicum of truth for us, if we but look about and read aright the signs of the times. The struggle in the future will not be one of muscle and brawn but one of wits in which education will play the master-hand. The course in philosophy is the ideal place for the inclusion of the fundamental ideas advanced by the study of education. This will not only make the teaching of philosophy more progressive than it is, but it will gradually bring about an incorporation of many of the best and most efficient principles of modern teaching methods. The correlation of education with philosophy is not only possible but a prime necessity at this time because it is one of the greatest forces now in operation shaping the minds and opinions of millions who will in turn shape our future educational policies. If we wish to take part in this work we must prepare our future priests and this can be more than partially done by giving education a place in our course of studies.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN OUR COURSE OF PHILOSOPHY

Fr. Cyprian Emanuel, O.F.M., Ph.D.

It has come to be quite generally acknowledged to-day that, while purely spiritual activities must ever continue to be the primary and essential duties of the priest, still some degree of practical interest and active participation in social and economic questions and movements on the part of the clergy have been rendered imperatively necessary by the circumstances of the times. Any misgivings that may have been harbored on this score in a former day should long since have been put to flight by the voice of authority. The Holy See for the past fifty years has been explicit, enthusiastic, and incessant in its emphasis and encouragement of priestly social activity, and a large and ever-increasing number of bishops have added their voices to that of the Sovereign Pontiffs in pleading for the coöperation of the clergy in the solution of the "social question."

I shall evolve this point at some length, devoting one section of my paper to its treatment, even at the risk of stressing a feature apparently irrelevant to my subject. I say "apparently irrelevant," because, as a matter of fact, it has, I think, a far more vital bearing than is evident at first sight. Here, as elsewhere, we must ever keep in mind the duties of the future priest if we would mold aright the curriculum of our seminarians. The rôle of the priest in social action must determine for us the place of the social sciences in our course of studies. And lest I seemingly allow personal prejudices to lead me to emphasize this point excessively, I shall endeavor to be entirely objective by making a liberal use of authoritative citations.

The Scope of the Present Paper Indicated

In the second section of the present paper I shall discuss various phases of the social sciences in their relation to our seminary curriculum, while the final section will be devoted to points of personal method and experiences.

I.

The Priest and Social Action

Pope Leo XIII, in his oft-quoted *Rerum Novarum,* May 15, 1891, makes it clear that the social question, because of its moral and religious implications, is one that the priest cannot afford to disregard. It touches his office at many points; and if the faithful in general are called upon to coöperate in the herculean task of restoring a Christian social order, the priest, in virtue of his very office and mission, far from standing aloof, must needs take a leading part in the work. Nor is this an unwarranted conclusion. The Pope states explicitly in the same Encyclical that "every minister of holy religion must throw into the conflict [against modern social and economic ills] the full energy of his mind and all the strength of his endurance . . . ; by every means in their power they must strive to secure the good of the people."

Leo XIII and Priestly Social Action

These instructions are plain and unmistakable. Yet, ten years later the same Sovereign Pontiff, in his Encyclical *Graves de Communi,* Jan. 18, 1901, again raises his voice to stress in still plainer terms the social obligations of the clergy and to praise the efforts of those who in various ways have taken the initiative in social enterprise. He says:

> Now in all questions of this sort where the interests of the Church and the Christian people are so closely allied, it is evident what they who are in the sacred ministry should do. . . . To go out and move among the people, to exert a healthy influence on them by adapting themselves to the present condition of things, is what we have advised more than once when addressing the clergy. More frequently also in writing to the Bishops and other dignitaries of the Church, and especially of late (to the Minister General of the Order of Friars Minor, Nov. 25, 1898), we have lauded this affectionate solicitude for the people and declared it to be the especial duty of both the secular and the regular clergy.

Again the great Pope Leo expresses his mind on this point in his *Encyclical to the Bishops of Italy on the Education of the Clergy and the Exercise of the Sacred Ministry,* Dec. 8, 1902, wherein he declares that: "the clergy must go to the Christian people who are surrounded by snares on all sides and are tempted

by delusive promises of all sorts, and especially by Socialism, to abandon the faith of their fathers." And sixteen days later, December 24th, at the annual reception of the Cardinals, he stated that, "every judicious and profitable enterprise of genuine charity is in accordance with the vocation of the Catholic priesthood," and went on to say that it is "a real and most timely form of charity to devote oneself with zeal and disinterestedness to the amelioration of the spiritual condition and temporal lot of the multitudes."

Should one demand further proof that Leo XIII has much more in mind than a mere academic and theoretic interest on the part of the clergy, one finds it in the Pope's words of an earlier date. In his special instructions to the French clergy, Sept. 8, 1899, he says:

> Obedient to the advice given in Our Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, you go among the people, the working men, and the poor. You seek by every means to help them. . . . To this end you arrange meetings and congresses; you found patronages, circles, rural banks, employment offices for the working class. You labor to introduce reforms into the economic and social order, and for so difficult a task you do not hesitate to make considerable sacrifices of time and money. . . . All these things are in themselves very praiseworthy, and you thereby give evidence of your good will and of your intelligent and generous devotion to the pressing needs of modern society and of souls.

Permit me to make but one further reference to Pope Leo. Mgr. Radini-Tedeschi had been appointed by him as his official representative in the organization of the Catholic movement in Central Italy. Hence, his words and actions can be rightly regarded as authoritatively reflecting the Pope's views anent the social action of the clergy. In particular, his address at the Fourteenth Catholic Congress of Italy, held at Fiesole, Sept., 1896, received the special approbation of His Holiness. In the course of this address Mgr. Radini-Tedeschi said very pertinently:

> Gentlemen, the priest must absolutely take his place in social life. . . . This is his mission, his imperative duty. . . . He must at the cost of whatever effort or sacrifice, take his share in social life, animate it, inspire it, bring Jesus Christ into it. . . . If society is to live, it must have social truth and social morality, justice, charity, honesty, the Decalogue, and Christian social principles. How, then, dare it exclude the priest who is the guardian of these treasures? . . . The social action

> of the priest should extend to all Catholic movements, to social science and study, to the different forms of Catholic association, and especially to congresses and committees, to the press, to young men and women, to mothers of families, to working men, to laborers and artisans, and to the people—and all this from the religious, moral, economic, temporal, and spiritual points of view, according to needs and opportunities. . . . From the spiritual exercises which bring men directly to God, down to the coöperative societies and banks, there is no sphere of activity in which the clergy should not take an interest.

Pius X

Throughout his pontificate the saintly Pius X evinced the same whole-hearted zeal and enthusiasm for Catholic social action as did his illustrious predecessor. In proof we need but take up, for example, his *Letter to the Bishops of Italy,* issued June 11, 1905, or his memorable letter in condemnation of the "Sillon," issued in August, 1910. In particular, let us make mention of but one especially illustrative incident. In March, 1905, the Abbé François of the Diocese of Cambrai was received in private audience by His Holiness. Upon his departure he was made bearer of the following message:

> Tell your venerable Archbishop of the great satisfaction with which I learn that he has appointed two priests to devote themselves particularly to the farmers and their laborers. I wish that all the rural clergy knew, together with their Theology, those matters which interest the peasantry. They can never do too much to show how the Church loves the working classes.

Benedict XV

A mere glance at the world-peace efforts of Benedict XV suffices to convince anyone of the importance he places on the rôle of the Church, and consequently also on the rôle of the clergy, in the solution of the world's social and economic problems. His activities in this regard are still too fresh in the memories of all to demand a recounting here.

Pius XI

As for our present gloriously reigning Pontiff, every priest, I dare say, should know by this time that the slogan of his pontificate is "Catholic Social Action" and that His Holiness lets no opportunity pass to emphasize the seriousness with which he would have every priest translate this slogan into practice. To him it stands forth as the means to the realization of his great objective: "The Peace of Christ in the

Kingdom of Christ." In this connection, we need but refer to a recent work in Italian from the pen of Mgr. Cavagna, ecclesiastical assistant of the Italian Catholic Young Women's Society, wherein the Pope's words on Catholic Action have been brought together in one volume. Its five hundred and thirty-nine large and closely printed pages are filled with his direct words, with newspaper summaries of addresses he delivered, with telegrams sent in his name by Cardinal Gasparri, and with decrees of Congregations. Glancing over the chronological index, we find that, from February, 1922 until September, 1929, the period covered by this book, only a period of three months elapsed in which he failed to speak publicly of Catholic Action.

And lest we be prone to lose sight of the present pertinence and practicability of the papal pronouncements of a former day, His Holiness tells us most emphatically in his first *Encyclical on the Peace of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ:*

> There are not a few who believe and say they hold Catholic doctrines on social authority, on the rights of property, on the relations between capital and labor, . . . on the social rights of Jesus Himself, Creator and Redeemer, Lord of individuals and of nations. But then they write, talk, and what is more, act as though it were not necessary to follow with the former exactness the doctrines and prescriptions solemnly and invariably recalled and inculcated in so many pontifical documents; namely, by Leo XIII, Pius X, and Benedict XV—doctrines and prescriptions that have their basis and their root in the dogma and morals of the Catholic Church. We have here a species of moral, juridical, and social modernism which We condemn with all Our energies because it is as pernicious as the dogmatic modernism which is better known. It is necessary to recall those doctrines and those precepts; all this is more than ever necessary to be made clear to the young people in our schools, particularly to those preparing for the sanctuary.

The Bishops of the World

The exhortations of the Sovereign Pontiffs have been echoed and reëchoed by bishops throughout the world. Here documentary evidence is overwhelmingly abundant. It were sheer folly to attempt in this paper to reproduce even in a summary manner the vigorous and weighty pronouncements of scores of bishops. Allow me to adduce merely one citation which must serve as fairly indicative of the very definite trend of episcopal sentiment in the matter. The Bishop of Badajoz, Spain, in the course of an

important speech delivered at Grenada in 1907, spoke as follows of the social activity of the clergy:

> As for us, what are we doing? We remain in the sacristy just as the priests did in the eighteenth century. . . . Our duty is precisely to come out of our sacristies and churches and cathedrals and monasteries without losing the spirit of God and without neglecting to invoke the assistance of Heaven. We must ascertain the actual condition of society, study its necessities, and labor unceasingly . . . learning modern tactics and employing the same weapons as our adversaries. . . . Leo XIII commands us to "go to the people" and praises a loving solicitude for the people, saying that it befits the clergy both secular and regular. . . . It is of urgent importance, then, that the clergy, who emphatically ought to be the soul of every enterprise accomplished in the name of Christ and His Church, should undertake a vigorous campaign of Catholic social action.

Social Activity and Priestly Effectiveness

A second forceful reason that we can adduce in furtherance of clerical participation in social work is that such participation is becoming more and more a necessary condition for the effectiveness of the priest's spiritual ministry. The Bishop of Northhampton, England, expressed this idea very aptly when, in 1914, he wrote:

> To the clergy of such a diocese as mine, where a lonely priest has to seek a hearing from those who view him with suspicion, if not with hostility, social action is the golden key which opens ears and hearts to his influence. Any interest in the public welfare is a passport to public good will, as many of us can bear witness. In large centers social action is required, not only as a means of winning fresh souls, but also, even more imperatively, as the condition of retaining the loyalty of workers who are already "of the household of the Faith."

As far back as 1908 Rev. Dr. Wm. J. Kerby of the Catholic University of America sounded the note of warning at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Catholic Educational Association, Cincinnati, Ohio, when he said that the social and spiritual leadership of the priesthood is at stake. "Pope Leo recognized it," he continued; "and we see proof of it every day. In our industrial centers to-day the priest must understand the issues raised by socialism, labor unions, methods of charity, labor legislation, reform movements. If he does not, he ceases to be a leader." The laboring classes and the poor, keenly interested, as they ever are,

in projects advanced for their material betterment, will more readily seek close communion with their clergy, if the clergy are known to have a practical and understanding sympathy with movements for social reform.

We perceive on all sides the trend towards organization. Labor must organize, or it will be exploited by capital. The professions must organize. Commerce and industry must do likewise. The same phenomenon is undeniably evident in education, research, sport, and pleasure, as well as in politics and finance. We are forced to deal less and less with the individual and more and more with organized groups. We cannot stem the tide. The most we can do is to try to influence it and to direct it into proper channels. Labor, for example, will organize whether we will it or not. Hence, it becomes the duty of the priest to guide, in so far as possible, the organization of labor towards a Christian type, to impress upon it our fundamental beliefs as to man's dignity and destiny, the rights of the parent, the sanctity of marriage, the responsibilities of labor, Christian justice and charity. We can truthfully say with Dr. John A. Ryan, writing in *The Catholic World,* September, 1910, that " unless the clergy shall be able and willing to understand, appreciate, and sympathetically direct the aspirations of economic democracy, it will inevitably become more and more un-Christian, and pervert all too rapidly a larger and larger proportion of our Catholic population."

That we are here chopping close to the line of actuality is very strikingly illustrated by the recent sorry plight of the Church in Mexico. José Echeverria tells us in his recent book on the condition of the Church there that, while the socialist agitators were busily engaged in organizing the uneducated masses of the workingmen in the cities and towns and to some extent also in the country districts, " Catholics for the most part were inactive, and showed no understanding of the importance of the social problems which were constantly growing more acute, and no appreciation of the dangers threatening them in consequence of their indifference." The words of the Bishop of Huejutla, Mexico, in his pastoral letter of March 10, 1926, referring to the same point, are also sufficiently pertinent and provocative of thought to find a place here. He writes:

> If we, the clergy of Mexico, have a share in the guilt [resulting from the present condition of the Church], it is that we took no part . . . in

> the political application of the principles which follow from the great truths of the social order and upon which the peace, happiness, and prosperity of nations depend. That we held aloof from these questions and did not intervene energetically was a grievous fault, in punishment for which we are now being punished by the Providence of God.

Again, let us turn to the large number of Catholics in our public institutions—prisons, workhouses, infirmaries, and old peoples' homes. It is true, generally speaking, the public authorities will grant the priest access to these because of his sacred Orders. Still, in many instances he is more tolerated than welcome. But if at the same time he is equipped to evince a sympathetic and intelligent interest in human society with its problems of relief and reform, his coming will be regarded as an asset to the institution and his field of sacerdotal activity will be correspondingly widened.

That the priest is called upon to take a leading part in the program of Catholic elementary education to-day no one doubts. Such work has become generally recognized as a necessary department of parochial duties. It is work for souls. But, surely, the same reasons that necessitate a priest to busy himself with the purchase of school property, the erection and upkeep of school buildings, the providing of teachers, etc., should urge him to occupy himself with the "follow-up" education of the adolescent and the adult. Indeed, if the second be neglected, the first will in a great measure have been in vain. From all sides comes the same lamentable story of "leakage" from the Church. Great numbers drift away. Pulpit eloquence will not reclaim them, for its echoes do not reach the street. The solution is undoubtedly implied in Pope Leo's formula to "go to the people," or, as Msgr. Deramecourt, Bishop of Soissons, expressed it on one occasion, the priest "must get in contact with the people by means of social institutions, by the methods which are in vogue to-day."

The instances here cited, and they could be multiplied almost indefinitely, suffice to show that many of the obstacles that tend to hinder the priest in the exercise of his spiritual ministry and to deter the faithful from the practice of their religion, are social rather than religious. Hence, we are warranted in saying that under our actual circumstances social action on the part of the clergy is no longer a mere matter of taste, or a pleasant hobby or

diversion. It has become a distinctly apostolic interest, an indispensable phase of the priestly vocation.

A third and final reason for the participation of the Catholic clergy in social work is the fact that Christian charity in these days demands it. Just as the clergy, in obedience to Christ's injunction of love of neighbor, have ever been foremost in works of charity in the narrower sense of the term, so in these days they must needs be leaders in the promotion of social justice. True, there will always be room for individual charitable endeavor and the motive of Catholic charity needs to be vindicated in these days when all charity tends to become less devotional and sentimental and more methodical and scientific. But, on the other hand, social justice must be promoted no less than charity, and in this work the Catholic clergy may be expected to take a leading part. In the present social dislocation and upheaval it is particularly necessary that priests, by exhortation and action, assist in the creation of that complexus of social and economic conditions which will enable anyone who is able-bodied, normally intelligent, fairly efficient, and industrious to procure for himself and his natural dependents the minimum of material, intellectual, and moral goods requisite for normal human life.

The Demands of Charity and the Clergy

The motives that we have adduced for priestly participation in social action apply in the main to the regular clergy as well as to the secular. It may be objected, however, that the regular clergy are not suited to social work; that their rule, constitutions, and traditions are not sufficiently pliant and elastic to allow of their taking part in it; that their founders have traced out for them a definite field of action—preaching or teaching or missionary activity—and that their rules will not permit their doing aught else.

The Regular Clergy and Social Action

History is the best refutation of any such objection. The past brings out very strikingly the marvelous flexibility of Religious Orders and shows them ever ready to accommodate themselves to the manifold exigencies of ever-changing social needs. Indeed, social action on the part of religious involves no veering from the moorings of the past but rather a reversion to the traditions of the

ages when religious life was so intimately associated with the entire well-being of society. Moreover, the voice of the Holy See leaves no doubt in this matter. Pope Leo, as we have already seen, without distinguishing between the secular and the regular clergy, calls upon " every minister of holy religion " to rally to the cause of social reform. And that he actually had no intention of distinguishing between the two clerical groups is evident from his later words, also already quoted, wherein he expressly declares that social action is " the especial duty of both the secular and regular clergy."

The Franciscan Order and Social Action

Turning more specifically to our own Franciscan Order with its glorious past, what need be said? No one, I venture to state, would be inclined to maintain that the task of social education, the study and application of Catholic social principles, researches in economic and social history, the providing of popular social literature, the giving of lectures, the formation of study circles, or even practical social work in a hundred different forms, is incompatible with the spirit of the rule and constitutions or foreign to the history and traditions of that Religious Order which, following in the footsteps of its sainted Founder and vitalized with the spirit of Christ which he infused into it, has since its inception over seven hundred years ago ever formed the vanguard of the movements that have as their goal the social amelioration of the masses. Verily, a more intensified practical interest in social problems on the part of Franciscans, and, I make bold to add, especially in this country, far from constituting a break with the past, would be but a reënactment of the noble achievements of the Franciscan social missionaries of a former period. In an earlier part of this paper we noted the reference of Leo XIII in his Encyclical *Graves de Communi* to a letter he had previously written to the Minister General of the Order of Friars Minor. In this letter, dated November 25, 1898, the Sovereign Pontiff expresses the fond and ardent desire (*valde velimus*) that we Franciscans, mindful of our Holy Founder's total dedication of himself to the well-being of his fellowmen and emulating the glorious deeds of those who have gone before us, will carry our beneficent influence beyond the monastery walls and exert it in ever widening circles for the public good.

In view of all that has gone before it is indubitably evident that the clergy, both secular and regular, have been encouraged and admonished in the gravest terms to enter the field of social action and that the circumstances of the times and the precept of charity urge them to do so. But can we speak here of any real obligation resting upon them either collectively or individually? To answer this question we must consider separately the respective binding force of each of the three motives adduced in the foregoing pages.

Is Social Action a Clerical Obligation?

In the first place, if we look to the various papal pronouncements urging clerical social activity, we shall find that there are those who, with Abbé Gayraud in *Revue du Clergé français,* August 1, 1900, maintain that "social action is . . . an obligation, a duty, a grave necessity . . . a duty of justice and charity." Others will not allow that every priest is strictly ordered by the Holy See to study social science and to organize economic-social undertakings. They insist that this is a matter for specialists, and while it is extremely desirable that such a specialist be connected with every large parish, still there is, quite apart from social action in the strict sense of the term, a superabundance of apostolic and charitable work in other fields.

The Binding Force of Papal Pronouncements

But be that as it may, it seems to me that either the priest must interest himself in social questions to some extent, at least, or we are forced to conclude that the papal Encyclicals of the past fifty years bearing on this point are without meaning. But even the thought of accepting this latter alternative is precluded immediately by Pius XI in his Encyclical on the Peace of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ. We have already heard him condemn as moral, juridical, and social modernists those who "write, talk, and what is more, act as though it were not necessary to follow with the former exactness the doctrines and prescriptions solemnly and invariably recalled and inculcated in so many pontifical documents." My contention, I think, receives additional weight for us Franciscans in view of the importance placed by the Holy See upon the Third Order as a most apt instrument of social reform—naturally under the leadership and guidance of us of the First Order.

And even though we could close our eyes to these considerations and should fail to discover any obligatory force in them, there would still be ample reason, I think, not to consider ourselves entirely free of obligation. As loyal sons of him who pledged " obedience and reverence to the Lord Pope Honorius and to his successors canonically elected and to the Roman Church," we have special reason, not only to obey the rigid injunctions of Holy Mother Church, but also to be attentive to her every beck and call (*sentire cum ecclesia*). Now, to say the very least, the Church has expressed her mind very definitely and emphatically on the question of priestly participation in social reform.

Obligatory Social Action and the Circumstances of the Times

Turning to the obligatory force of the second motive advanced for clerical interest in social and economic problems, namely, that the circumstances of the times demand it, I think we can truthfully say that it is as much the duty of the pastors of souls to-day as it was at the time of the great Apostle of the Gentiles, to become all things to all men, that they might save all (I Cor. IX, 22). In fact, St. Paul here strikes the keynote of the missionary method followed by the apostles of the Gospel from his day to ours. Whether we turn our eyes to the Benedictine abbeys that sprang into existence throughout Western and Northern Europe during the early Middle Ages, or to the stately Franciscan Missions that dot the Pacific Coast, or to the Franciscans laboring in the missionary field to-day, or to any other arena of evangelical activity, we everywhere find the same readiness to adapt tactics and methods to the peculiar exigencies of place and time so long as no compromise of faith or morals is entailed. And if such adaptation in any given aggregate of circumstances becomes a necessary medium of salvation to souls, or even increases pastoral efficiency in a marked degree, the conscientious priest will not consider himself free, but will deem himself in duty bound to mold his course of action accordingly.

The application is simple enough. The authoritative dicta of the Sovereign Pontiffs and personal knowledge of the present turbulent state of human society leave little or no doubt, I venture to say, in the mind of the thinking priest that at least some practical interest in social problems to-day, if it does not actually constitute a necessary medium of priestly success, does notably im-

prove the priest's efficiency in the generality of cases. The conclusion is evident.

As regards the binding force of the precept of charity in the matter of clerical participation in social movements at the present time, we must not lose sight of the fact that the seven corporal works of mercy are to-day as obligatory upon all, including priests, as when Christ first declared their practice or neglect to be the determinant of man's eternal destiny (Matt. XXV, 33-46). The methods of practicing charity have, it is true, changed considerably. They have shifted in the main from individual and haphazard almsgiving to an organized and scientific basis. But in the face of all change of method, which after all is merely accidental, the precept itself remains unalterably binding in all its original rigidity.

The Binding Force of the Precept of Charity

Having attempted to show the position that the priest must occupy in modern social action, I have implicitly determined in general the relative position that the social sciences must occupy in our seminary curriculum. If it is extremely desirable, not to say actually obligatory, that some at least of the clergy take part in social work, it is proportionately desirable, if not obligatory, to give them some interest in, and some general knowledge of, that work before they leave the seminary, since they cannot be expected to master it in its vastness and complexity amid the multifarious duties of modern parish life.

II.

The Social Sciences in our Philosophical Curriculum

It was the great Leo XIII who wrote to the bishops of Italy, December 8, 1902: "We desire that, towards the end of their education in the seminaries, the aspirants to the priesthood should be instructed, as is fitting, in the pontifical documents that deal with the social question and with Christian democracy." What he meant by these words he showed when by a *Motu Proprio* of August 31, 1901, he instituted a course of social studies in the Apostolic College for the training of professors and rectors of seminaries. Pius XI has shown himself even more insistent than Pope Leo in regard to the preparation of his priests for Christian

social action. Nor is this surprising when we recall that he was one of the founders of the University of the Sacred Heart at Milan which was organized with two faculties: one of philosophy and the other of social sciences.

The Social Sciences in Philosophy or in Theology?

But where are we to fit the social sciences into our already overburdened seminary curriculum? The Franciscan Educational Conference in both of the philosophical plans which it drafted at the St. Louis Meeting in 1919, sets aside one hour per week in the third year of philosophy for the study of sociology and political economy. The *Statuta pro Studiis Regendis in Ordine Fratrum Minorum,* 1927, demand as a minimum two hours of *Sociologia et Economia Politica* per week over a period of one year both in the two-year and in the three-year plan of philosophical studies. In article 29 *e,* of the same statutes, however, we read:

> Ethicæ et Juri naturæ addant (Lectores) notiones fundamentales *Sociologiae et Oeconomiae politicae* cum confutatione mortiferarum theoriarum communismi, nisi utilius appareat in schola speciali, post finem cursus theologici, Clericos, circa suae institutionis exitum, de iis docere quae ad christianam sociologiam pertinent.

That the social sciences could be taught much more effectively and with much more practical benefit to the seminarian *post finem cursus theologici,* i. e., as one of the disciplines of the fifth year of theology, were it once introduced, or even as a part of pastoral theology, I do not doubt in the least. The cleric, as any other student, quite naturally evinces more intensive interest and diligence in the pursuit of a subject which will make practical demands upon him in the immediate future; whereas, just as naturally, we can expect both interest and diligence to flag and the subject to take on a more and more purely academic atmosphere—to say nothing of what will be forgotten during the intervening years—in proportion as the student is compelled to peer into the remote future for a possible opportunity of applying his knowledge practically. Still, I suppose, any discussion of this point is entirely theoretic in so far as this assembly is concerned, for after all has been said pro and con, the choice lies, practically speaking, between fitting the social sciences into the philosophical course and neglecting them entirely. Let us, then, make the most of a

bad choice and, with sociology, political economy, and political science taken in philosophy, endeavor in so far as in us lies, to overcome the entailed handicaps.

Relative Importance of the Social Sciences

A further question confronts us. What must be the relative importance laid on the social sciences? Are we to stint our Scholastic philosophy or our theology on their account, or even to allow certain sections thereof to be displaced by the more practical sciences? Here we come face to face with two somewhat mutually opposed points of view; namely, a) though it is utterly erroneous to be guided exclusively by the principle of utility in the formulation of our seminary curriculum, still in the face of the ever-widening fields of all branches of learning, when a choice must be made, it must be made in favor of those branches which will prove of greater practical value to the future priest; and b) the pursuit of the social sciences can never afford a valid excuse for the neglect or stinting of philosophical or theological studies; on the contrary, the former, if anything, demands an intensification of the latter, first, because the grasp of philosophical and theological principles contributes very much to the understanding and assimilation of the social sciences; secondly, because of the comparative ease with which the inexperienced can become entangled in the mesh of current social and economic systems and spurious argumentations of modern sociologists and economists; and, thirdly, because of the intrinsic connection between true philosophical and theological principles on the one hand and genuine social well-being and social reform on the other.

Here the professor must see to it that he strikes a happy middle course, keeping in mind the first of the points of view, mentioned above, and not neglecting the second. As for the rest, the most that can be said is that the professor must judiciously accommodate his course in the social sciences to the time and talents of his students. That very much can be accomplished with proper selection and allotment of matter, I know from actual experience. Still, it were preposterous, for example, to imagine for a moment that a completed and fully rounded-out training in the social sciences could be foisted upon our seminarians with their limited time and conveniences.

For the guidance both of overzealous professors and of over-

interested students of the social sciences, it is well to bear distinctly in mind that our seminarians are not to become expert and professional sociologists and economists. They are primarily students for the priesthood and the study of the social sciences grows in importance only in so far as it gives promise to equip them more adequately for the discharge of the priest's sacred functions. Very few priests, comparatively speaking, are called upon to devote themselves to actual social service at any time, and still fewer, e. g., directors of diocesan charities, to follow it as a profession.

What the Seminarian Should Acquire

But the seminarian should acquire a rather thorough knowledge of the fundamental principles pertaining to the nature, constitution, functions, and processes of human society in general, and should acquaint himself also, at least in a general way, with the vital facts and ethical aspects of current social conditions, doctrines, and tendencies (such as socialism, labor unionism, and social legislation), and with modern standards and methods of social relief and social reform. He should acquire that knowledge and breadth of social vision and should become imbued with that abiding interest, enthusiasm, and alertness of mind which will enable him, as also impel him, when once ordained to the priesthood, to continue and perfect his sociological education on his own initiative along the lines and to the degree made necessary by the peculiar needs of his assigned field of sacerdotal activity, even to the extent of becoming, if circumstances so demand (and I venture the opinion that the circumstances in any parish in the congested sections of our large cities to-day, do demand it), what Prof. L. A. Halbert, in his *What is Professional Social Work?* calls specifically, and in lieu of a more precise term, a "social worker." Such a person, according to Professor Halbert, is one who has a thorough knowledge of the social sciences, knows, at least theoretically, all the resources which society has at its disposal for serving humanity, and knows how to use them to the greatest advantage in any given instance in accordance with the best recognized standards and methods of modern social work, even though he engages not at all in actual case work. Such a one is distinguished for what he knows how to do rather than for what he actually does in matters of social

service. He knows, for example, all the public institutions in his locality, how they are administered, on what terms admission to them is possible, which are best fitted for different needs, etc. In a given case he knows whether to invoke the aid of the Associated Charities, of the St. Vincent de Paul Society, of the Visiting Nurses' Bureau, of the Children's Bureau, of the Special Schools for Handicapped Children, of the Juvenile Court, of the Big Brothers or Big Sisters, of the Widows' Pension Bureau, etc., and, at the same time, is in a position to discuss his case intelligently in all its phases and implications with the worker of the respective social agency.

A Danger

If we look to the students themselves, we shall find, I think, that there is always a lurking danger lest some, if allowed the opportunity, will plunge into the fascinating study of concrete social conditions and methods of reform with an interest and enthusiasm prejudicial to those basic seminary sciences upon which all sound and fruitful Catholic social study must rest and which, in spite of their appearing at times to be purely theoretic and impractical, must ever form the staple of the priest's education. We need not be surprised, then, to hear the voices of the Holy See and various bishops calling the attention of seminary professors and seminary students alike to this danger. Still, I discern no particular reason for alarm on this score. The vigilant eye of the professor will ordinarily be quick to detect any such aberration, and its correction will be merely a matter of tact and prudence, of greater watchfulness, and of a sharper insistence on essentials.

The Social Sciences an Aid to the Philosopher and Theologian

On the other hand, the study of the social sciences, if prudently directed and controlled, will render valuable aid to the student of philosophy and theology. It will impart vitality to what might otherwise appear arid and antiquated. It will help to give body and content to the formulas of the Schools and will serve to illustrate abstract principles, to supply a background of interest, and to furnish an inspiring motive for diligent and intelligent work. Some knowledge of actual labor problems, for example, cannot but render our ethical principles more intelligible and more interesting. The cleric will see them in a new light, will reflect upon

them, will find ready and practical application for them, and will be motivated to master them, not because he knows he must meet the requirements of the semester, but because he wishes to assimilate them as a necessary condition for dealing with concrete problems that will confront him throughout his priestly career. With regard to theology, Fr. Plater, S.J., in *The Priest and Social Action* (Longmans, Green and Co., 1914), says very pertinently: "The student will be the better able to appreciate the magnificent cohesion, the satisfying completeness, the solidity and harmony of Catholic Theology, if he is able in some measure to appreciate its bearings upon modern needs and current aspirations." He will learn to realize that he is devoting time and talent to a science that will stand him in good stead. It is, therefore, not a question of diverting energy from the fundamental philosophical and theological studies or of lessening the esteem in which they are held; but rather a question of supplying an additional motive for mastering them and of emphasizing their importance.

Methods of Social Study

The possible methods of social study in seminaries are manifold. They may, however, be conveniently grouped under the following heads: a) a regular course in the social sciences, b) the social sciences in conjunction with other sciences, c) private study under the control and guidance of the professor, d) study clubs and debating societies, e) occasional lectures by externs, and f) practical work, especially during vacations.

a) *A Regular Course in the Social Sciences.*

a) The Regular-Course Plan

The special-course plan is undoubtedly more in keeping with the express mind of the Church and conforms to the letter of the study plan drawn up by the Franciscan Educational Conference in 1919 and with the *Statuta pro Studiis Regendis in Ordine Fratrum Minorum.* It also offers practical advantages to the student not equalled in any other plan. It deserves, therefore, primary consideration and where the circumstances in any way permit, it should be adopted in preference to all others. The circumstance of time, of course, looms up as the most formidable obstacle in its way. Still, we must not allow

this difficulty to take on unwarranted proportions. It can be obviated in the generality of cases by the simple process of relegating to their respective provinces branches of study which in more ways than one are plainly foreign to a seminary department of philosophy, but for some reason or other have come to find a place there (v. g., the classical languages and mathematics to junior college, and Church history and Sacred Scripture to the theological department), while retaining in philosophy only those sciences which by content and consensus of opinion can lay just claim to a structural place in the philosophical curriculum.

The amount of time devoted to the social sciences in this plan, even after the department of philosophy has been stripped of extraneous matter, will depend upon a variety of circumstances which must be contended with in individual cases. Still, we are not left entirely without guidance. As we have already noted, the Franciscan Educational Conference in its Meeting of 1919 sets aside one hour per week in the third year of philosophy in both its plans and the *Statuta pro Studiis Regendis in Ordine Fratrum Minorum* demand as a minimum two hours per week during the final year of both the two-year and the three-year plan. Two hours is certainly not excessive. I should even presume to go a step farther and suggest three hours per week where the three-year plan of philosophy is in vogue. That such an arrangement will work no particular hardship I know from an actual instance. In the three-year plan it can be arranged quite easily to complete five branches of philosophy in the course of the first two years. Thus ethics alone remains to be treated during the third year. Let us suppose that the seminarians are subject to a total of sixteen class hours per week and that nine or ten of these sixteen are assigned to the professor of ethics.[1] I think he can now well afford to devote at least three of his nine or ten hours per week to the social sciences without reasonably jeopardizing his pensum in ethics.

b) *The Social Sciences in Conjunction with Other Sciences.*

The plan of connecting the social sciences with certain branches of philosophy and theology, although it must be rated as inferior

[1] This is not merely a wild and unfounded supposition but a recital of the actual numbers in the case I have in mind.

in many respects to the one above and, therefore, only as second choice, is by no means devoid of merit. It has this very much in its favor that, under proper direction and control, it serves, as no other method does or can, to clothe with the interests of everyday life points of philosophy and theology which may otherwise appear lifeless and academic. It brings home to the seminarian emphatically that the knowledge of philosophy, Sacred Scripture, morals, and dogma is not for himself alone, is not merely for the development of his own mind, but also for the spiritual and material well-being of those who will later be committed to his charge or will come within the sphere of his influence. It tends to bring about that living conviction of the intrinsic relationship between the principles of philosophy and theology and human welfare so essential to the Catholic sociologist and economist.

b) Social Sciences in Conjunction with Other Sciences

Where this plan is followed, the course in ethics can be made to embrace, for example, not only the examination and refutation of socialism, but also some account of the present social and industrial evils together with their suggested remedies; with the question *De Fine Proximo Hominis* can be united such points as the minimum of decent livelihood, poverty, and housing conditions; the tract *De Contractu* can be made to include such questions as the labor contract, labor unions, minimum wage, and unemployment. Thus also psychology, for example, with a little transition can be made to dwell on the important phases of social psychology; moral theology lends itself very readily to the task, since contemporary application of moral principles can hardly be made without touching almost everything sound and unsound in modern social theory and practice; both the history of philosophy and Church history furnish an excellent opportunity for imparting a knowledge of the history of economics; homiletics and catechetics treat of methods that are applicable, not only to the pulpit, but to the social field as well; and pastoral theology can hardly regard social organization and management as matter extraneous to the practical duties of the priest.

c) *Private Study under the Guidance of the Professor.*

The method of conducting a course in the social sciences along

the lines of private study under the control and direction of the professor can, under proper conditions, be productive of excellent results. Let us suppose, for example, that of a total of sixteen class hours per week in the three-year plan of philosophy seven or eight hours, or even nine or ten, are assigned to one professor who within that allotted time must complete, not only the course in ethics, but also the pensum in theodicy. He will soon discover, I think, that if he intends to devote to these two branches the time that their importance demands, he will have but a minimum of class time at his disposal for the social sciences. Here is where the present plan will come to his rescue. He may rightly presuppose that, if he does his duty in expounding and properly elucidating the daily assignments in the classroom and at the same time succeeds fairly well in holding the attention and interest of his students, a goodly portion of them will all but know their lesson for the following class period when they leave the classroom. To say the least, very few, if any, of them will be obliged to devote more than twenty or thirty minutes of intensive study to the immediate preparation for class. This means, then, that, even after allowing a reasonable amount of time for the all-important *mater studiorum*—repetition—the seminarians will have on their hands a certain surplus of time which they are ready either to squander, to consume on a more or less useful hobby of their own choosing, or to utilize under the direction of the professor. It is true that the professor, if he so desires, can absorb this time by assigning class papers, reference reading, etc., within the limits of his specific branches (theodicy and ethics in our supposition), in so far as such papers, reading, etc., are compatible with a passive course. But may he not also direct it into the field of the social sciences? And more especially so, if, practically speaking, this is the only opportunity the students will have in the course of their seminary career to take up these sciences.

c) Private Study Under Guidance of Professor

The professor, after convincing himself and his students that they have more time at their disposal than is needed for actual class work, will proceed to make a judicious selection of textbook matter, in some instances an entire book, in others only certain chapters, and put it into the hands of his clerics, leaving its

mastery now to their individual initiative, interest, and enthusiasm. Of course, he will do well to set aside a class hour, or at least a part of an hour, each week during which he will check up on the ground covered in the course of the past week and solve the difficulties which the students, perchance, have encountered. It may well happen, too, that at times the professor will find it necessary to devote an extra hour, or even two or three, to the explanation of preliminary and basic principles involved in a sociological or economic question upon which the students are about to enter. But it will be time well spent.

It may be objected that it is expecting too much of our seminarians to throw them thus upon their own resourcefulness. We must remember, however, that, according to our supposition, we are dealing with clerics who are in their third year of philosophy and, I suppose, in most cases, in their fifth year of college work. They are, in consequence, fairly well equipped to launch forth on their own initiative. Moreover, they are asked to take up, not the abstruse and knotty problems, let us say, of general metaphysics treated in a foreign language (Latin), but the concrete and, comparatively speaking, readily intelligible questions of sociology and economics dealt with in the vernacular. Hence, I see no particular difficulty on these grounds.

d) *Study Clubs and Debating Societies.*

d) Study Clubs, Debating Societies, Literary Circles

Study clubs, debating societies, and literary circles, too, can quite easily be brought into the service of the social sciences. Such clubs, in some shape or form, either as optional or obligatory, either as intra-curricular or extra-curricular, flourish in most of our seminaries. The members are frequently at a loss to find an acceptable topic for treatment and discussion. Their attention might well be directed to social and economic problems, of interest to all and of special importance for the candidate for the priesthood. And I venture the statement that when, under proper guidance, they have once been initiated into these problems and have learned to know their importance and fascinating interest, they will be glad to give them the preference over all others. What we have said above concerning the ability of the seminarians to attack such problems without the direct aid of the professor, applies with equal force here.

Even though the students be permitted to follow their individual preferences and choose their individual subjects without regard for a more or less complete plan, they will derive great benefit. It will be far more advantageous for them, however, if the professor prepares for them in advance a properly interrelated and coördinated plan of subjects.

But what if no study, debating, or literary club is in existence in a particular seminary? Then, I should say, organize one, and the sooner it is done the better it will be for more reasons than one. Here, as elsewhere, where there is a will, there is a way. Again, what if the curriculum is so heavy as to burden the seminarian of average talent to reasonable capacity? Even here the situation is by no means hopeless. Without doubt there are to be found in every group of seminarians some of superior ability who meet the demands of even a crowded curriculum with comparative facility. These may well be made to form the nucleus of a serious class in social studies.

While this plan is unquestionably inferior to the first three, still it can be turned to good advantage and will serve to give the students at least a preliminary and elementary knowledge of the social sciences where other plans are impossible or infeasible.

e) *Occasional Lectures by Externs.*

e) Occasional Lectures by Externs

Occasional lectures by men who are outstanding in the theory or practice of the social sciences offer advantages to our students which we cannot afford to overlook. Such lectures cannot but be extremely beneficial in stimulating and sustaining interest and enthusiasm in the problems of sociology in all cases, and in supplementing the regular course, where it is had, by conveying specialized knowledge and suggesting new points of view. In cases where the course is not long enough to allow time for much in the way of regular lectures on social subjects, these periodic talks by men from the field will do much to create an interest that will bear fruit at a later date.

In view of the vast extent of social science, its importance for the Catholic priest, and the difficulty of providing each seminary with experts, I am of the humble opinion that we could and should make a more liberal use of this system of occasional lec-

tures. On the one hand, in every city of considerable size (and in such cities most of our seminaries are situated) there are directors of charitable organizations and institutions (v. g., the diocesan director of Catholic Charities, the president of the particular council of the St. Vincent de Paul Society, the president of the Big Brothers, etc.), the scout-master of the boy scouts, judges of the various courts including the judge of the juvenile court and of the court of domestic relations, psychiatrists of the local courts, probation officers, professors of sociology and economics in the local universities, labor leaders, and others of outstanding authority, who are, as my experience has amply proved, very courteous and obliging in giving our clerics the benefit of their expert knowledge and experience for the mere asking. On the other hand, there are our clerics who have everything to gain and nothing to lose by such lectures and are only too eager for an opportunity to lend an attentive ear to them. Why, then, should we deny them this advantage, especially since it can be afforded them without expense and inconvenience? These lectures can be given at an hour, let us say from seven to eight o'clock on Sunday evenings, when they will interfere in no way either with the community exercises, or with study time, or with class periods.

f) *Practical Social Work Especially During Vacations.*

Practical social work, especially during the months of vacation, is undoubtedly a field open to the candidate for the secular priesthood. In almost every diocese of the country, I think it is safe to say, there is scope for the vacation employment of seminarians in a sort of clerical internship. They may well offer themselves to assist in the conducting of a rural vacation school, the governing of a parish club, the directing of Catholic recreational grounds under parish auspices, the managing of Catholic summer camps for boys, or some other form of priestly apprenticeship. But so far as I can see, all such avenues of activity are closed to our Franciscan seminarians. Still, they can be taught to connect theory with practice in some little way, at least, by occasional study trips to social institutions, both private and public. These trips can serve the purpose of supplementing and perfecting any of the preceding plans of social study. They can be taken, for example, on free

f) Practical Social Work

afternoons or during vacation without any sacrifice of study time whatsoever.

To derive the greatest profit from them, the professor will do well to explain to the students beforehand the general bearing of the problem, the social philosophy involved, the current remedies and methods applied, etc., so that, when the students arrive at the institution, they will be in a position to devote an intelligent and undivided interest to the practical details of the work instead of being dazzled by generalities. It is also essential for the success of such trips that a well-informed person act as guide on the tour through the institution. Moreover, after their return a class hour can be well spent in discussing what they have seen and heard. It should be taken for granted that they will jot down a summary of the impressions and knowledge thus acquired.

The professor might follow another plan, which, however, differs slightly only in method from the one just expounded. He might tell his students in advance to study thoroughly the theory of a specified problem, for example, the care of orphans, with an eye to a visit to a particular orphanage in the near future. And after the visit he will tell them to go back over the identical material and check up point for point on the relationship they have discovered between the theory they had studied and the practice as they observed it.

Summer Courses

Although, as we have mentioned, active social work on the part of our clerics during the vacations is a practical impossibility, I hardly think the plan of conducting summer courses in the social sciences for their benefit is an idea entirely to be scoffed at, particularly in cases where, on account of peculiar circumstances, no one of the preceding plans can be fitted into the seminary curriculum. I feel confident that, if the importance of social knowledge for the priest to-day were brought home to them in the proper manner and if, at the same time, they were made to realize that they stood face to face with the alternative either of foregoing entirely the opportunity of acquiring it during their seminary days, or of devoting an hour or so each morning, let us say, for a month or six weeks, to its acquisition, they would gladly choose the latter and rejoice in the opportunity offered them. Should any particular difficulty or objection arise, the course could be made optional and that, too, I dare say, without any appreciable decline in attendance.

I have attempted to evaluate the various methods of teaching the social sciences according to their intrinsic merits. I think one fact, at least, now stands out uncontrovertibly evident; namely, if our clerics are denied all opportunity of acquainting themselves with so important a priestly asset as sociological and economic lore, the reason is to be sought, not in the dearth of practical methods of imparting it, but in the failure of the seminary faculty to grasp the gravity of the truth once enunciated by Dr. Francis Duffy in a paper at a seminary conference; namely, that "the mere showing that this or that item of knowledge is advantageous to priestly work is no proof that a new course should be added to the seminary curriculum; if, however, a subject, and such a one is sociology, is one of which the newly ordained priest stands in urgent and instant need, then the seminary is bound to take cognizance of it." Certainly with a little interest and good will and with such a variety of plans from which to choose, one can be found which will prove feasible and practicable under conditions even the most unfavorable. To say the least, what conspiracy of adverse circumstances could reasonably preclude the occasional-lecture plan, should the others prove impossible?

Selecting the Plan

What particular plan is the most acceptable in any given instance must be decided by the individual professors or seminary faculties in the light of the peculiar advantages they enjoy, or, perhaps, more correctly, in view of the peculiar handicaps under which they labor. All I can say is that they all have been tried and have not been found wanting. But that one should be followed which under the circumstances bids fair to benefit the students most in the shortest time. Perhaps, too, it will prove far more satisfactory to the individual professor not to follow any one of the suggested plans slavishly, but to select parts of the different plans and mold them into a workable plan after his own liking. We must remember that the teaching of the social sciences is the essential point here at stake, while the method to be followed is of secondary importance if only it serves the purpose.

III.

Personal Methods and Experiences

In the hope that the difficulties I have encountered, the methods I have followed, and the success and failure I have met with in the teaching of the social sciences over a span of eight years, may prove to be a source of at least some little profit to those of you who are placed in identical or akin circumstances, I shall, with an apology, presume to take the liberty of recounting my own homely classroom experiences. If my account savors of the commonplace and unromantic rather than of the poetic and ideal, I offer as my defence the plea that I am endeavoring to adhere as closely as possible to commonplace and unromantic actualities.

An Apology

With the sole exception of my first year's teaching, my students have been clerics in their third (and final) year of philosophy, which means that, at the same time, they have been in their fifth (and final) year of college work. Hence, I can reasonably expect them, as a rule, to be fairly well equipped for study on their own initiative. Of a total of sixteen class periods per week, twelve have been assigned to me—nine for philosophy (theodicy and ethics) and three for the history of philosophy.

I very soon became painfully aware of the fact that, if I were to complete both theodicy and ethics within the allotted time, a specific course in the social sciences was out of the question. Hence, in lieu of something better, I was compelled to content myself with a few fragmentary points that I could conveniently attach to certain parts of ethics; v. g., the labor contract, and especially the question of the living wage, with *De Contractu*. After pursuing this method for three or four years, I hit upon the plan which I have since followed and which I shall now attempt to outline. It will be seen that it coincides in the main with what I have described above as the supervised private-study plan.

Feeling My Way

My first step, shortly after the opening of the school year in September, is to convince the students that they have more time on their hands than is really necessary for their class assignments,

My First Step

even after making due allowances for requisite repetition. This is a comparatively easy task, controlling, as I do, twelve of the total of sixteen class periods and, in consequence, knowing full well the extent and the difficulty of the daily lessons both in philosophy and in the history of philosophy, and, at the same time, the thoroughness with which I have attempted to explain them.

I now lay before the clerics these four possibilities: a) the spare time may be squandered; b) it may be spent more or less profitably on hobbies of their individual choice; c) it may be absorbed by class papers, reference reading, etc., covering the fields of theodicy, ethics, and history of philosophy; or, d) it may be utilized to very good advantage in the study of sociology and economics. I stress the respective evils and advantages of these possibilities, laying special emphasis on the fact that, while the knowledge of the social sciences is so extremely timely and important for the priest to-day, this is the first and only opportunity of acquiring it in the seminary course. Before the hour draws to a close, they are ready to assure me that their choice has fallen whole-heartedly on the side of a private-study course in the social sciences. I, on my part, assure them that I shall supervise and direct, urge and encourage them, but, to express it in classroom parlance, I shall not "drive" them. I let them know definitely that each one is thrown upon his own ambition and resources, on his aim and desire to make his preparation for the priesthood as complete and perfect as circumstances permit. It is true, I take a weekly inventory of the material covered, but if anyone has fallen short, or even has accomplished nothing at all, I demand of him merely that he inform me of the fact and I excuse him without question.

Four Possibilities

At the same time, however, I endeavor to bring home to them very emphatically that the study of the social sciences is to serve as a "time absorber" only and that I shall tolerate no relaxation whatsoever in their regular study of the philosophical branches and of the history of philosophy. I inform them in unmistakable terms that I must demand as an absolute minimum the mastery of the regularly assigned textbooks; upon it depends the question of their passing or not passing the class. Still, what they accomplish

Time Absorber Only

in the social sciences, I grade as regular class work and allow it to enter in as a determinant of the semester's mark.

I am now ready to open the course. I place in the hands of each student a copy of *The Priest and Social Action* by Charles Plater, S.J., M.A. (Longmans, Green and Co., 1914, viii and 265 pages). I find this book preëminently adapted as an introduction to a seminary course in the social sciences. It serves to instill interest and enthusiasm and emphasizes, as its title indicates, the importance of the subject in the life of the priest by dealing with such points as religion and social action, the Catholic Church and social action, the place of the priest in social action, social studies in seminaries, the priest and social study, the priest and Catholic social agencies. A few chapters may well be omitted as being of minor importance or irrelevant to our purpose.

Introductory

I begin by suggesting that the clerics make an earnest effort to master, let us say, the first three chapters (forty-nine 8vo pages of comparatively light and easy matter) within the coming week. Quite naturally the assignment will be shorter or longer depending upon the importance of the matter and the compactness with which it is treated. In the opening statement of this paragraph I used the word *master* and designedly so, because I try to insist upon the proverbial *non multa sed multum,* much preferring that the clerics study thoroughly as they proceed, even though in consequence some be compelled to fall behind. I have always set aside an hour on Thursday morning for checking up. When Thursday morning arrives, I enter the classroom and claim the privilege of submitting the clerics, except those who have excused themselves, to an oral or written quiz on the matter covered just as though it were regular class study. I also grade it as such.

The First Assignment

I continue this method from week to week until all the pertinent and important matter of the book has been studied. A week or two later, according to the students' choice, I hold a test covering the entire book. As a rule, I do not extend the time beyond two weeks. If at the end of that time, one or the other is not yet ready for the final review, I proceed with the test, restricting my questions for the less progressive to what they tell me they have been able to accomplish. I follow throughout the method here de-

scribed. Hence, it will be unnecessary for me to repeat it as I proceed. I may also add here that it is a simple matter for the professor, if he find it expedient or necessary, to inform the student of poorer talent to restrict himself to the more important portions of the social science book or even to limit himself exclusively to the regular textbooks.

Political Economy

I now turn to the field of economics. Here I find *Political Economy* by E. J. Burke, S.J. (2nd ed., American Book Co., 1922, xvi and 480 pages), very profitable as an introduction. I usually assign for study only the first two chapters (31 and 34 pages, respectively), which deal with the definition, methods, and schools of political economy, and with the study of economics, wealth, value, and price. The scarcity of time forbids more. I do express the hope that in the course of the year the clerics will find time to study the important chapters on exchange, banks and banking, protection and free trade, taxation, etc., but I do not exact it in any sense of the word. I am convinced that the clerics will be benefitted more directly by the study of the more practical economic questions. With this in mind, I now take up *The History and Problems of Organized Labor* by Frank T. Carlton, Ph.D. (2nd ed., D. C. Heath & Co., 1920, xi and 559 pages). In my humble opinion, Dr. Carlton's work is the best to be had on this particular phase of economics. The author is no propagandist but gives a clear and objective analysis of the labor situation in this country. At the same time he is creditably philosophical. *The Principles of Labor Legislation* by John R. Commons, LL.D., and John B. Andrews, Ph.D. (2nd ed., New York: Harper & Bros., 1920, xii and 559 pages), is also very good, but, as the title indicates, approaches the problems of labor from a different angle. If both can be taken, so much the better. They can, as a matter of fact, very correctly be considered as mutually supplementary. But where a choice must be made, I deem the former better suited to our purposes.

In conjunction with Dr. Carlton's chapters on government and policies of labor organizations, coercive methods, and industrial remuneration, I assign from *The Church and Socialism and Other Essays* by Dr. John A. Ryan (Washington, D. C.: The University Press, 1919, vii and 251 pages), the treatises on the moral

aspects of the labor union (strike, boycott, closed shop, limitation of output and apprentices, and excessive demands, pp. 100-151), a living wage (pp. 57-75), and the legal minimum wage (pp. 76-99). It is particularly while dealing with these economic problems that I find it necessary to devote an extra hour, and exceptionally even several in succession, to the explanation of preliminary and fundamental principles.

Next in order I take *Papal Program of Social Reform—An Analysis* by Dr. August C. Breig (Milwaukee, Wis.: Diederich-Schaefer Co., 1913, 72 pp.). It is a study of the text of Pope Leo's Encyclical on *The Condition of the Working Classes* (*Rerum Novarum,* May 15, 1891) and of the equally important Apostolic Letter of Pius X on *Catholic Social Action* (*Motu Proprio,* Dec. 18, 1903). The former needs no comment. In the latter Pope Pius X, in fifteen short but comprehensive articles, collects and confirms anew all the social teachings of his illustrious predecessor as contained in his great Encyclicals, and adds four others taken from an Instruction of the Sacred Congregation of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs.

With this I usually close the first semester. For the midyear examinations, both written and oral, I draw my theses from the material thus far covered in the social sciences just as freely as from the material covered by the routine study. For those who have not been able to follow my assignments, I regulate my examination questions accordingly. I do the same at the end of the second semester.

Sociology

I open the second semester with *What is Professional Social Work?* by L. A. Halbert, A.M. (New York: The Survey, 1923, 149 pp.). It is rather loosely written, but I find it satisfactorily helpful as an introduction to the general field of practical sociology. It deals with the object, scope, and definition of social work, with the definition and classification of social workers, with social organization and procedure, with the various kinds of social work, etc.

For the last two years I have now taken up *An Introduction to Social Work* by Rev. John O'Grady, Ph.D., of the Catholic University of America (The Century Co., 1928, x and 398 pp.). It is thoroughly Catholic and covers very adequately and efficiently the field of social service. I do not hesitate to recommend it whole-heartedly to professor and student alike. Others, however,

may prefer one of the following, both of which are very good; namely, *Social Problems and Agencies* by Henry S. Spalding, S.J. (new and enlarged ed., 600 pp.) and *Man and Society* by Rev. Francis J. Haas, Ph.D. (New York: The Century Co., 1930).

In conjunction with Dr. O'Grady's book, I may throw in two pamphlets which I consider very timely and pertinent. The one is *The Social Significance of the Third Order of St. Francis* by Rev. Capistran Romeis, O.F.M. (St. Louis: Central Bureau of the Central Verein, Timely Topics No. XXIII, 1926, 20 pp.); and the other, *Community House Programs and the Community House as a Community Force* by Rev. John M. Cooper, D.D. (reprinted from *The Catholic Charities Review,* May and June, 1920, 22 pp.).

At this juncture I feel at liberty to direct the clerics' energies along the lines of any one of many specific social problems. In consequence, from this point forward the subject-matter may differ considerably from year to year. For the past semester I selected juvenile delinquency and child-dependency as the problems for more detailed study.

I used the following publications of the Children's Bureau of the U. S. Department of Labor in the order of their enumeration and found them quite satisfactory:

1) *The Practical Value of Scientific Study of Juvenile Delinquents* by William Healy, M.D., Director of Judge Baker Foundation, Boston (Bureau Publication No. 96, 1922, 31 pp.). I consider the titles and the accompanying annotations of this and the following publications to be sufficiently indicative of their contents. Hence, I shall refrain from further comment.

2) *Juvenile-Court Standards,* Report of the Committee Appointed by the Children's Bureau, August, 1921, to Formulate Juvenile-Court Standards. Adopted by the Conference Held Under the Auspices of the Children's Bureau and the National Probation Association, Washington, D. C., May 18, 1923. (Bureau Publication No. 121, 10 pp.)

3) *The Legal Aspects of the Juvenile Court* by Bernard Flexner and Reuben Oppenheimer (Bureau Publication No. 99, 1922, 42 pp.).

4) *Probation in Children's Courts* by Charles L. Chute, Secretary of New York State Probation Commission and of National Probation Association (Bureau Publication No. 80, 1921, 32 pp.).

5) *A Summary of Juvenile-Court Legislation in the United States* by Sophonisba P. Breckinridge and Helen R. Jeter (Bureau Publication No. 70, 1920, 110 pp.).

6) *Juvenile Courts at Work.* A study of the Organization and Methods of Ten Courts, by Katharine F. Lenroot and Emma O. Lundberg (Bureau Publication No. 141, 1925, 323 pp.).

7) *Standards of Public Aid to Children in Their Own Homes,* including Summaries of Methods in Nine Localities, by Florence Nesbitt (Bureau Publication No. 118, 1923, 145 pp.).

8) *The Work of Child-Placing Agencies,* Part I.—A Social Study of Ten Agencies Caring for Dependent Children by Katharine P. Hewins and L. Josephine Webster; and Part II.—Health Supervision of Children Placed in Foster Homes by Mary L. Evans, M.D., (Bureau Publication No. 171, 1927, 223 pp.).

9) *Foster-Home Care for Dependent Children.* A Symposium (Revised, Bureau Publication No. 136, 289 pp.).

10) *Handbook for the Use of Boards of Directors, Superintendents, and Staffs of Institutions for Dependent Children* (Bureau Publication No. 170, 129 pp.).

Study Trips to Social Institutions

Being aware that these assigned readings are capable of imparting theory only, I attempt to bring in the practical phases, to some extent at least, by having the clerics visit one or the other social institution toward the end of their course. I conduct these study trips in accordance with the ideas and methods set forth in an earlier part of this paper (cf. above: Methods of Social Study, under f.). I consider visits to three institutions which typically exemplify their respective fields of social activity, reasonably sufficient to satisfy our purposes. The selection may be made from such institutions as orphanages, hospitals, " bad boys' " schools, homes of the Good Shepherd, and workhouses.

Also toward the end of the course each year I procure a number of outstanding authorities in the different fields of sociology and economics to address the clerics. Here I judge four or five a

Addresses by Externs

reasonable number. Of course, if arrangements can conveniently be made for more, so much the better. During the past semester the following gentlemen addressed our students, each for the period of an hour: the president of the Cleveland Particular Council of the St. Vincent de Paul Society, one of the municipal judges of Cleveland, and the professor of economics at Case School of Applied Sciences. The latter, Dr. Frank T. Carlton, proved particularly interesting owing to the fact that the clerics had previously studied his textbook, *The History and Problems of Organized Labor.*

Class Papers

Over and above the designated readings, the study trips to social institutions, and occasional lectures by experts from the field, each student is assigned the task of delving more deeply into some specific problem, either ethical, sociological, economical, or political, and of summarizing his findings in the form of a class paper. I generally assign one paper to each student each semester. I try to select the topics as early in the semester as possible and direct the clerics to work on them as time permits in the course of the coming months. I do not specify the date on which they are to have their tasks completed other than to stipulate that it must be sometime within the semester. My motive for allowing this liberty is my general policy of having the students rely upon their own initiative whenever possible and my conviction that in work of this nature the item of thoroughness is more worthy of consideration than the item of time. Naturally some require more time for a thorough piece of work than do others.

When I assign the individual subjects, I put each student in touch with the literature requisite for his paper. The student has nothing even remotely akin to a definite plan of treatment at the beginning. He merely knows that he has on his hands a more or less general topic which he must attack in some specific manner. As he proceeds with his reading he is expected gradually to form within his mind his preferred plan of treatment. It may well be that more than one plan appeals to him as feasible. After the practical completion of his reading, he commits his plan, or plans, to writing. He then comes to me, and we discuss his work thus far and decide upon the plan he is to adopt. When he has finished his paper, he informs me to that effect and I determine when he

is to give the class the benefit of it. Prior to the determined class period the cleric puts a complete and rather detailed outline of his paper on the blackboard in order that the class will be able to follow the reading of his paper more intelligently and profitably and also in order that those who wish may copy the outline. The portion of the hour not taken up with the reading is given over to general discussion and criticism.

I lay great importance on methodology in the preparation of these papers. I devote one or more hours to the discussion of method at the time of assigning the subjects and demand that the student introduce his paper with the enumeration of his sources and with the narration of the method he followed in taking notes as he covered his literature, of the particular manner in which he formulated his plan of treatment, of any specific difficulties he may have encountered in developing his plan, of the things that he would do differently if he were to go over the identical field again, etc.

Here I may remark that ordinarily one or the other cleric is excused from the writing of a class paper because I realize that his time is already sufficiently occupied. It also happens that a student who has been assigned a paper is obliged to report lack of sufficient time to complete it. If he has already accomplished something, I ask him to give the class at least the benefit of his "methodological introduction," of which we spoke above; otherwise, he is excused entirely. Practically speaking, it amounts to this: I expect papers from those only who, after mastering their routine textbooks and covering the assigned readings, find that they still have some time at their disposal.

At times also I permit the students to choose their own topics, subject, however, to my approval. I followed this plan during the past semester. It may be of general interest to take note of some of the topics thus selected. They are, for example: "Some Legal Knowledge for a Priest"; "The Economic Phase of the Soviet Government in Theory and Practice"; "Rural Social Work"; "Outstanding Catholic National Social Agencies"; "The Methods of Dr. John A. Ryan," and "The Spirit of the New Scholasticism."

In the course of my teaching, I have learned to know that, even with my material mapped out as I have been describing it in the

preceding pages, there are always some students who at times during a semester have accomplished the full task required of them and still have some little time on their hands. For the benefit of these, I place at the disposition of each student a copy of Dr. John A. Ryan's *Declining Liberty and Other Papers* (New York: Macmillan, 1927). This is a volume of x and 350 pages, embodying twenty-nine very timely, interesting, and instructive discussions of subjects which the author classifies as political, economic, and social. Although I in no sense exact the mastery of this work of my students, I find that there are always some who do so, and more who do so in part.

Declining Liberty and Other Papers

I have gone into detail, and, perhaps, in places even tediously so, in the narration of my personal methods and experiences. I trust, however, that my humble efforts have not been entirely in vain. The plan appeals to me as one which quite readily lends itself to a variety of circumstances and, at least in its general outline, may serve others where a specific course in the social sciences is impossible, as I am convinced it has been of great service to me in the past. It leads to very definite results with a minimum of effort on the part of the professor and with practically no drain on the regular routine work. But what I consider its greatest asset is the fact that, toward the end of his college career, the student learns in a very practical way to study on his own initiative. At the same time the plan takes proper regard for the individual student's talent.

Conclusion

DISCUSSION

FR. CLAUDE VOGEL, O.M.Cap.:—As sons of St. Francis, the great Social Reformer, there can be no doubt of the very definite and concrete rôle that we must play in the solution of social questions. Our past history furnishes sufficient evidence of this. The Friars were always men of the people, more especially men of the poor. While eschewing money and wealth for themselves, they were not loath by virtue of dispensation to collect and handle money in the interests of God's poor. Witness, for instance, the establishment of the *montes pietatis*, those charitable institutions for lending money at low rates of interest, which were founded by Franciscan Friars in the middle of the fifteenth century. The idea of the *mons pietatis* was devised by the Franciscans, Barnabo da Terni

The Mons Pietatis a Glorious Achievement of the Sons of St. Francis

and Fortunato Coppoli, as a remedy against the evils of usury practiced by the Jews. Through the preaching of the Franciscan, Michele Carcano of Milan, the first *mons pietatis* was established at Perugia in 1462. In 1463 the Franciscan Bartolomeo de Colle succeeded in establishing another at Orvieto. Soon such banks were founded in all the large cities of Italy and in the Venetian Republic, and everywhere the Franciscans took the initiative. The greatest credit for the development of these banks is undoubtedly due to Blessed Bernardine da Feltre, who in his apostolic journeys either instituted or reëstablished such banks. Later, when certain theologians and canonists attacked the *montes pietatis* on the ground that interest was taken for the loans, it was the Franciscan Bernardino de Bustis who in his *Defensorium Montis Pietatis* defended them and succeeded in convincing theological faculties and individual jurists of the morality of such banks.[1]

This is just one phase of the social or economic activity of the Friars of St. Francis. A galaxy of keen-minded men succeeded by this means in combating usury and in bringing relief to the poor of their times. To-day no less than centuries ago there are economic and social problems with which we as men of the people must cope and we shall be remiss in our duty if we send our clerics unprepared into the field. We must teach at least the elements of the social sciences, and in so doing we should by no means neglect to point out to our clerics the great power for social good that is to be found in the Third Order of St. Francis. While the primary aim of the Third Order is the sanctification of its members, its secondary object is and has always been the social uplift of the community. From the very beginning the tertiaries caught the spirit of St. Francis and dedicated themselves to the service of the poor and afflicted. Blessed Luchesius, the first tertiary, worked among the fever victims distributing medicines to them gratis. St. Elizabeth of Hungary, the tertiary queen, and St. Louis of France, a tertiary king, established hospitals and homes for the sick and needy. Indeed, within less than a century after the death of St. Francis, hospitals, houses of mercy, and guest houses under the direction of the tertiaries of St. Francis were established in all the important cities of Italy, France, Spain, the Netherlands and other European countries. There can be no reason why the tertiaries of to-day should not live up to their glorious traditions of the past. Directors should see to it that their confraternities have some social interest in keeping with their numbers and their opportunities in their respective communities.

The Third Order a Great Social Power

Let our teachers of the social sciences, therefore, acquaint our clerics with the social activities of the Third Order both in the past and the present, and this wonderful organization with its adaptibility to all times and peoples will leave its impress on our present age no less than it did in the past. A very serviceable book to place into the hands of our clerics is, *The Third Order of St. Francis, A Historical Essay* by Fr. Fredegand Callaey, O.M.Cap., translated into English by John M. Lenhart, O.M.Cap. (St. Augustine's Monastery, 220—37th St., Pittsburgh, Pa.)

---

[1] See Holzapfel, *Die Anfänge der Montes Pietatis* (Munich, 1903).

THEODICY AND ETHICS

Fr. David Baier, O.F.M., S.T.D.

Theodicy or natural theology and ethics or moral philosophy logically belong together just as dogmatic and moral theology are closely related. Ethics supposes theodicy, while theodicy would be incomplete without ethics. Theodicy, which treats of God from the standpoint of reason, is the speculative element of natural religion. Ethics, which lays down the principles of human conduct, is its practical element. God, the Efficient Cause of creatures, must also be the Final Cause of all that has been created. God is also the Eternal Law, which is the ultimate basis of all moral obligation. It is true, we speak of things as moral or immoral, according as they conform or do not conform to our rational nature. But God has constituted our nature as it is, hence this very rational nature is an indication of His will in our regard. Theodicy alone, which ascribes all things to God as the Efficient and Final Cause, can adequately explain why man must do this and avoid that. The phenomenon of fear and remorse after yielding to evil or that of peace and hope of a reward after doing good is founded only in the firm conviction that there is a God. In other words, ethics supposes the existence of a God, Who has determined the moral law as well as the sanction for its violation.

Relationship between Theodicy and Ethics

Theodicy and ethics are the constituents of natural religion. But they are also parts of a more comprehensive system of truths, which we call philosophy. Without them philosophy would be incomplete. Cosmology, which treats of the visible world, and rational psychology, which treats of the spiritual nature of man, are unintelligible without theodicy. After considering all that cosmology and psychology have to offer, we must still face the question: whence is the world? whence is man? The ultimate Efficient Cause of all this is a personal and infinitely perfect God, Who is the material object of theodicy. Furthermore, the principal object of rational psy-

Theodicy and Ethics Constituents of Natural Religion

chology, the psyche, with its spiritual faculties—intellect and free will—is a postulate of ethics, for man is subject to the moral law and has moral obligations, precisely because he is endowed by God with an intellect, by which he is able to recognize the law, and with free will, by which he is able freely to observe or violate the law.

We come now to the relation of theodicy and ethics to theology or supernatural religion. While it is often difficult in practice to make a clear-cut distinction between dogmatic and moral theology, in theory there is in supernatural religion a speculative element, which is treated in dogmatic theology, and a practical element, which is treated in moral theology. In regard to the material object natural and supernatural religion coincide in many points. Thus, the various truths concerning God, which are treated in theodicy, are also the object of dogmatic theology. In a similar manner the moral principles as proposed in ethics are also enunciated in moral theology.

Intimate Relationship between Natural and Supernatural Religion

Both dogmatic and moral theology, however, contain more than is found in theodicy and ethics. The reason for this lies in the difference of the formal object. Theodicy and ethics have for their object reason alone, while the formal object of theology, dogmatic or moral, is reason enlightened by faith. Many truths have been revealed, that are entirely beyond the scope of unaided reason. These must be accepted on the authority of God, Who has made them known to us. Other religious truths which can be known by reason alone, have also the support of revelation. These are common both to natural and supernatural religion. It is sufficient to mention here that mankind as such in its present state requires revelation even for such truths on account of the great difficulty of attaining a certain knowledge of them.

Superiority of Supernatural Religion

An important problem of a practical nature presents itself here in regard to such truths that are common both to natural and supernatural religion. Should they be treated only during the course of theology, or should they receive a twofold treatment, namely, in philosophy and in theology? The Scholastics made no clear distinction between theology and philosophy, and therefore, in systematizing and coördinat-

Philosophy and Theology Distinct but not Separate

ing religious truths, they considered them all in theology from the standpoint of reason and revelation. For them philosophy is important only as an aid to theology, it is the *ancilla theologiae.* In more recent times, however, philosophy has been separated from theology, and a course of two or three years in philosophy precedes that of theology. Is this course to be regarded as a mere preparation for theology, or is the independence of philosophy as distinct from theology to be stressed? Is philosophy still the *ancilla theologiae* in the strict sense, or has it obtained its freedom and is it now separated from theology? The answer to this question might be succinctly stated in the words of a modern Catholic philosopher: "Philosophy and theology are distinct but not separate." While they are distinct in their principles and methods, they are not entirely separated. Philosophy aids theology in systematizing, explaining and showing the reasonableness of revealed truths. Theology protects philosophy from the gross errors to which unaided human reason is subject.

Let us return to the problem that has just been proposed. The problem stated in a slightly different fashion is this: Should theodicy and ethics be dropped from the course of philosophy and their subject-matter be taught only in theology, or on the other hand, should they be included in the course of philosophy and their subject-matter be repeated during the theological course? It is needless to state that we are concerned here only with the philosophical course of students who are preparing for entrance into theology.

Philosophy without Theodicy and Ethics

We shall suppose in the first place a philosophical course of ecclesiastical students, from which theodicy and ethics are dropped. The reason for dropping them would be, that their subject-matter is also treated in theology, and it is sufficient to consider it there from the twofold standpoint of revelation and reason. In such a case the professor of theology, dogmatic or moral, as the case may be, must stress the fact that the truths and principles proposed are not only based on revelation, but are also proved by solid rational arguments. He must also take cognizance of the modern tendency in the philosophy of religion as well as of the modern ethical theories and refute them adequately, so that the student may be able later to deal with such problems.

Place of Theodicy and Ethics in the Theological Course

At what part of the theological course should the subject-matter of theodicy and ethics be taught? Manuals of dogmatic theology usually have the tract *De Deo Uno* after the fundamental treatises *De Vera Religione, De Ecclesia, De Fontibus Revelationis* and *De Fide.* The rational arguments for the existence of God as well as the various points of theodicy concerning the essence and attributes of God could be taken up in that tract. But inasmuch as the fact of God's existence is a postulate of fundamental dogma, it would be more logical to consider the arguments for the existence of God before the tract *De Vera Religione* and reserve for the tract *De Deo Uno* only those elements of theodicy that pertain to the divine Essence and Attributes. In regard to ethics, a great deal of the subject-matter coincides with what is known as fundamental moral. The tracts *De Actibus Humanis, De Conscientia, De Legibus* and *De Virtutibus* embrace all the elements of general ethics. Particular problems of ethics that pertain to society, whether domestic or civil, can be sufficiently explained in tracts of special moral.

Advantages of a Philosophic Course without Theodicy and Ethics

But what would be the advantage or disadvantage of incorporating the various elements of theodicy and ethics in the program of theological studies, and of omitting them from the course of philosophy? A practical advantage resulting from such a procedure would be the saving of much time that could be devoted to other important problems of philosophy. Since the course of philosophy is usually confined to but two years, the elimination of theodicy and ethics would enable the professor of philosophy to give a more thorough course in the other parts of philosophy. Besides, the course of philosophy is somewhat overcrowded by the introduction of non-philosophical subjects. Sciences, Latin, English, Biblical languages, Introduction to Sacred Scripture and frequently Church history, not to speak of ecclesiastical chant, are included in the program of studies. In view of this fact the gaining of more time is quite important for the student of philosophy. But there is another more important advantage derived from such a course of studies for ecclesiastical students. It is important for the student of theology to realize that faith is a

reasonable homage, and that his philosophical *Weltanschauung* conforms with his theological outlook. A separate consideration of the problems of theodicy and ethics in the course of philosophy is apt to give the impression that philosophy is not only distinct but independent of theology, and that he might subscribe to one thing in philosophy and to something diametrically opposed in theology. Truth is one, whether a knowledge of it is obtained by revelation or by rational argument, for God, Who is Truth itself, cannot contradict Himself. A proper coördination in those points, in which philosophy and theology overlap, should make the student realize that his philosophy is thoroughly Christian, and that his theology is thoroughly reasonable; that philosophy is not a mere stepping-stone to theology, which may be neglected as soon as one has passed over it, but rather that the course in philosophy is not finished until the completion of his theological course.

Disadvantages of Such a Course

We have considered the advantages that flow from the consideration of the subject-matter of theodicy and ethics during the course of theology. What disadvantage might follow from such an arrangement? The philosophical course would certainly benefit by it, but only at the expense of the theological course. It is just as true of the theological as of the philosophical course that it is overcrowded. The professor of dogmatic theology would find it extremely difficult in the time allotted to him to treat satisfactorily all that belongs in a course of theodicy. The professor of moral theology would find less difficulty in treating the general principles of ethics during his course of fundamental moral, but he would meet with the same difficulty as the professor of dogma in dealing with the particular ethical problems that pertain to domestic and civil society. More time cannot be allotted to the professors of theology, because there are so many other ecclesiastical subjects that demand attention during the theological course. In such a course as we suppose, there is every danger that the subject-matter of theodicy and ethics, except for the general ethical principles, would receive only cursory treatment. But not only is the time wanting to give it adequate treatment, as has just been suggested. It is true that the professors of dogma and moral could not pass over in silence the related problems from the field of philosophy, but for them the all-important thing is the theological aspect, while the philosophical

viewpoint is subordinate. The insistence upon the former, more than anything else, might easily influence the student to think that the other is unimportant and can be neglected. At the present time, when the very fundamentals of religion are attacked from every angle, it is imperative that the philosophical viewpoint be emphasized, but it appears impossible to do this during the course of theology without injury to the theological viewpoint.

Theodicy and Ethics in the Course of Philosophy

Let us now suppose a course of studies for ecclesiastical students, in which theodicy and ethics are included in the course of philosophy. This program supposes that their content is treated again later from a theological viewpoint. It is obvious that theodicy and ethics should not be taught before other parts that are necessary for a proper understanding of their subject-matter. I think it is quite the general practice to have logic and epistemology first in the course of philosophy, and certainly no one will question the statement that they ought to precede theodicy and ethics. As for cosmology and psychology, it should not make very much difference whether they precede or follow them. It is, however, important that ontology or general metaphysics precede them. It is certainly true of theodicy, though not so true of ethics, that the terminology is that of general metaphysics. If the student has a knowledge of this terminology before he enters upon the study of theodicy, he will be able better to grasp its content.

We might ask the question: Is it necessary to spend as much time on theodicy and ethics during the philosophical course of ecclesiastical students as during the same course of college students? We are not discussing what the college student ought to know to prepare himself for his future career, but it is certainly important for him to obtain a thorough course in Christian philosophy, including theodicy and ethics. The ecclesiastical student, however, enters upon the study of theology after the completion of two or three years of philosophy, and will meet with many of the problems of philosophy during his course of theology. His course of philosophy is not complete until he has completed his theological course.

There is every reason for an abridgment of the courses of theodicy and ethics, of which the subject-matter overlaps that

of theology. In the course of theodicy it is necessary and sufficient for the professor to stress the demonstrability of the existence of God and to show the conclusiveness of the arguments for it. This much is necessary, because philosophy is a system of truths, distinct from theology, but it would not have the appearance of completeness, if God were left out of it. Besides, as stated above, the existence of God is a postulate of apologetics, and hence the insistence on this part of theodicy is quite important as a preparation for fundamental dogma. But what about the rest of theodicy? I do not say that it should be entirely passed over in the course of philosophy, but I would say that it is not necessary to spend much time on it. The proofs for the existence of God also prove His infinite perfection, and this includes all that is taught in the rest of theodicy concerning the divine Essence and Attributes. Such a treatment of theodicy would enable a professor of dogma merely to recall to mind the principal arguments for the existence of God and to supplement the previously received knowledge concerning the rest of theodicy. The part, which is more important for philosophy thus receives adequate consideration during the philosophical course.

Abridgment of Theodicy and Ethics

Who will say that the repetition of this part in theology will not be of great benefit to the student? On the other hand, theology should consider more adequately that knowledge concerning God, which is principally theological. Theology, aided by revelation, is more capable of conveying a definite knowledge concerning the divine Attributes than philosophy, which can treat them only as deductions from the infinite perfection of God. Here again there is repetition which is always profitable, and there is likewise a supplementing, from a theological viewpoint, of that which theodicy imparts.

In regard to ethics something similar may be said, except that it is the first part, general ethics, which does not require such adequate treatment in the philosophical course, while the second part, which may be termed social ethics, should be considered more at length on account of the social problems involved. Since the general principles of ethics are constantly applied in moral theology, it is proper that the professor of moral should treat this matter thoroughly in the classroom of moral. The previous treat-

ment, however cursory, in the course of ethics is not superfluous, for it not only contributes to a better understanding of the matter when repeated in the theological course, but also instils a proper appreciation of basic moral principles from the standpoint of rational nature, gives a reason for moral obligation and explains that human nature is a norm of moral conduct precisely because it reflects the will of God.

Separate Treatment for Ethics in the Philosophic Course

Moreover, since philosophy is distinct from theology, and ethics is a part of philosophy, it seems quite important to deal with this subject separately in the philosophical course. As to the social problems that are part of the content of ethics, a more thorough course seems necessary during the years devoted to the study of philosophy. Undoubtedly, this need can be best met by a course in sociology injected into the program of studies. Certainly social problems have also a theological aspect, and it is from this viewpoint that theology must deal with them. As noted before concerning theodicy, the professor of moral should not neglect, as the occasion requires, to recall to the students' mind what has been learned in the course of sociology. Thus the student profits by the repetition and at the same time is enabled to view the problems from the combined viewpoint of theology and philosophy. The social problems, however, seem too important to be left for systematic treatment during the course of theology.

No Danger of Dualism from the Separation of Theodicy and Ethics from Theology

Is there any danger of creating a dualism in the viewpoint of the student by the separation of theodicy and ethics from the course of theology? I do not think so, because no professor of theology can afford to pass over in silence what has been previously learned in philosophy. Besides, our manuals of theology are drawn up along the lines of Scholastic theology, so that the rational viewpoint is by no means neglected. Thus, the *Weltanschauung*, as derived from revelation and reason appears as a united *totum*. Christian philosophy appears as in perfect conformity with Catholic theology; on the other hand, while Catholic theology supplements Christian philosophy, it does not appear as an entirely separate system of truths. By the separation of theodicy and ethics from the course of theology no injury is done

either to philosophy or theology, there is no danger that the philosophical viewpoint will be regarded as unimportant, and there is likewise no danger of creating a dualism in the viewpoint of the student.

It is true, some time is saved by dropping theodicy and ethics from the course of philosophy. This is an advantage, but I do not believe it to be an important factor in the present discussion. In the course that has been proposed much time is not required for theodicy and ethics. Moreover, the repetition of their contents in theology will be a decided advantage. If there is anything important for an ecclesiastical student, it is certainly that which pertains to religion. If supernatural religion as taught in theology is of greater importance, natural religion as taught in theodicy and ethics is not to be despised, for the natural is the foundation of the supernatural. The supernatural perfects and supplements but does not destroy the natural. I would add that, if it is important to save time in the course of philosophy it is equally important to do so in the course of theology.

As a last point we might ask: What is the result of omitting theodicy and ethics from the course of philosophy? I am not able to say anything definite in regard to this question. I have pointed out the advantages and disadvantages that follow from either dropping or retaining the subjects in the philosophical course. I can point to only one case in which ethics has been discontinued in the course of philosophy. In a paper entitled, "Moral Theology in the Curriculum," which was written for the Catholic Educational Association in 1913 by Bishop Peterson, at that time Rector of St. John's Seminary of Brighton, the omission of ethics from the course of philosophy is advocated. In the discussion which followed Bishop Peterson stated that no great inconvenience would follow from a brief treatment of ethics in the course of philosophy, but that the experience at Brighton had shown that ethics did not suffer from being taught only in theology. I would say, too, that no great inconvenience would follow from teaching the subject-matter of theodicy and ethics only in the course of theology. Considering, however, the advantages that follow from the retention of these subjects in the philosophical course, I would favor this policy in the sense in which I have explained it in this paper.

DISCUSSION

FR. PIUS KAELIN, O.M.Cap.:—Whether we look upon philosophy as an autonomous branch of study to be taught "in its own right," and "for its own sake," or whether we stress its character as the *ancilla theologiae*, it would seem that there is far better reason for retaining both theodicy and ethics in the philosophical course than for treating their subject-matter along with dogmatic and moral theology. If theology and philosophy were taught to-day as they were largely taught in the Middle Ages, when the *Summa Theologica* presented the student with a synthesis of both theological and philosophical doctrines, we should not have to face the questions proposed by Fr. David, *viz.*: "Should theodicy and ethics be dropped from the course of philosophy and their subject-matter be taught only in theology?" But now that specialization in all sciences has become so universally accepted, it would afford us little genuine advantage, and it might even cause confusion in the mind of the student, if a mingling of the two sciences took place—and this could not be avoided if theodicy and ethics were made a part of dogmatic and moral theology.

Retain Theodicy and Ethics in Philosophy Course

Philosophy and theology are distinct sciences, and, for the present at least, they will remain distinct branches of study. This would seem to constitute an *a priori* reason for our following the traditional method. But practical reasons also would seem to discourage the attempt to graft theodicy and ethics on to the theological branches. Many students find the study of philosophy uninteresting and lifeless. To them the months of study devoted to abstract and abstruse questions are far from being enjoyable. Why then should we deprive these students. who constitute the bulk of our classes of philosophy, of the keen pleasure which the fascinating study of the *Ens Primum* and the vital and practical study of human conduct will give them? Would it not seem strange if we were to drop from the list of philosophical disciplines the study of life's most interesting problems? Again, if we were to make the change under consideration, the dogmatic tracts *De Deo Uno* and *De Deo Creatore* would become altogether too extensive, as would likewise the moral tracts *De Principiis* and *De Jure et Justitia*.

Life's Most Interesting Problems Studied in Theodicy and Ethics

It seems to me that it is practically out of question to lop off from general ethics the exposition and refutation of the various false theories of morality, e. g., that of Spencer, Kant, of the Utilitarians, etc., and to include them in general moral theology, and likewise, to deal adequately with the various ethico-social topics, which are studied in special ethics, in moral theology, without placing a heavy and an entirely unnecessary burden upon both the professor and the student of the latter branch of study. Apparently, then, it is a more feasible plan to keep ethics and theodicy where they rightly belong. The unavoidable over-lapping this will necessitate will be of advantage to the student, for *repetitio est mater studiorum*. Brief and concise repetition of this kind can only be beneficial and will entail no appreciable loss of time.

Benefit of Repetition

FR. SIMON JOSEPH ARCHAMBAULT, O.F.M.:—The Franciscan view of philosophy would seem to favor placing the study of theodicy and ethics in the course of theology. According to Scotus there must not be any strict limitation between philosophy and theology. If Revelation throws new lights upon the intellect, the philosopher has no right to ignore them. Above all Doctors there is the Holy Scripture whose true text and true sense are that which the Catholic Church authenticates and determines. All the philosophers combined are not equal to St. Paul: *Philosophus noster, scilicet, Paulus,* answers Duns Scotus, to those who display texts of Aristotle before him to prove the superiority of the intellect. To Jean de Touilly who would find knowledge nowhere but in Aristotle, Duns Scotus answers: "If a man can properly expound Scripture, develop its content and resolve the objections opposed to it, that man is the first in the Church *by his science.*"

Reserve Theodicy and Ethics for the Theological Course

Above Greek wisdom there is also St. Augustine, one of the ablest minds of all times, to whose methods the Franciscan School has chosen to be faithful. His genius was so vast that his thoughts refused to be imprisoned in a closed system. One never knows whether St. Augustine speaks as a philosopher or a theologian. Perhaps this absence of mental order is only the presence of a moral order that is different from the order we should expect. If the question of life is to love rather than to know, the duty of the philosopher is less to satisfy the mind than to answer the desires of the will. According to Pascal: "Jesus Christ and St. Paul have the order of charity, not the order of the mind, because they wished to warm the soul rather than to teach it. So with St. Augustine—This order consists principally in digression." By his digressions he refers us constantly to God, not as an end, but as a center to which it is ever necessary to return. We must therefore dispense ourselves from the preoccupation of submitting theodicy and ethics to the discipline of air-tight compartments and we may easily delay their study until we reach the course of theology.

THE TEACHING OF EPISTEMOLOGY

Fr. John Baptist Schunk, O.F.M., Lect. Phil.

Epistemology, we are told, is a *new* science, a science that owes its origin to Descartes and Locke, and culminates in Kant's *Critique*. But, I dare ask, must this assertion go unchallenged? Is the *Science of Science* an exclusively modern exploitation? Have not the philosophers of old (I mean the thinkers before A. D. 1600) grappled with the problems of knowledge? Does not Socrates deserve to be hailed as the founder of epistemology for having made the first inquiry into the conditions of scientific knowledge? Was it not the task of Plato and Aristotle to *criticize*, to formulate a new problem in face of antinomies such as the dynamism of Heraclitus and Parmenides' immutable Being, to unriddle the dilemma between the skeptical tendencies of the Sophists, who had reduced truth to the level of opinion, and the dogmatism of Socrates, and, in particular, was it not their avowed purpose to solve the antithesis between sense-knowledge and rational-knowledge, between the individual and the universal, between the many and the one, and to validate both kinds of knowledge? A close student of Plato has found no essential difference between the great Greek philosopher and Kant in their statement of the epistemological problem, and, since he has expressed this very succinctly, I take the liberty to quote him at length:

> The *theory of knowledge* is the very center of Plato's philosophy. He takes his stand upon the fundamental assumption that there really is such a thing as *science*, i. e., a body of knowable truth which is valid always and absolutely and for every thinking mind. The problem he sets before himself in his metaphysics is to find the answer to the question, *How is science possible? What is the general character which must be ascribed to the objects of our scientific knowledge?* Plato may, therefore, in spite of Kant's hasty inclusion of him among the dogmatists, be truly said to be a great *critical* philosopher, and, indeed, with a partial reservation in favor of his revered predecessor Parmenides, the earliest critical philosopher of Europe. Indeed, it is not too much to say that Plato's fundamental problem is essentially identical with that of Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, though Plato's solution of it differs strikingly in some respects from Kant's.[1]

[1] A. E. Taylor, *Plato*, 36, in the series "Philosophies Ancient and Modern."

Kant himself confesses that he began his Critical Philosophy with the consciousness of antinomies between British Empiricism and Continental Rationalism. He was convinced of the truth of certain elements in both the one and the other, just as he was convinced of the unsatisfactoriness of either theory taken by itself. The aim of his *Critique* is to conciliate sensibility and understanding and thus lay the basis and limit of valid knowledge.

> Leibniz *intellectualized* phenomena, just as Locke had *sensualized* the concepts of understanding. Instead of seeking in the understanding and sensibility two wholly distinct sources of representations, which, however, can form objective judgments of things only *in conjunction*, each of these great men recognized but one of these faculties, the one which, in their opinion, immediately referred to the things in themselves, while the other (faculty) served only to fuse (*verwirren*) or arrange the representations of the first.[2]

This conjunction of sense-knowledge and intellectual-knowledge, the Sage of Königsberg believed he had discovered in his synthetic *a priori* judgment, which he accordingly made the touchstone of all scientific knowledge. Hence, the one, great, universal problem of epistemology is contained in the question: How are synthetical *a priori* judgments possible? Upon the solution of this problem depends the existence or downfall of the science of metaphysics.[3]

William James, too, was awakened by the cognizance of the very same antinomies, by the dilemma between empiricism and rationalism, which he chose to caricature as the tender-minded and tough-minded temperaments. He describes the tender-minded as rationalistic (going by principles), intellectualistic, idealistic, optimistic, religious, free-willist, monistic, dogmatical; and the tough-minded as empiricist (going by facts), sensationalistic, materialistic, pessimistic, irreligious, fatalistic, pluralistic, skeptical. The aim of pragmatism, the American philosopher expressly avers, is to temper the two extremes.

> I offer the oddly-named thing pragmatism as a philosophy that can satisfy both kinds of demand. It can remain religious like the rationalisms, but at the same time, like the empiricisms, it can preserve the richest intimacy with facts. . . . I have all along been offering it expressly as a mediator between tough-mindedness and tender-mindedness.[4]

---

[2] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (ed. R. Schmidt: Leipzig, 1926), 317.
[3] *Ibid.*, Einleitung VI, 51.
[4] *Pragmatism*, 33, 269.

Now this critical attitude towards sensism and intellectualism is *not new.* The Sage of Königsberg, by insisting on the *complementary rôle* of sensibility and understanding in scientific knowledge, is unwittingly pointing the way back to the traditional medieval position.[5] The great Schoolmen were agreed that the proper object of human knowledge *pro statu isto* was not to be ascribed exclusively to sensibility or to the understanding, but to the simultaneous and strictly complementary activity of these two faculties. Their well-known adage *nihil in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu* anticipates Kant's "earth-shaking" discovery of the synthetic *a priori* formula of conciliation, and withal "preserves the richest intimacy with facts." Moreover, in the positions taken by the leading schoolmen, we detect such nuances which show that they exercised no small degree of critical acumen and belie the charge that Scholastic philosophy betrays a lack of originality.

The Old Problem

Thus, for example, St. Thomas expressly appeals to the Aristotelean *via media* between the sensism of Democritus and Plato's transcendentalism. Sense-knowledge, according to the Angelic Doctor, is not the whole and all-sufficient cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather in a way the *materia causae.*[6] The very terminology employed by the thirteenth-century thinker is suggestive of the *material* and *formal* element in Kantian ideology, although we are by no means to infer that the solution of St. Thomas is identical with Kant's.[7] To quote Gilson:

> The whole Thomistic epistemology rests on the fact that the intellect attains to being and takes possession of it, because it attains to the sensible species and takes possession of that, after transforming it. The objectivity of knowledge is consequently based upon the sensible species as the meeting-point between the intellect and the object.[8]

Blessed John Duns Scotus, taking his cue from the Augustinian formula *ab utroque paritur notitia, a cognoscente, sc., et cognito,* compares the complementary action of the understanding and of

[5] J. Maréchal, S.J., *Le Point de Départ de la Métaphysique, Cahier III, La Critique de Kant,* 147. Cf. *Present-day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism,* ed. by J. S. Zybura (St. Louis, 1927), 526.

[6] *Magis quodammodo materia causae, Sum.* I, 84, 6. Cf. *De Verit.* X, 6.

[7] Cf. Geny, *Critica* (Rome, 1927), 254 Obiec. 7; E. Przywara, "Kantischer und thomistischer Apriorismus," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch,* B. 42 (1929), 1-24.

[8] *The Philosophy of St. Thomas* (Cambridge, 1924), 214.

the object derived from the senses to the mutually active rôle of father and mother in procreation.[9] The Subtle Doctor concedes the conditioned (yet not an absolute and essential) dependence of the intellect on the senses for its object: *talis est connectio istarum potentiarum, sc., phantasiae et intellectus, pro statu isto, quod nihil intelligimus in universali nisi cujus singulare phantasiamur.*[10]

We are indeed fortunate in having St. Bonaventure label his position in epistemology. The Seraphic Doctor prefers to have the plumb of his critique mediate between Plato and Aristotle, and this position he vindicates for St. Augustine. I shall let the Franciscan thinker express himself in his own inimitable style:

> *Unde quia Plato totam cognitionem certitudinalem convertit ad mundum intelligibilem sive idealem, ideo meritus reprehensus fuit ab Aristotele: non quia male diceret, ideas esse et aeternas rationes, cum in hoc laudet Augustinus, sed quia, despecto mundo sensibili, totam certitudinem cognitionis reducere voluit ad illas ideas; et hoc ponendo, licet videretur stabilire viam sapientiae, quae procedit secundum rationes aeternas, destruebat tamen viam scientiae, quae procedit secundum rationes creatas; quam viam Aristoteles e contrario stabilicbat, illa superiore neglecta. Et ideo videtur, quod inter philosophos datus sit Platoni sermo sapientiae, Aristoteli vero sermo scientiae. Ille enim principaliter aspiciebat ad superiora, hic vero principaliter ad inferiora. Uterque autem sermo, sc. sapientiae et scientiae, per Spiritum Sanctum datus est Augustino.*[11]

Now if the method of criticism in philosophy is the method of determining the limits of our knowledge by an inquiry into the instrument (and this is the method pursued by Locke, "the first critical philosopher," and by Kant), we must concede, I think, that the Greek and Scholastic philosophers are not to be classed as uncritical. The question: *How is science possible?* was faced by them squarely. The problem of the one and the many, the conciliation and verification of the variety in sense-knowledge and of the unity in intellectual-knowledge is not a new problem; it is very ancient. When Kant essayed to criticize sense and thought, we must remember that he was leveling his attacks against the

[9] Oxon. I, d. 3, q. 9. To appraise this figure exactly, we must bear in mind the physiological notions of the time: *una causa est simpliciter perfectior altera, ita tamen quod utraque in sua partiali causalitate est perfecta, non dependens ab alia.*

[10] *Ibid.*, q. 6. Cf. Z. van de Woestyne, O.F.M., *Cursus Philosophicus* (Mechlin, 1925), II, 361 ff.

[11] *Opera Omnia* (Quaracchi ed.), V, 572.

rationalism of the Leibniz-Wolff school to which he had previously belonged; while turning away from that school, he was actually heading for the Scholastic synthesis.[12] It it also apparent that William James, in the main, vents his criticism on a "vicious abstractionism," on the transcendental idealism of a Bradley or a Royce, or the monism of a Swami Vivekananda. The noble enterprise of steering clear of the Scylla of empiricism and the Charybdis of rationalism had been undertaken long before. Already in the twelfth century, John of Salisbury said of this perennial problem of harmonizing the universal with the individual, upon which the validity of science depends, that in discussing it "the world had grown old, and it had taken up more time than the Cæsars had occupied in conquering and governing the world," and he makes this significant conclusion his own: "He who seeks for the object of genera and species outside the things of sense is wasting his time." [13]

Since the one, universal problem of epistemology, "the most central of all philosophic problems," is to show the complementary rôle of sensibility and understanding and thus to answer the question: *How is science possible?* and since this problem is not new, we must seek elsewhere for the distinctive mark of *modern epistemology.*

The New Dogma

It might seem presumptuous on my part, nothing short of a "vicious abstractionism," to try to point out a specific character in the welter of divergent and conflicting systems. But there must be some earmark of modern philosophy, beside the very fact of its excessive preoccupation with the theory of knowledge, and I venture to describe it as a morbid egocentrism or subjectivism.[14] In the modern interpretation of knowledge, the knower is given the lion's share of function, while the object known is made to play a very insignificant part. An immanentistic orientation, the viewpoint of the subject, the spirit of autonomy are stressed beyond measure.

[12] Zybura, *op. cit.*, 522. Zybura cites A. Inauen, S.J., *Kantische und scholastische Einschätzung der natürlichen Gotteserkenntniss* (Innsbruck, 1925) to the effect that Kant's criticism is aimed at the *a priori* proofs of the Wolffian school and does not affect the proofs offered by Scholastic philosophy for the substantiality, spirituality and immortality of the soul.

[13] M. De Wulf, *History of Medieval Philosophy* (London, 1925), I, 178.

[14] *Beides: Ausgang vom Ich und Erkenntnisstheorie ist der innerste Geist der modernen Philosophie.* B. Jansen, S.J., *Wege der Weltweisheit* (Freiburg, 1924), 81.

Right here, it is important to call to mind that the part played by the thinking subject in the knowledge-process was far from ignored in the older systems. As our illustrious confrere, Father Gemelli, has pointed out, "subjectivation" or interiority is not a peculiarly modern trait.[15] Did not Protagoras of old, in proclaiming that "man is the measure of all things," inspire a humanistic orientation? The Socratic maxim "Know thyself!" inaugurated an anthropocentric era in philosophy. St. Augustine is celebrated for his introspective method and anticipated Descartes in making consciousness the bed-rock of certitude by his classic formula *si cogito sum.*[16] For the Scholastics, sensation and intellection imply not only receptivity, but also activity; they are *immanent* acts of the subject.[17]

But what is new and peculiar to modern philosophy and epistemology, is its dogmatic approach to the problem of science. It takes for granted that knowledge breaks down all contact with reality. Consciousness sets an insurmountable barrier betwixt the knower and the thing in itself. The *porta quinque sensuum* becomes a sealed wall. Raw reality is so much made over by us, "peptonized and cooked" and humanized, as to be no longer distinguishable from mind-stuff. It is this uncriticized assumption of the principle of immanence, this unquestioned axiom that the knower does not attain to the extramental object, which, in my opinion, differentiates modern epistemology and gives it its specific character.[18] We never perceive the extramental object or *res in se,* be it substance or accident, be it an extrasubjective or the noumenal self, we get to know only an internal product which goes under the name of *phenomenon,* an appearance, as Jacobi objected to Kant, without anything appearing.

[15] Cfr. Gmelli's introduction to *Immanuel Kant (1724-1924). Volume commemorativo del secondo centenario della nascita* (Milan, 1924).

[16] *Modern ist der Ausgangspunkt seiner Erkenntnisslehre und seines Philosophierens vom Ich und von den Bewusstseinstatsachen.* Jansen, *op. cit.*, 79.

[17] Aristotle and St. Thomas are alleged to stress the passive character in sensation. Cf. J. Fröbes, S.J., *Psychologia Speculativa* (Freiburg, 1927) I, 119: *Hanc quaestionem historicis diiudicandam relinquimus. Independenter a Schola peripatetica, praesertim Platonici activitatem sensationis praedicant; ita Plotinus, S. Augustinus, S. Anselmus, Matth. ab Aquasparta, Scotus, qui in hac re Thomam impugnat.*

[18] *Principium immanentiae habetur tanquam DOGMA FUNDAMENTALE TOTIUS PHILOSOPHIAE MODERNAE, imo tanquam TESSERA cujusque veri philosophi; ipsum autem pronuntiatur esse EXTRA OMNEM CONTROVERSIAM positum atque EX SE EVIDENS.* Geny, *Critica*, 204.

Yet it is on this dogmatic assumption of phenomenism that Kant presumes to answer the question: How is science possible? Because the mathematical sciences are confined to phenomena (with the spatial and temporal forms supplied by mind itself) and do not apply to things in themselves, mathematics is *the* science, whereas metaphysics which implies the knowledge of things in themselves is adjudged unscientific. "Kant's doctrine that we know only phenomena, and his statement that an inquiry is only scientific in so far as it is mathematical, are two ways of saying the same thing." [19]

William James is no less dogmatic in his agnostic position.

> "Reality" is in general what truths have to take account of; and the first part of reality from this point of view is the flux of our sensations. Sensations are forced upon us, coming we know not whence. . . . Other pragmatists may think to get at the sensible core of reality in its independent nature, by peeling off the successive man-made wrappings.[20]

With the American Philosopher as well as with Kant, is not this assumption of phenomenism the core of their epistemological theorizing? [21] Kant could not have better labeled his philosophy than with the caption *praestet fides supplementum sensuum defectui;* since by phenomenism, by default of the senses, metaphysics is made impossible, he would reinstate metaphysics by means of the unscientific *ratio practica.* And is not this postulate that mind is bottled-up with its products and cannot lay hold of an external (extra-conscious, to be more precise) reality, but, at most, can only infer the existence of such a reality, conjecture its main outlines, and nothing more, is not this the specific milieu of modern epistemology? [22]

A cursory glance over the history of modern philosophy will reveal that it is by far the story of a detour from *El Camino Real.* And most detours, experience teaches us, do not fare very well.

[19] A. D. Lindsay, *The Philosophy of Bergson* (1911), 16.

[20] *Pragmatism,* 244, 249.

[21] James in a note to *The Meaning of Truth,* 195, explains how he wished to remain "an epistemological realist": I need hardly remind the reader that both sense-percepts and percepts of ideal relation (comparisons, etc.) should be classed among the realities. The bulk of our mental "stock" consists of truths concerning these.

[22] Cf. Geny, "Scholastic Philosophy and Modern Mentality," Zybura, *op. cit.,* 169.

Off the Real-way

The break from the highway of the real is traceable to the luckless legacy of Descartes, to the *pons* he established between mind and the real. We do not know *things* directly but only through mental phantasms, which are not indeed mere affections of mind, but are suspended somewhere betwixt mind and real things; the ideas as *medium quod* are the only objects we know. It is by reason of this "fundamentally negative doctrine concerning the root-incapacity of the human mind to go beyond its subjective ideas," [23] that the French thinker is accorded the title of Father of Modern Philosophy. It is a commonplace that this idealistic attitude was largely influenced and dominated by the methods and aims of the mathematical sciences, and coincident with their development.[24] Descartes ventured to hope that the same key would unlock the secrets of Nature and Mind; he dreamed of a universal mathematics. He soon found that the evidence of the external world did not measure up to his postulate of mathematical evidence.

> The chief and the commonest of errors consists in thinking that my internal ideas are like or in conformity with things outside me. . . . It is merely through a blind and hasty impulse that I came to believe that there were things outside me which were different from my own being, which by the organs of the senses or in some other way communicated to me their notions or representations and imprinted their likenesses upon me.[25]

This phenomenalistic position, however, is not entirely original with Descartes. In the fourteenth century, Nicholas of Autrecourt had maintained that God could arouse in us sensible impressions which we think we receive from the external world, and that the existence of the external world cannot be demonstrated. The only substance which a man can know with certitude is that of his own soul.[26]

A similar position had been taken by John of Mirecourt. He, first of all, distinguishes primordial knowledge which is endowed

[23] Mercier, *The Origins of Contemporary Psychology* (London, 1918), 48.

[24] According to Mercier, *op. cit.*, 3, Descartes' distinctive contribution to thought is the conception of a science of pure mathematics which would apply to every kind of research.

[25] *III. Meditations.*

[26] *Quod in lumine naturali intellectus viatoris non potest habere notitiam evidentiae de existentia rerum evidentia reducta seu reductibili ad evidentiam seu certitudinem primi principii* (of contradiction). De Wulf, *op. cit.*, II, 240.

with absolute certitude and comprises an immediate intuition of our own existence (to doubt which would be implicitly to allow the psychological reality of the doubt and the existence of the doubter) together with a series of analytical judgments reducible to the principle of contradiction. But experiential knowledge, which puts us in contact with the external world, does not present the same guarantees of certitude, for God or some other agent, an evil genius, perhaps, could give us the illusion of the existence of things outside us although nothing really existed.[27]

Once ideas were severed from things, the denial of reality became inevitable. Reality was ruthlessly placed on the Procrustean bed and the bloody butchery began. Locke lopped off the secondary qualities of things; Berkeley hacked away the primary qualities and the very substance of body.

> I know what they mean by "things considered in themselves." This is nonsense, jargon. . . . *Thing* and *idea* are much words of the same extent and meaning. . . . Real existence is not conceivable without perception and volition. Existence is perceiving and willing, or being perceived and willed.[28]

Hume completed the *real-cide* by despatching the soul itself. Nothing remained but a "bundle of perceptions," a series of mental events, or, in the language of James, "a stream of sciousnesses." Conscience-stricken, as it were, Hume confesses: "I am affrighted and confounded with that forlorn solitude in which I am placed by my philosophy. When I return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them farther."

A gallant attempt, it is true, was made by Reid and the Scottish school to escape from the wrecked ship of philosophic speculation and to swim back to the *terra firma* of common sense.

> These three great men (Descartes, Malebranche, Locke; we may add Berkeley and Hume), with the best good will, have not been able, from all the treasures of philosophy, to draw one argument, that is fit to convince a man that can reason, of the existence of any one thing without him. Admired Philosophy! . . . if indeed thou hast not power to dispel those clouds and phantoms which thou hast discovered or created, with-

---

[27] De Wulf, *Ibid.*, 242. Peter D'Ailly (201) takes the same stand. Peter Aureoli (174) seems to have introduced a measure of phenomenism.

[28] *Commonplace Book* cited by A. C. Fraser, *Berkeley and Spiritual Realism*, 4.

> draw this penurious and malignant ray; I despise Philosophy, and renounce its guidance; let my soul dwell with Common Sense.[29]

But the Scotch thinker, notwithstanding his good intentions, failed to disengage himself entirely from the meshes of phenomenism.

Now if the ideas are detached from the objects we know, individualism or solipsism is inevitable. To quote the famous example of Kant, there is a great difference between the experience that when I see the sun shine I feel the stone grow warm, and the experience that the sun warms the stone. The second proposition is knowledge and makes for science; the first is part of the contents of an individual.[30] Kant recognized this problem and essayed to save science by apriorism, which he termed a Copernican revolution in the realm of thought. The question: How many things in themselves are there, or is there any way of *knowing* that there is more than one, is left unanswered by the German Sage.[31] As William James opines, solipsism excites too great horror and was never seriously accepted by any one. But the American professor, by his agnostic assumption, shows close affinity to Kant.

> The *sciousness* in question would be the *thinker*, and the existence of this thinker would be given to us rather as a logical postulate. . . . But who the thinker would be, or how many distinct thinkers we ought to suppose in the universe, would all be subjects for an ulterior metaphysical inquiry.[32]

If, then, I cannot attain directly to the extramental object, nevertheless in the domain of consciousness I must distinguish thought and object. My ideas, thus reasons Descartes, considered *subjectively* as certain ways of thinking, do not differ from one another; but viewed *objectively,* they do differ from each other, for one idea represents me to myself, another idea represents God to me, other ideas represent inanimate bodies, animals, men and angels to me.[33] This distinction between the phenomenal object and the noumenal object is all-important in the modern systems

[29] Reid, *An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense* (London, 1769), 13 f.
[30] S. Alexander, *Locke*, 64.
[31] Hence the conflicting interpretations concerning Kant's *realism*.
[32] *Principles of Psychology* I, 304.
[33] Mercier, *Contemp. Psych.*, 15-20.

of epistemology. It might be noted that the transference of the "object" into consciousness and the consequent distinction between the psychological act of knowledge (*esse subjectivum*) and its representative content (*esse objectivum*), namely an *object* in etymological sense of the word (*id quod menti ob-jicitur*) had been already proposed by Peter Aureoli.[34]

Intramental Objectivity

Objectivity, therefore, means in the modern systems phenomenal or intramental objectivity, objects of consciousness. As Geny remarks, the idealists are very correct in asserting that nothing can become known to us, unless it becomes an *object* to us, unless it appears to us; but their fatal mistake lies in *separating* the phenomenal object from the noumenal object, in breaking the contact and continuity between the mental object and thing in itself, a position largely due to the false conception of *substance,* as a kind of mysterious postulate, which Locke had introduced.[35]

What then Is Truth

What then becomes of the common-sense notion of truth as the agreement between the mind's knowledge and the thing independent of the knower? In the light of their phenomenism, the problem of truth becomes meaningless for the idealists. To oppose the "known" to an unknown "conscious something" is a flat contradiction. And if it is of the nature of *knowledge* to distort reality, it is also bound to distort conscious states by the very fact of taking the state of consciousness as the term of the cognitive act.[36] The phenomenists are, consequently, forced to define truth in terms of subjectivism. Truth for them is not objective, is not something imposed on the mind, it is a law of the mind, a merely logical function.[37] To cite again the Belgian Cardinal:

> If the human mind knows nothing but its own ideas, it may very well be logical or illogical—i. e., in accord or in disaccord with itself in the association of its ideas, judgments, and reasonings—but the question of the harmony or want of harmony between its perceptions and some objective reality that they mentally represent becomes meaningless. We should thus be driven to strike out of our speech any expressions that reveal opposition between exactitude, or logical correctness, and truth.[38]

---

[34] De Wulf, *History* I, 175.
[35] Geny, *Critica,* 37 f., 188 f. Wm. James shows himself a victim to this mystery-interpretation of substance in *Pragmatism,* 85-92.
[36] Mercier, *op. cit.,* "Criticism of the Idealist Principle," 247 ff.
[37] Cf. Kant, *Kritik der rein. Vernuft,* "Die transzendentale Logik," iii.
[38] *Contemp. Psych.,* 253.

Truth and error imply some distinction between the two terms, knowledge and reality. If there is no distinction between them, then both truth and error are impossible.

> The cardinal problem of epistemology consists in stating precisely the meaning of these common-sense notions, to wit, real, truth, agreement between mind and the real. . . . Truth appears only when the mind begins to possess, over against reality, something which is its own, and which may be compared with reality. *Ibi primo invenitur ratio veritatis,* says St. Thomas, *ubi intellectus incipit aliquid proprium habere.*[39]

Now whilst I cannot know anything about an object unless it becomes known to me and the object thus known necessarily enters into a relation to my act of knowing, it does not follow from this that the object known depends upon that relation. There is no question of comparing knowledge with an unknown reality; that the object become present to the knowing mind is an indispensable condition; but if knowledge never attains to anything but mental terms, never reaches the *hinterland* of our conscious states, a comparison between mind and something independent of mind becomes impossible, is but a Sisyphus task. Hence the real must be attained in some way by a kind of knowledge which does not terminate in mental terms but rather in reality itself, in which case comparison between mind and thing becomes possible. We have here touched upon the crucial point, the sore spot, of epistemology.[40]

On the Enemy's Terrain

The position of Cardinal Mercier in attacking idealism and in setting the epistemological problem is familiar and has gained widespread acceptance amongst Neo-Scholastics, not, however, without much discussion. Mercier meets the idealists on their own terrain. He adopts the idealistic platform outlined by Herbert Spencer:

> The first step in a metaphysical argument, rightly carried on, must be an examination of propositions for the purpose of ascertaining what character is common to those which we call unquestionably true, and is implied by asserting their unquestionable truth. Further, to carry on

---

[39] L. Noël, "The Neo-Scholastic Approach to the Problems of Epistemology," *The New Scholasticism,* I (1927), 139.

[40] *Dass der Gegenstand der Erkenntniss beides ist: Gedachtes und Wirkliches, abhängig und unabhängig, darin liegt das Geheimniss, das Paradoxon der Erkenntniss.* E. Landmann, cited by Jansen, "Aus dem Bewusstsein zu den Dingen," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch,* B. 42 (1929), 166.

this inquiry legitimately, we must restrict our analysis rigorously to states of consciousness considered in their relations to one another; wholly ignoring anything beyond consciousness to which these states and their relations may be supposed to refer.[41]

Intramental objectivity or sole states of consciousness are chosen as the arena on which the battle of truth is fought. The Cardinal's definition of truth answers the requirements of the idealistic platform: Truth is a relation of identity of nature between the thing presented to mind and an ideal type previously known there. This is the meaning of the universally accepted definition of truth: *veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus.* For by *res* is to be understood something perceived or imagined at the present moment (the subject of a proposition); by *intellectus,* the previously existing idea in the mind of the thing perceived or imagined (the predicate of a proposition); whilst the exact conformity, *adaequatio vel conformitas,* of the subject perceived or imagined with its mental type (the copula) is its truth.[42] This interpretation of the generally accepted definition is in accord with the common Scholastic doctrine that truth is found formally in judgment.[43] Mercier's position has been vigorously upheld by the school of Louvain, especially by his pupil Noël.[44] It has found many adherents, notably Jeannière,[45] van de Woestyne,[46] Gemelli, Reinstadler, and

Truth Defined

[41] *Essays,* II, 204.

[42] Mercier, *Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy,* I, 460.

[43] *Veritas est tantum in intellectu componente et dividente, non autem in sensu neque intellectu cognoscente, quod quid est. . . . Quando judicat, rem ita se habere, sicut est forma, quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc facit componendo et dividendo.* St. Thomas, *Sum.* I, 16, 2. *Veritas aut accipitur pro fundamento veritatis in re, aut pro veritate in actu intellectus componente aut dividente.* Scotus, *Oxon.* I, 2, 2.

[44] *La vérité ne gît pas dans un rapport de nous à des choses séparées et distantes. . . . Le rapport est tout entier, si l'on peut dire, tranporté a l'intérieur de la conscience. . . . Ses termes sont, l'un la réalitè apprehendée, l'autre le jugement de l'intelligence.* "Note sur le Problème de la connaissance," *Annales de l'Institut Sup. de Phil.* II (1913), 674.

[45] *RES est res menti praesens prout in ea apparent notae quaedam objectivae inter quas intellectus enuntiare potest nexum quemdam logicum. Problema de conformitate judicii cum re-in-se, nullo interposito medio, est insolubile. Criteriologia,* 311.

[46] *Aliam in Criteriologia, in qua contra Kantianos, Idealistas, alios dimicandum, non licet significationem tribuere voci objectivitatis. Objectivum ergo nihil est aliud quam id quo aliquid praesens intellectui sisitur. Cursus* I. 112 n. 1.

even the professedly conservative Geny.[47] Noël was able to write in 1927 that the main outlines of the problem of epistemology as Mercier sketched them, were obtaining a more and more widespread acceptance.[48]

The "Why" Of Truth

Aristotle at the beginning of his *Metaphysics* shows how science deals only with universals; the individual is the object of experience, but is not the object of scientific knowledge.[49] The man of experience knows that a thing is so, but does not know why; the wise man, the philosopher, knows the "why" and the cause. Since science is a firm adhesion to a judgment expressing a necessary relation between subject and predicate, it becomes apparent that the fundamental problem of epistemology must be concerned with giving the reason, the cause of our adhesion; must explain the *nexus* or formal element of a judgment. With such knowledge, we are not merely in possession of science, we not only know; but we know why we know. It is the Science of Science.

Science is reducible in the last analysis to the first principles. These are the starting point and the goal, the alpha and omega, of the mind in its restless quest for knowledge.[50] Beyond the first principles one cannot and need not go. To demonstrate them would be as superfluous as to take sunshine to California, or to carry coals to the state of Pennsylvania. If we can find the reason for our unshakable assent to them, we will be in possession of a *criterion* whereby we can distinguish true judgment from the false. And in this wise, skepticism stands refuted. If this

[47] Yet not without a stricture: *Pace illustrium virorum dixerim: non ita loqui fas est; non INTRA CONSCIENTIAM tota transfertur relatio, sed CORAM facultate cognoscitiva, quae est operationum suarum CONSCIA. Hac correctione facta, quae forsan solum modum loquendi attingit, libenter subscribo verbis* (of Noël) *quae praecedunt et sequuntur, quaeque citare juvat. Critica*, 38.

[48] Article cited in note 39, p. 137.

[49] *Ad cognitionem scientialem necessario requiritur veritas immutabilis ex parte scibilis, et certitudo infallibilis ex parte scientis. Tunc enim scimus "cum causam arbitramur cognoscere propter quam res est, et scimus, quoniam impossibile est aliter se habere."* S. Bonav. V, 568.

[50] It is well known that movement starts from an antecedent immobility and ends in rest; the same holds good of human knowledge. Reasoning proceeds from certain initial terms which we apprehend purely and simply by means of the intellect: these are the first principles; its final term is equally the first principles to which it returns to check the conclusions of its argument. Gilson, *Phil. of St. Thom.*, 195.

criterion be objective, i. e., *imposed* on the mind after an inspection of the relation between the two terms, subjectivism and apriorism also are disproven.

As Mercier points out, to judge of the power of the mind independently of its acts is to posit a pseudo-problem. Yet such was the chimera Locke and Kant entertained in presuming to analyze and appraise the ability of human reason without the study of its exercise.[51] As a tree is known by its fruit, so are our cognitive faculties known by their acts.

Mercier leveled his attack at a clearly vulnerable spot in the Kantian system, and a vital spot it was. The German Sage in essaying to show the validity of science in setting out to criticize rationalism and bring it into contact with empiricism, failed to free himself from the apriorism of the first and fell a prey to the latter, to Hume's panphenomenalism. Kant's solution is not critical, is not synthetic; it is painfully eclectic, a juxtaposition of the two elements. Under Wolffian influence, he postulates in an unparalleled, dogmatic fashion the necessity and universality of a judgment as coming *a priori,* independently of experience, as a purely subjective factor. In order to meet Kant on his own ground, the Cardinal limited the problem to judgments of the ideal order. The certainty of an ideal judgment is independent of contingent existence and does not involve committing oneself to any realistic presupposition.[52]

The Problems Stated

The problems of epistemology are therefore concerned with the judgment under its formal and material aspect. Can the judgment be justified, validated by reflexion? The first problem will determine the motive of the formal element in judgment, the reason of the synthesis of subject and predicate. Is our adhesion due to an *a priori* synthesis, or does it follow the clear and evident apprehension of the relation between subject and predicate? The second problem deals with the material element of judgment, the terms themselves. Have the terms a real value, an extramental objectivity?

[51] *Contemp. Psych.*, 255. Cf. J. H. Ryan, "The Approach to the Problem of Knowledge," *New Scholasticism*, II (1928), 21 ff.

[52] *Contemp. Psych.*, 243. These ideal, eternal truths played an important part in the discussion of the *rationes aeternae* in the Middle Ages. Cf. Augustine: *Nunquam fuit, nunquam non erit, sed semper fuit, semper erit, quod septem et tria decem sunt.* II de Lib. Arb. c. 8, n. 21.

> In the general question of certitude, there are two problems which are essentially distinct. The first has to do with the *objectivity of the relation* between the predicate and the subject, and may be confined to the objectivity of principles of an ideal order; the second has to do with the objective *reality* of the terms of the judgment, whether that reality is concerned with that of the Ego, or whether it has to be verified in things existing outside, belonging to the non-Ego. But the solution of the first problem is independent of the solution demanded by the second, whilst the latter is essentially subordinate to the former.[53]

Geny also deems the problem of the formal *nexus* in the judgment as holding first rank, and puts the problem of the extramental objectivity of the terms in the second place.[54]

This twofold aspect of the problem of truth was recognized by the old Scholastics. Duns Scotus distinguishes truth as—formally (existing) in judgment, and fundamentally in things: *Veritas aut accipitur pro fundamento veritatis in re, aut pro veritate in actu intellectus componente aut dividente.*[55] Cardinal Matthew of Aquasparta also makes the sharp distinction between the formal and causal aspect of truth.[56]

Bridging the PERCIPI and the ESSE

Judgment, to be *true,* must formulate the relation as perceived existing between the two terms of a proposition according to the criterion of *evidence.* This is the common Scholastic solution of the first problem of epistemology. The second problem, as we have seen, deals with the terms of the proposition and asks the question whether they are, objective, i. e., representative of extramental reality. But we soon discover a fundamental difference between the terms, for some are abstract and universal, others are individual and function only as the subject of

[53] Mercier, *Contemp. Psych.*, 245.

[54] *Primum problema criticum ponitur de ipso judicio, utrum in eo possimus securi quiescere, alterum erit de elementis judicii, utrum revera existant extra nos ista subjecta concreta, cum notis quas de eis affirmamus. Dices forsan primum problema de altero dependere, v. g. nos non posse in hoc judicio: Nix est alba, quiescere, nisi prius sciamus existere nivem extra nos, in eaque albedinem verificari. Hoc ad PLENAM judicii significationem vindicandam requiri fateor; nam cum dicimus: Nix est alba, non de qualicunque apparentia objectiva, sed de re a nobis independente, non solum apparentem, sed realem qualitatem affirmare intendimus; valor igitur ontologicus tum subjecti, tum praedicati, in judicio IMPLICITE AFFIRMATUR. Critica,* 35.

[55] Oxon. I, 2, 2.

[56] *Veritas non est eodem modo in rebus et intellectu. In rebus est originaliter et causaliter per respectum ad intellectum, sed in intellectu est formaliter. Quaestiones de Cognitione* I, 237.

a proposition.[57] The problem of conciliating and verifying the universal or predicate with the individual or primary subject is an ancient and perennial task which confronts philosophers, and undoubtedly the most prolific source of conflicting *isms*.

Perhaps the most outstanding contribution of Aristotle and Scholasticism to philosophic speculation is the theory of *Abstractionism,* by which the content of abstract concepts and universals is shown to be *realized* in the individual. The universality (*modus quo*) is indeed due to the intellectual function, but the content, far from being a purely subjective constituent as Kant postulated, is derived from the individual thing. The intellect attains to the concrete existent.[58] But has the last word been said thereon? Has not perhaps the negative description been stressed to the detriment of the positive? Is not a kind of intuition compatible with abstractionism?[59] Is not intuition a "yet unexplored field of knowledge"? Scholastics with the great asset of tradition, and especially of the Augustinian tradition, are well equipped to tackle this difficult point of intuition.[60]

There still remains the primary subject, the primitive presence of an object in consciousness, accompanied by a strong feeling of passivity on the part of the *Ego*. "What is it then," asks Noël, "that we should call real if it be not that *datum* opposed to my activity? What could we possibly discover which corresponds better to the idea of the *non-Ego?*"[61]

In this problem of sense-perception, we have perhaps the most delicate problem pressing for solution at the present time. Are we to be content with inferential realism? or, in other words, is

[57] Noël calls these terms *primary subjects* and calls attention to the fact that in many judgments the subject itself is an abstract term. Cf. "Neo-Schol. Approach to the Probl. of Epist.," *New Scholasticism,* I (1927), 141.

[58] *Bei aller Betonung der Abstraktion eignet nach Aristoteles und Thomas, erst recht nach Skotus und Suarez, dem menschlichen Verstand logisches, einsichtiges Erfassen des Konkreten, des Existierenden.* B. Jansen, "Aus dem Bewusstsein zu den Dingen," *Phil. Jahrb.* 42 (1929), 192.

[59] Jansen, *ibid.,* 192, cites "*l'intuition abstractive de l'intelligible*" of Garrigou-Lagrange; p. 172: *der klassisch gewordene Ausdruck ABSTRAKTION ist im Grunde recht unglücklich gewählt.*

[60] Intuition is the weapon used by Bergson against Kant: "The doctrine that I defend proposes to rebuild the bridge (broken down since Kant) between metaphysics and science. This divorce between science and metaphysics is the great evil from which our philosophy suffers." Cited by Lindsay, *The Phil. of Berg.,* 11.

[61] *Op. cit., New Schol.,* I (1927), 142.

the question of the Cartesian *pons* a legitimate one, and are we to bridge over mind and reality by an appeal to the principle of causality (after this has been intramentally vindicated by the real existence of the *Ego*)? This position, which is called *Representationism* and *Illationism,* seems to involve the concession to phenomenism that sensations are the *medium quod* in perception, which is the starting point of modern idealism. Naturally, the qualitative heterogeneity of things would have to be arrived at by the very same principle. Or, can the spontaneous conviction of an immediate perception of external reality be justified? This position of direct realism, which is called *Perceptionism or Intuitionism,* admits of various degrees, ranging from Naïve Realism to Critical or Scientific Realism. Most Scholastics, it appears, favor direct realism,[62] although they do not go to the full extent of naïve realism. Geny has frankly stated his opinion on this point:

> I believe that the Scholastics have not yet answered this difficulty (of the critical problem) with sufficient force. Not that there exists or should exist for them any real doubt as to the certainty of their position; but its legitimacy should be established more effectively. Above all, it should be made clear that the setting of the critical problem in modern philosophy is artificial, even unnatural, because, since the time of Descartes, it has issued from a false interpretation of the immanence of thought.[63]

The epistemologist will not presume to solve this problem of perception and of knowledge in general, without taking exact account of the proven results in experimental psychology. Such problems as the distinction between sensation and images, sense-illusion and hallucination, the possibility of experimental proof for the existence of abstract concepts and imageless thought, the influence of apperceptive and emotional elements in judgment, especially in cases where *certitudo libera* is involved, these and many other empiric questions must needs prove of vital interest and importance to the epistemologist.

There's a sweet legend which would have it that the *Padres* in founding the chain of California *missions,* strewed wild mustard seed in their journeying and were enabled by this path of gold

[62] Cf. J. H. Ryan, "Does Natural Realism Break Down?" *New Scholasticism,* I (1927), 244 ff.; P. Coffey, *Epistemology* (1917), II, 24 ff.
[63] In Zybura, *Present-day Thinkers,* 169.

Back on El Camino Real

to retrace their way from *mission* to *mission.* This was the beginning of the King's Highway, *El Camino Real,* of which the Bear State is so justly proud. Had modern philosophy strewn mustard seed and kept to *El Camino Real,* to the Highway of the Real, it would have saved itself a disastrous detour of three centuries of idealistic wandering. A healthy reaction, however, has set in against idealism; the Neo-Realism which has been gaining ground in America and England, although marred by monistic and materialistic tendencies, will, no doubt, lead to fresh and minute examination of sense-perception and to a more natural setting of the epistemological problems.

This determined reaction against idealism presents a golden opportunity to Neo-Scholasticism. It marks a distinct epoch in the history of philosophic speculation. The pendulum has swung from extreme subjectivism to extreme objectivism.

Vetera Novis Augere

The history of philosophy in the past would seem to indicate that the time is ripe for a new, critical synthesis. It ought to be the function of the *philosophia perennis* to show its vitality by adjusting the old with the new, by mastering the original endowment and enriching it with the new. It will thus force modern philosophy to abjure its heresy of the non-continuity of thought. "For progress to deny tradition, is to deny the parent that gave it birth." [64]

DISCUSSION

FR. HUBERT VECCHIERELLO, O.F.M.:—In all our discussions concerning the place which either logic or epistemology should occupy in our philosophy curriculum, we should not forget that there are certain practical considerations

Logic and Epistemology Introductory to Philosophy

which must be kept in mind before we attempt to change our present arrangement of subjects. Logic and epistemology, think what we will, are prerequisites for all other courses in things philosophical, they are the open sesame, the entrance to the imposing and many-aisled temple of philosophy. If a student fails first to master the essentials of logic and epistemology, I fail to see how he can profitably and safely investigate anything in philosophy, make comparisons, draw conclusions, or evaluate much that one encounters in the study of the numerous and bewildering systems, opinions, etc., elaborated in the course of ages to answer the riddle of the universe. David came out victorious in his struggle with the giant Goliath, but we cannot afford to tempt the fates or hazard an unequal combat by putting a mere sling into the hands of our students and asking them to go thus miser-

[64] Zybura, *op. cit.*, 500.

ably armed into a fray that often vanquishes the greatest minds even after years of patient preparation. The false systems in the realm of epistemology described in Fr. John's excellent article result from faulty logic and convince me the more that a solid training in logic should be preliminary to the other philosophical disciplines.

In the few years that I have been teaching young men, I have found that they are imbued with a certain amount of skepticism and doubt concerning most questions. Unless the teachers in our Catholic schools fully realize this condition of affairs and take measures against it, our young men and women will become easy prey for the multitudinous pitfalls that are laid to ensnare them. This is not a mere academic opinion but rather the result of close contact with the thought-processes of many of our young students hailing from various sections of the country.

If our logic and epistemology courses were enlivened, if much of the useless accretions of bygone ages were trimmed off and modern teaching methods employed, these difficulties could be met, discussed, and many of the problems solved. The fact that these subjects may be difficult counts for little, because most subjects, and especially the philosophical, are difficult in the beginning. Taking all things into consideration, there is no real reason why both logic and epistemology should not be given during the first year of philosophy. They belong there logically since they prepare the student's mind for what is to follow, and any reorganization of our philosophy course would labor under serious handicaps if the present sequence of subjects were inverted so as to place logic and epistemology last instead of first.

THE TEACHING OF ONTOLOGY

Fr. Cuthbert Dittmeier, O.M.C., D.D., Ph.D.

Metaphysical questions have stirred the mind of men even from the most ancient times, but more especially those questions which refer to or touch upon the highest truths. From the very beginning metaphysical doctrines are found intimately bound up with the traditions and religious books of the oriental nations, as the Chinese, Hindus, Persians, Chaldeans and Egyptians. Likewise among the Greeks, who in ancient times almost exclusively cultivated the science of philosophy, do we find their religious traditions preparing the way for their beginnings of philosophy.

Ancient Interest in Metaphysics

In the early days of the Church when Christian truth was assailed with weapons seized from pagan philosophy, the Apologetes culled arguments from human wisdom to refute the errors of the opponents. More diligently, however, did the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers of subsequent centuries investigate the doctrines of the ancients and compare these doctrines with the revealed truths. Whatever truth was found among the ancients, they embodied, amended, and animated with the Christian spirit. Among these champions shines the preëminent genius, Augustine (354-430), who with profound depth of thought discoursed upon almost every question of metaphysics.

Early Influence of Christianity

Heirs to the wisdom of the Fathers are the Scholastics of the Middle Ages, who resting upon the foundation prepared by the Fathers, and guided by the infallible authority of the Church, expunged the errors and perfected the philosophy of Aristotle, and through dialectics joined the truths of faith harmoniously with the truths of natural reason, and thus founded an admirable system of philosophy and theology.

Christianizing Plato and Aristotle

We accept substantially as true the metaphysics or the philosophy begun by Plato and Aristotle, advanced to a higher state of perfection by the Church Fathers and Scholastics, and frequently

commended by the authority of the Church. Nevertheless, we profess also that in this science progress is necessary, especially as it touches upon empirical and historical data, to which the ancient philosophers devoted scant investigation.

Various elements contributed to the changes which western life underwent during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Thus it happened, that whoever applied himself to the study of philosophy outside the pale of the Catholic Church's influence fell away from the Attic-patristico-scholastic system, in which alone philosophical truth was fostered and preserved. And thus these students either entirely despised metaphysical questions, or contemptuous contemners of authority and tradition, eventually introduced new systems of metaphysics.

Unsound Departures of Later Centuries

In England with Francis Bacon (d. 1626) and John Locke (1632-1704) empirism began to dominate and with this a neglect of metaphysics, yea, skepticism (David Hume, 1711-1776) was born. In France and elsewhere the ambiguous system of René Descartes (1596-1650) spread the seed of recent subjectivism and fostered a contempt of the ancient philosophy.

Finally, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) became the standard-bearer of a more recent philosophy and joined into one system subjectivism and empirism by which he attempted to demonstrate that knowledge of the supersensible, and therefore of every metaphysical truth, is impossible.

Thus it happens that in our own age a certain peculiar form of reasoning pervades and rules the minds of many men and scholars, that only those things can be known with certainty which are included within the confine of experience; all others, which transcend this limit, i. e., supersensible things, cannot be apprehended by reason or the so-called "true science"; that they are objects of faith only, or of a certain internal sense, which arises from impulse and need of the soul (*Gefühl, Erleben,* sentiment). This opinion has been rightly termed Agnosticism.

False Systems of To-day

In England they called it Empirism; in France, Positivism; in Germany, *Transcendentalphilosophie.* The principal defenders of the first were Francis Bacon, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spenser; August Comte, Littre, and Hippolyte Adolphe

Taine are the proponents of the second; Immanuel Kant in his book *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* is the authority for Germany.

Modernism, which is the credulous lackey of modern philosophy, had its origin in this method of reasoning. Thus it happens that nowadays all metaphysical sciences are brushed aside or despised by many, although in more recent times metaphysics is beginning to receive consideration.

With this brief résumé of the development of systems of metaphysics before our mind we can easily comprehend the important position which metaphysics holds in our Catholic philosophical course. Since ontology has for its object the highest principles which are common to the other parts of philosophy, yea, to all sciences, it follows that too much stress cannot be placed upon its study. The most efficient and accurate method of teaching ontology ought to be employed because of its subtleties, relations, subject-matter, importance in theological studies, which treat of Him Who is the *Alpha et Omega, Principium et Finis, cujusque nomen est: Sum qui Sum.*

Importance of Ontology

Pedagogy has a general principle that learning should proceed from the concrete to the abstract, from effect to cause, from the individual to the universal, from particular explanations of facts to the grouping of these into general principles.

Metaphysics considered etymologically signifies that science which follows upon the study of physics. It is the scientific exposition of the facts of the universe. One of the great difficulties with the teaching of metaphysics seems to consist in this, that the corrected pedagogical orientation has been reversed. Metaphysics should be the last conclusion and summary of all positive physical and philosophical science; it should be the collection of general conclusions drawn from the data of positive science accumulated during high school and college and the philosophical course of the seminary. Unfortunately, metaphysics is usually treated in one of the following three ways:

Illogical Position of Metaphysics in Present-day Curriculum

1. As a system of laws and principles which can be deduced from an *a priori* consideration of the sheer notion of being. If thus viewed as a subject detached from everything which has gone

before, it conveys no meaning to those who study it and serves not at all to integrate the various fields of knowledge which the student has already traversed.

2. Ontology is sometimes studied without a proper foundation or groundwork in the natural physical sciences. It is the height of folly for a teacher to evaluate, criticize or catalogue the conclusions of sciences of whose fundamental elements the students possess no knowledge. Unless a student has a thorough training in the so-called positive sciences, such as physics, chemistry, biology, he is in no position to understand the scientific philosophical discussions which involve the simple elements of these sciences.

This criticism was already noted by the Friar educator, Roger Bacon (1214-1294) in his *Opus Tertium*. He accounts for an indifference which universally prevailed regarding all such studies, founded upon their supposed inutility and unpractical character. He says:

Testimony of Roger Bacon

> Because men do not know the uses of philosophy they despise many magnificent and beautiful sciences; and they say in derision, and not for information: What is the use and worth of this science or of that? They are unwilling to listen; they shut out, therefore, these sciences from themselves, and despise them. When philosophers are told in these days that they ought to study optics, or geometry, or the languages, they ask with a smile: What is the use of these things? insinuating their uselessness. They refuse to hear a word said in defence of their utility; they neglect and condemn the sciences of which they are ignorant. And if ever it happens that some of them profess a willingness to learn, they abandon the task in a few days, because they do not see the use of these things. For they teach not their own use; but this is without them won by observation; as the utility of a house is not seen in the house, nor in its construction, but when the storms descend, and the robbers come, and other evils ensue.

The theory of act and potency cannot be discussed in all its bearings unless the student really understands what physicists mean by atoms, ions, protons and electrons. We cannot, therefore, really deceive ourselves into believing that we are imparting more than words unintelligible, and therefore worthless, when we lecture to students who lack the proper fundamental training in the physical sciences, and criticize before them the general elements, phases, trends and discoveries of these physical sciences.

The teaching of metaphysics implies, first of all, that provision has been made for the students to come to the lecture-hall prepared to understand those things which of necessity are discussed in metaphysics. In a word, metaphysics should be considered as a philosophizing about science. Unless the knowledge of this science is present, philosophizing about science is mere babble so far as the students are concerned. I repeat that it is a sound principle of pedagogy that we proceed from the concrete to the abstract. Without knowledge of the positive sciences, speculation on the abstract is simply time wasted.

3. We again violate principles of sound pedagogy when metaphysics, which is to summarize and to unify all that has gone before, is approached not as a subject, but as a propædeutic to the grand theses of theology. Here again we must recall that metaphysics is the most general and abstract of all the sciences. As St. Thomas reminds us, that which is first in nature is last in the order of knowledge. True, the basic principles of metaphysics find a very general expression in the fundamental theses of theology; but also is it true that, considering the relations of these two sciences, theology sheds far more light on metaphysics than metaphysics throws on theology.

When we question those who have gone through both the philosophy and the theology courses, the answer of many is that they never understand such theses of metaphysics as those of Being, of the four Causes, of the Absolute, etc., until they have finished the tracts on *De Deo Uno, De Deo Creatore,* and so forth.

A Reason for Meagre Results in Metaphysics

Of course, we may find some consolation by saying that at least some knowledge is acquired in the study of metaphysics, although a more complete understanding must wait until the theological applications have been presented. I venture to question even this unpretentious claim. It seems to me that the notions of fundamental causality, the complete understanding of the four causes, are not apparent *at all* until the great tracts on God have been studied. The student may indeed remember some smattering of words from a course of metaphysics pursued several years before, and may, finally, attach some real concrete meaning to those words; but, if this is all the purpose which metaphysics has served and all that it has achieved, is it

worth the time and labor involved? The seminary student need not have had such a vague, meaningless course. This course has not actually aided him to understand the great theological theses. Rather the contrary is true. His study of the tracts, *De Deo Uno, De Deo Creatore,* has enabled him to understand the principles of metaphysics which he had verbally committed to memory several years previously.

To sum up: no generalizing science should ever be taught until the particularizing has been studied. Metaphysics is the last word in philosophy. Philosophy is the system of conclusory principles whereby all that has gone before in the way of positive knowledge of the world and its various and different phenomena is summarized, integrated and unified into a consistent whole. In a word, philosophy makes of the multitudinous data of the sciences that *unum,* which is the *sine qua non,* of true knowledge. Aristotle warned us that whatever we do not know as one, we do not know at all. Metaphysics, then, serves this great purpose of giving the student a solid, measured and deliberate *Weltanschauung.*

Every priest must possess a knowledge of theology; but in an age devoted to science, and in a world in which the conclusions of science perilously at times approach the principles of faith, such a Christian summary of science, such a *Weltanschauung,* such an orientation in the domain of the physical knowledge of the world, are absolutely necessary and essential to the priest. For long, metaphysics was considered as the necessary prerequisite of theology. Withholding my agreement with this view, but not disputing it at length now, I submit that the primary function of metaphysics is to summarize and to integrate the knowledge of the world.

Metaphysics the Summary Science in the Mind of the Schoolmen

In the days of the mighty schoolmen, of him who was called the Magician because he delved into the mysteries of the material world, Albertus Magnus; in the days of him who is rightly called the Father of Science and its greatest prophet, John Duns Scotus, metaphysics was considered as the concludent, integrating and summarizing system of all the positive knowledge of this material world and universe. In vain shall we search the writings of the great Doctors for a single line that even suggests or hints that metaphysics was a propædeutic of theology.

It was only after he had exhaustively treated of the various fields of material knowledge that Aristotle wrote his magnificent metaphysics, literally *post physica.* Albert the Great, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas did not violate the eminently sound method of their master in this respect. They needed to wait for no Francis Bacon to teach them a sound Method of Learning. We may wonder whether Aquinas might not have written a *Meta Theologica* had not death called him, before his great *Summa Theologica* had been completed. At any rate, metaphysics should be considered as a vital and indispensable means of orientating our young seminarians towards the problems of the physical universe. The priest must be one whose gaze is fixed on heaven and who must have sufficient knowledge of the divine science to lead men thither; but he is dealing with human beings who are concerned with the things mostly of this world. The priest should possess all human knowledge of this world and at the same time have that calm detachment from the marvels of this world which can be his only who knows how to estimate and appraise these things at their proper value. Such an evaluation can be made only by him who has studied the things of this world with the philosophical view of Christian wisdom. Such we consider to be the primary purpose of metaphysics.

A Suggested Order and Content

Difficulty of Changing the Traditional Method

The order and content of school subjects are always difficult to change. No group of people in the world seem more impotent to break out of the groove and rut of traditionalism than school teachers. A certain sequence of subjects and a selection of content are found in textbooks and these are without further question accepted because the syllabus orders them. It is only within the last quarter of a century that educators have begun to question the wisdom of this acquiescent attitude toward the standard "traditional" system. Each such attempt involves a struggle with the dead weight of a so-called tradition. When we actually begin to investigate that tradition we very frequently, if not invariably, find that it is based upon no solid and carefully thought-out plan, and very often is

the product of a sheer, haphazard throwing together of various elements of knowledge.

Thus, in recent years we have seen the whole curriculum of the elementary schools radically changed, after it had been clearly demonstrated that much of the content material of arithmetic, spelling, grammar and geography was simply useless. Formal grammar is no longer taught in the middle grades, because it has been clearly proven that the pupils of those grades are capable of acquiring no more than a surface and verbal memorization of rules, and have not the capability of understanding the meaning of those rules.

Now when we turn to metaphysics we find that tradition dictates first that this branch of philosophy should be taught in the first year of the philosophical course; and secondly, that students of metaphysics need not acquire anything more than an ability to recite a few formulæ and to recite verbatim a few definitions which are to be their stock in trade. This is the fact which confronts us. Let us ask, then, why general metaphysics, which as the summarizing science should be placed at the very end of the course, is placed right boldly in the beginning.

Appealing to history, we find that the present relative disposition of the parts of philosophy, was made first by Christian Wolff. The teacher of Immanuel Kant (1679-1754), he was the first, as Schwegler remarks, who attempted to construct a systematic whole of doctrine, an encyclopædia of philosophy in the highest sense of the word. The tradition which I am now opposing did not originate from any source hallowed in the eyes of Catholic philosophers.

Present Position of Metaphysics Due to Christian Wolff

Secondly, when we examine the actual reasons as given by the authors of our own textbooks for the present order, we find that they think a general metaphysics should precede the study of cosmology and psychology because these two sciences make use of the general principles of ontology and hence cannot be understood properly unless these propædeutic principles have been well digested; thus Rickaby, Hickey, etc. Cardinal Mercier, however, called attention to the fact that such a procedure is contrary to sound psychology of learning. We repeat that what is first logically, is last psychologically. General principles can never be

understood if studied by an *a priori* method. They must recur again and again in varied applications until gradually they emerge in a clear and unmistakable fashion.

Now, cosmology is the science which philosophizes about the constitution of the world and psychology explains the constitution of the living, sentient, thinking, emotional and volitional creature, which is man. Again, cosmology can have no meaning for one who is not well grounded in physics and chemistry. Psychology can have no meaning for one who has not an adequate knowledge of biology. Cosmology and psychology are built on these sciences and summarize and present in more abstract form their various concrete data. General metaphysics, in turn, continues the process of abstraction and universalizes in the highest degree all that is known of cosmology and psychology and of the sciences on which they are based.

Since the universal proceeds from the individual, and not *vice versa,* abstract principles should not be presented first and concrete data later be made to fit into these; but these abstract principles should be what the term itself implies—things which are abstracted or drawn from other things. Accordingly, general metaphysics should be taught at the very end of the course in philosophy and not in the very beginning or outset, and this with equal right as critical logic and epistemology should be taught after psychology and not before.

Metaphysics Should Be Taught Last

Turning now to the content of ontology we find that it is usually made up of treatises on being as such, on the three transcendental notions, on potency and act, the ten categories, and the four causes.

The theory on potency and act, fundamental in Scholastic philosophy, can easily be grasped after the doctrine of matter and form has been discussed in cosmology when dealing with *inanimate* nature and has been even more clearly indicated in psychology in dealing with *animate* nature. In such a sequence there would not be presented to the students principles bewildering by their profundity and baffling because of their utter lack of concrete application. The doctrine of being will always be difficult to grasp, but the transcendental notions will then be understood. From psychology and logic the student has been already taught what *verum* and

Content of Ontology

bonum really mean. The concept of *unum* is simple enough. The category of *substantia* will at least be more understandable if the essence of concrete objects has been previously explained in cosmology. Quantity and quality should present no insuperable difficulties if presented in a summary setting of certain data of physics and chemistry. The concept of *relatio* should be taught with an eye to elementary algebra; *situs et locus* might well be presented with an appeal to geometry. The notions of *actio* and *passio* should be closely coupled with concrete illustrations from physics. Coming finally to the four causes, the formal and the material causes will have been illustrated repeatedly in cosmology and psychology. Efficient causality is always easily understood. Final causality simply sums up all that has gone before and gives the last touch to that process of unification of knowledge which general metaphysics endeavors to produce in the mind of the student.

One word more, if general metaphysics be taught in the manner which is herewith sketched, it is apparent that the teacher of metaphysics, would he be successful, should be one who has a thorough knowledge of the positive sciences. Too frequently, perhaps, teachers of metaphysics fail to impart their message because they have not this knowledge of science, because their interests are in the realm of dogmatic theology, and because they treat metaphysics from the standpoint of its relation to theology. Usually, being competent theologians themselves, intensely interested in matters theological, they cannot understand the students' lack of interest in a study so closely connected with theology as is metaphysics. But nothing is loved before it is known. The students do not know theology at this stage of their education and should not be expected to love it nor anything associated with it. If, however, metaphysics be treated not as an introduction to theology, cosmology and psychology, but as the science which universalizes and unifies the knowledge of this material universe; and if these positive sciences are previously studied and absorbed by the student, then perhaps our present feeling of helplessness in treating this subject in the seminary may be replaced by one of confidence and satisfaction.

Teacher of Metaphysics Should be Well-versed in Science

To sum up: It is indisputable that metaphysics as now taught

in our seminaries does not register desired results. Hitherto, we have attributed the cause of the failure to the student. This paper has presented a contrary view—that the teacher himself and his method are at fault.

We must be conservative, it is true, but our conservatism should be liberal and enlightened, lest we conserve error and repel truth. Extremes meet, and those who think that they are conservative, are sometimes most destructive. We live in an age of progress—an age, which, at least, calls itself enlightened. Principles which had been received as axioms, things the most sacred, and names the most revered, must submit to the analysis of modern thought and be tried by its laws. We cannot repress, if we would, this growing spirit of enlightenment. It is the spirit of the age, and will move onward, despite every obstacle. If, then, we cannot check this torrent of thought which is flooding the world, would it not be true wisdom to endeavor to elevate, to purify, and to direct it?

Danger of Ultra Conservatism

Where intellect, knowledge, and high mental culture lead, mankind will follow. The triumph of truth is certain, if her defenders are men of enlightenment. Let the movement begin in the Catholic seminaries, and let the seminarians be thoroughly educated in sciences and philosophy, and sent into the world equal in intelligence, if not superior to those who are educated outside the Church's teaching.

DISCUSSION

FR. DONALD SHEARER, O.M.Cap.:—Fr. Cuthbert is to be congratulated on his scholarly paper. We all agree that one of the signs of life and healthy growth is improvement, or, at least, the desire and effort to improve that which we already have. The view put forward by Fr. Cuthbert indicates a keen evaluation of a very deep philosophical subject, and a sincere effort to place that subject in its proper position in the philosophical curriculum. The teaching of ontology has frequently been barren of good fruit. It would be interesting to know how many students hew their way through the "learned lumber" of ontology and come to the conclusion that, after all, ontology is merely a *vox et praeterea nihil*. Nor is the blame always with the student. It often lies elsewhere and, perhaps more frequently than we should like to admit, the fault is with the system of teaching this abstruse subject coupled with the consequent attitude which the student develops toward it. Any change that will make for increased appreciation of ontology must be welcome to teacher and student alike.

A Timely Suggestion

Soundness of Catholic Attitude Toward Metaphysics

Outside the Church the attitude of many philosophers toward ontological thought has helped to degrade the study of metaphysics to the level of the ridiculous. But the Catholic lector with his solid foundation in Scholastic philosophy realizes how inescapable is this subject if the rules of cold logic are followed. Metaphysics must be taught as one of the most important disciplines of the philosophical course and the great question for the teacher is—Where will it fit in best? The writer of this paper has made bold to suggest a departure from the present accepted position of this subject in the philosophical course and his reasons deserve earnest consideration. True, his ideas may be labelled iconoclastic, but not merely so, for he builds up where he has torn down and his action is prompted only after years of experience in teaching his subject. May it not be that his suggestion will lead to that revitalization in the realm of metaphysics for which we are earnestly waiting?

INDEX

Action, Française, 17.
Aesthetics, 75, 108, 110.
Albert, the Great, 52, 190.
Alexander of Hales, 15.
Analecta Ord. Min. Cap., 106.
Anaxagoras, 75.
Apologetes, 185.
Apologetics, 61.
Archambault, Simon Joseph, O.F.M., 16, 164.
Aristotle, 75, 164, 185.
Astronomy, 75.
Augustine, St., 7 ff., 164, 170.
Augustinism, 17 ff.
Aureoli, Peter, 175.

Bacon, Francis, 186.
Bacon, Roger, 52, 83, 188.
Baier, David, O.F.M., 154 ff.
Barnabo, da Terni, 152.
Bartolomeo, de Colle, 153.
Behaviorists, 95.
Being, In Franciscan philosophy, 12 ff.
Benedict XV, Pope, 120.
Bernardino, de Bustis, 153.
Blondel, Maurice, 13.
Bonaventure, St., 3, 4, 10, 13, 14, 168.
Bruni–Zybura, 82, 84.

Capuchin Schools, Requirements in philosophy, 106.
Carlton, Dr. Frank T., 150.
Categories, 26 f.
Ceretti, Cardinal, XI.
Chemistry, 75.
Conflict, 103.
Cosmology, 108, 111, 154, 193.
Cuthbert, O.M.Cap., 13.

Dante, 11.
Democritus, 75.
Descartes, 172 ff.
De Wulf, 173, 175.
Dialectics, 34.
Dittmeier, Cuthbert, O.M.C., 185 ff.
Dorzweiler, Edwin, O.M.Cap., 14, 50 ff., 68.
Dreiling, Raymond, O.F.M., 68.
Duffy, Dr. Francis, 142.

Economy, Political, 146.
Elizabeth, St., tertiary, 153.
Emanuel, Cyprian, O.F.M., 36, 69, 117 ff.
Embryology, 75.
Empedocles, 75.
Ens Transcendental, 26.
Epistemology, 35 f., 96, 108, 165 ff., 168, 178, 183.
Ethics, Its place in philosophy curriculum, 108, 110, 154, 156, 160 f., 164.

Fichte, 57.
Fochtman, Vincent, O.F.M., 102.
Fortunato, Coppoli, 153.
Franciscan Augustinianism, 16, 164.
Froebes, S.J., 15, 56.
Frumveller, S.J., 84.

Geology, 75.
Gemelli, Agostino, O.F.M., 55, 56, 170, 177.
Geyser, 55, 56.
Geny, 178.
Gilson, 14, 167.
Gutberlet, 56.

Hogan, Rev. J. B., S.S., 20.
Hume, David, 173, 186.

Instinct, 32.
Intellectualism, 11, 17.
of Action Française, 17.

James, William, 51, 169, 171, 174.
Jeanniere, 177.

Kaelin, Pius, O.M.Cap., 61, 163.
Kant, Immanuel, 43, 57, 163, 165 f., 170, 171, 174, 179, 186 f.
Kerby, Dr. Wm., 122.
Krogh, Prof., 15.

Laws, 32.
Leibniz–Wolff, 169.
Lenhart, John M., O.M.Cap., 153.
Leo XIII, Pope, 54, 87, 118, 119, 122, 126, 129.
Lex Aeterna, 31.
Libraries, 70.
Locke, 97, 173, 175, 179, 186.
Logic, 34, 69, 108, 183.
Louis, IX, St., tertiary, 153.
Luchesius, Bl., tertiary, 153.

Malebranche, 173.
Matthew of Aquasparta, 180.
Mauritain, Prof., 51.
Maurras, 17.
Mensing, Cyprian, O.F.M., 105 ff.
Mercier, Cardinal, 54, 56, 175 ff., 192.
Metaphysics, 36, 175, 185 ff.
Meteorology, 75.
Michele, Carcano, 153.
Mindorff, Claude, O.F.M., 41 ff.
Mons Pietatis, 152 ff.
Moore, Thomas Verner, O.S.B., 56.
Mussel, Claude, O.M.C., 90.

Neo-Scholasticism, 55, 82 ff., 176.
Neumann, Therèse of Konnersreuth, 98.
Nicholas of Autrecourt, 172.
Nietzsche, 57.
Noël, L., 176, 177, 178.

O'Brien, Albert, O.F.M., 48.
O'Grady, John, 147.
Olgiati, 83, 84.
O'Mahony, James, O.M.Cap., 1 ff.
Ontology, 26, 37, 38, 108, 111, 185 ff.
Order, Third of St. Francis, 148, 153.

Peterson, Bishop, 162.
Philosophy,
  Arabian, 15.
  A science, 22.
  And ultimate causes, 24 ff.
  Curriculum, 105, 109.
  Definition of, 24, 40.
  Division of, 18, 23 ff.
  Franciscan, 1 ff., 4, 10 ff., 16 ff.
  Function of, 14.
  History of, 41 ff., 47, 110.
  Inadequacy of, 6, 16.
  Modern Materialistic, 79.
  Modern separation from theology, 5.
  Typical Franciscan attitudes to, 10.
  Unity of, 22 ff.
  Versus religion, 56.
Physics, 75.
Pius X, Pope, 120.
Pius XI, Pope, 120, 129.
Plater, Charles, S.J., 145.
Plato, 75, 102, 167, 187.
Protagoras, 170.
Provincial superiors, 197.
Psychology, empirical, 92 ff., 108.
Psychology, rational, 95, 108.

Reid, 173.
Reinstadler, 177.
Rerum Novarum, 119, 147.
Romeis, Capistran, O.F.M., 148.
Ryan, James,, 87.
Ryan, John A., 56, 80, 123, 146, 151, 152.

Schmalz, Gerard, O.F.M., 18 ff.
Scholasticism, 52 ff., 60, 70, 76, 91, 155.
Schools, Franciscan, 112.
Shunk, John Baptist, O.F.M., 47, 165 ff.
Science, 21, 73 ff., 77 ff., 80.
Scotus, John Duns, 4, 11, 13, 68, 164, 167, 180, 190.
Seminar, 67, 68.
Shearer, Donald, O.M.Cap., 195.
Sheen, Fulton, 56, 58.
Sociology, 117 ff.
  And Clergy, 122.
  And Regulars, 125.
  And Franciscan Order, 126, 152.
Socrates, 75.
Spencer, Herbert, 163.
Standardization, 107.
Statuta pro studiis regendis, 106, 130, 134, 135.
Stier, Mark, O.M.Cap., 36.
Study Clubs, 138.
Summer Courses, 141.
Swami Vivekananda, 169.

Teaching methods, 36, 48, 63, 64 ff., 114, 116, 134.
Thales, 75.
Theodicy, 108, 111, 154 ff., 164.

Theology, 5, 98, 163.
Thomas of Aquinas, St., 3 ff., 53, 60, 167, 191.
Thomism, 4 ff.

Valeriano Magno, Capuchin philosopher, 13.
Van der Veldt, James, O.F.M., 92 ff.
Varro, 10.
Vecchierello, Hubert, O.F.M., 63, 72 ff., 115 ff., 183.
Vogel, Claude L., O.M.Cap., 103 ff., 152 f.
Vogt, Berard, O.F.M., 64 ff.
Voluntarism, 11.

Wolff, Christian, 169, 179, 192.

Zoölogy, 75.
Zybura, J. S., 52, 82.

CATHOLIC THEOLOGICAL UNION
3 0311 00108 4115

WITHDRAWN

LC 495 .F7 F72 1930

Franciscan Educational Conference (12th : 1930)

Franciscan philosophy and education

DEMCO

3 0311 00108 4115

C0-ARL-961